“TRUSTED” Architecture Unlocked: Zero Trust, Digital Power & The Hidden Blueprint Every CISO Must Master + Video

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Introduction:

The invisible architecture of digital power determines who truly controls modern enterprises—not firewalls or antivirus suites. Pierre Dewez’s forthcoming book “TRUSTED: L’architecture invisible du pouvoir numérique” exposes how trust models, identity fabrics, and systemic design dictate cyber resilience. This article extracts the book’s core themes, delivers hands-on technical labs, and maps the concepts to actionable Zero Trust deployments, privilege escalation mitigations, and API hardening across Linux and Windows environments.

Learning Objectives:

  • Implement a Zero Trust identity verification chain using Linux jq, curl, and OAuth 2.0 introspection endpoints.
  • Harden Windows Active Directory against Golden Ticket attacks by configuring Privileged Access Workstations (PAW) and monitoring Event IDs.
  • Deploy a practical API gateway authorization layer with NGINX and JWT validation to enforce “never trust, always verify” patterns.

You Should Know:

  1. Trust No Packet: Building a Local Zero Trust Packet Filter with BPF and Windows Filtering Platform

The book’s premise—“trust is earned, never assumed”—translates directly to micro-perimeters. Below are commands to enforce per-connection verification using extended Berkeley Packet Filters (eBPF) on Linux and the Windows Filtering Platform (WFP) via PowerShell.

Step‑by‑step (Linux – eBPF with `bpftrace`):

Create a script that logs every outbound connection and drops packets to non‑approved identity‑verified endpoints.

 Install bpftrace (Ubuntu/Debian)
sudo apt-get update && sudo apt-get install -y bpftrace

Trace all connect() syscalls and log source/dest
sudo bpftrace -e 'kprobe:__sys_connect { printf("PID %d connecting to %x\n", pid, arg2); }'

To enforce blocking: use eBPF with XDP (requires clang, libbpf)
sudo apt-get install -y clang llvm libbpf-dev
 Sample XDP program that drops non-whitelisted IPs – compile and attach

Step‑by‑step (Windows – WFP via PowerShell + `New-NetFirewallRule`):

Implement a dynamic micro‑segmentation rule that permits outbound traffic only after a successful API call to your identity provider.

 Block all outbound traffic by default
New-NetFirewallRule -DisplayName "ZTA_Default_Deny_Out" -Direction Outbound -Action Block
 Allow ICMP and DNS only during bootstrap
Set-NetFirewallRule -DisplayName "ZTA_Default_Deny_Out" -Enabled True

After identity validation (example: querying /v1/user/trusted), add an allow rule for the specific destination IP
$trustedIP = (Invoke-RestMethod -Uri "https://idp.company.com/v1/session/trusted").allowed_outbound_ip
New-NetFirewallRule -DisplayName "ZTA_Temp_Allow_$trustedIP" -Direction Outbound -RemoteAddress $trustedIP -Action Allow

What this does: It enforces a zero‑trust outbound model where no traffic leaves the host until a central policy service confirms the user’s real‑time trust score.

  1. The Invisible Power of Service Accounts: Detecting & Abusing Overprivileged Tokens

One chapter in “TRUSTED” likely highlights how service accounts often become silent backdoors. Attackers love Kerberoastable accounts (Windows) and over‑scoped OAuth tokens (cloud). Below are verification commands and mitigations.

Step‑by‑step (Windows – Find Kerberoastable accounts):

Use `PowerView` or native `setspn` to list accounts with SPNs.

 List all accounts with SPNs (Kerberoastable)
setspn -T yourdomain.local -Q /

Get password last set and bad password count for those accounts
Get-ADUser -Filter {ServicePrincipalName -like ""} -Properties PasswordLastSet, BadPwdCount, Name, ServicePrincipalName

Step‑by‑step (Linux – Audit OAuth tokens for over‑granted scopes):
Using `curl` and `jq` with a token introspection endpoint.

 Introspect a bearer token (requires Introspection endpoint + client secret)
TOKEN="eyJhbGciOiJIUzI1NiIs..."
INTROSPECT_URL="https://auth.company.com/oauth2/introspect"
CLIENT_ID="auditor"
CLIENT_SECRET="secret123"

curl -X POST $INTROSPECT_URL \
-H "Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded" \
-d "token=$TOKEN&client_id=$CLIENT_ID&client_secret=$CLIENT_SECRET" | jq '.scope'

If .scope contains "write:all" or "admin", revoke immediately

Mitigation (Linux & Windows combined):

Implement a monthly service account review script. On Windows, output to a CSV and compare with a desired state.

