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Introduction:
In modern cloud environments, a single set of compromised Entra ID (formerly Azure AD) credentials can be the master key to an organization’s entire digital kingdom. Attackers are increasingly exploiting built-in roles and permissions, like the Password Administrator, to perform lateral movement and escalate privileges to a degree that compromises critical assets such as Azure Key Vaults and security groups. This article deconstructs a real-world attack path based on a lab from Altered Security’s Redlabs platform, detailing the technical steps an adversary takes from initial access to total control.
Learning Objectives:
- Understand the attack vectors associated with the Entra ID “Password Administrator” role.
- Learn the specific commands and Microsoft Graph API calls used to enumerate users, reset passwords, and extract secrets.
- Develop mitigation strategies to harden Entra ID against these common permission abuse techniques.
You Should Know:
1. Initial Reconnaissance with AzureAD and MSOnline Modules
`Get-AzureADUser -ObjectId [email protected]`
`Get-MsolUser -UserPrincipalName [email protected] | Select-Object DisplayName, LastPasswordChangeTimestamp`
Step‑by‑step guide: After gaining initial access to a user’s account, the first step is reconnaissance. Using the legacy `MSOnline` and newer `AzureAD` PowerShell modules, an attacker connects to Entra ID (Connect-AzureAD, Connect-MsolService) using the stolen credentials. The `Get-AzureADUser` cmdlet fetches basic user object details, while `Get-MsolUser` can provide valuable additional information like the last password change time, helping an attacker assess the account’s activity and value.
2. Enumerating User Roles and Assignable Groups
`Get-AzureADDirectoryRole`
`Get-AzureADDirectoryRoleMember -ObjectId `
`Get-AzureADUser -ObjectId targetuser | Select-Object -ExpandProperty MemberOf`
Step‑by‑step guide: To identify paths for escalation, an attacker must determine what roles and groups the compromised user belongs to. `Get-AzureADDirectoryRole` lists all available admin roles in the tenant. By piping a specific role’s ObjectId to Get-AzureADDirectoryRoleMember, the attacker lists all users assigned that role, potentially identifying high-value targets. Checking the current user’s group memberships helps understand existing permissions.
3. Abusing the Password Administrator Role
`Set-AzureADUserPassword -ObjectId -Password `
Step‑by‑step guide: If the compromised user is a Password Administrator, they can reset the passwords of non-admin users. Using Set-AzureADUserPassword, the attacker targets a specific user account (identified via reconnaissance), forcibly setting a new password. This grants them immediate access to that user’s account, enabling lateral movement. This is a critical step in jumping to a more privileged account.
4. Lateral Movement via PowerShell Session
`$cred = New-Object System.Management.Automation.PSCredential (‘[email protected]’, (ConvertTo-SecureString ‘Password123!’ -AsPlainText -Force))`
`Enter-PSSession -ConfigurationName Microsoft.Exchange -ConnectionUri https://outlook.office365.com/powershell-liveid/ -Credential $cred -Authentication Basic`
Step‑by‑step guide: With a new user’s credentials acquired, the attacker establishes a remote PowerShell session to another service, like Exchange Online. They first create a PSCredential object containing the stolen username and password. Then, `Enter-PSSession` is used to initiate an interactive remote session, specifying the connection URI for Exchange Online. This allows the attacker to operate as the new user within a critical service.
5. Microsoft Graph API for Advanced Enumeration
GET https://graph.microsoft.com/v1.0/users`Authorization: Bearer
<h2 style="color: yellow;"></h2>GET https://graph.microsoft.com/v1.0/me/memberOf`
Step‑by‑step guide: The Microsoft Graph API is a powerful tool for attackers. Using a stolen access token (often acquired via the initial compromise), an attacker can perform granular enumeration. A `GET` request to `/