 Windows: export all service accounts
Get-ADServiceAccount -Filter  | Select Name, Enabled, PrincipalsAllowedToDelegateToAccount | Export-Csv -Path service_accounts_audit.csv
  1. API Security: Fortifying the Power Connectors – JWT Hardening & Rate‑Limiting Gateway

The “digital power architecture” heavily relies on APIs. A misconfigured API gateway leaks the entire kingdom. Below is a production‑ready NGINX configuration for JWT validation and request shaping.

Step‑by‑step (Linux – NGINX as JWT‑aware reverse proxy):

Install NGINX with `nginx-module-http-jwt` or use Lua scripting.

 Install NGINX plus with JWT module (or use openresty)
sudo apt-get install -y nginx nginx-module-http-auth-jwt

Create `/etc/nginx/conf.d/api_gateway.conf`:

server {
listen 443 ssl;
location /api/ {
auth_jwt "API Protected";
auth_jwt_key_file /etc/nginx/keys/public.pem;
auth_jwt_validation_delay 30s;  Re-validate every 30 seconds (never trust stale JWTs)
auth_jwt_require sub,exp,iat;

Rate limiting
limit_req zone=api_zone burst=20 nodelay;
limit_req_status 429;

proxy_pass http://backend_upstream;
}
}

 Global rate limit zone
limit_req_zone $binary_remote_addr zone=api_zone:10m rate=10r/s;

Step‑by‑step (Windows – IIS with URL Rewrite and JWT validation):
Using the `URL Rewrite` module and a custom provider (e.g., Azure Front Door or a reverse proxy like YARP).

 Install YARP as a reverse proxy (requires .NET Core)
dotnet new web -n JWTProxy
cd JWTProxy
dotnet add package Yarp.ReverseProxy
 Configure appsettings.json to validate JWT from Authorization header
  1. Breaking the “Invisible” Chain: Linux Privilege Escalation via sudo & Polkit Misconfigurations

Understanding how digital power accumulates requires attacking privilege escalation paths. Below are hands‑on commands to test misconfigurations and then fix them.

Step‑by‑step (Enumeration):

 List sudo rights without password
sudo -l

If you see (ALL, !root) /usr/bin/systemctl – you can escape to root
sudo systemctl edit --full systemd-networkd  spawns editor as root

Polkit misconfiguration – test for CVE-2021-3560 (account creation)
dbus-send --system --dest=org.freedesktop.Accounts --type=method_call --print-reply /org/freedesktop/Accounts org.freedesktop.Accounts.CreateUser string:hacker string:"Pentester" int32:1

Step‑by‑step (Hardening – Disable passwordless sudo and polkit unauthenticated actions):

 Edit sudoers securely
sudo visudo -f /etc/sudoers.d/secure
 Add: Defaults always_authenticate
 Remove any lines with NOPASSWD

For Polkit: Ensure all actions require auth
sudo nano /usr/share/polkit-1/actions/org.freedesktop.accounts.policy
 Set <allow_any>auth_admin</allow_any> for CreateUser action
  1. Cloud Hardening: IAM Trust Boundaries – OIDC Federation & AWS `sts:AssumeRole` Restrictions

“Trusted” architecture extends to cloud identity federation. Attackers compromise an external IdP and then assume privileged roles. Use these commands to audit and lock down.

Step‑by‑step (AWS CLI – Audit trust policies):

 List roles that trust external OIDC providers
aws iam list-roles --query "Roles[?AssumeRolePolicyDocument.Statement[?Principal.Federated!=null]].[RoleName,AssumeRolePolicyDocument]" --output table

Check for over-permissive condition: missing 'aud' or 'sub' validation
aws iam get-role --role-name VulnerableRole --output json | jq '.Role.AssumeRolePolicyDocument'

Step‑by‑step (Terraform snippet to enforce strict OIDC conditions):

data "aws_iam_policy_document" "constraint" {
statement {
effect = "Allow"
actions = ["sts:AssumeRoleWithWebIdentity"]
principals {
type = "Federated"
identifiers = [aws_iam_oidc_provider.github.arn]
}
condition {
test = "StringEquals"
variable = "token.actions.githubusercontent.com:aud"
values = ["sts.amazonaws.com"]
}
condition {
test = "StringLike"
variable = "token.actions.githubusercontent.com:sub"
values = ["repo:myorg/myapp:ref:refs/heads/main"]
}
}
}
  1. Training Courses & Labs to Master “TRUSTED” Concepts

Based on the LinkedIn post’s emphasis on sharing knowledge and the author Pierre Dewez’s expertise, the following free and paid labs align directly with the book’s architecture.

Step‑by‑step (Self‑hosted lab environment):

Deploy a complete Zero Trust lab using Docker Compose.

 Clone the “TRUSTED” lab template (community contributed)
git clone https://github.com/undercode/trusted-lab
cd trusted-lab
docker-compose up -d
 Services: Keycloak (IdP), Traefik (JWT gateway), Vault (secrets), and a protected API

Free training resources extracted from the post’s context:

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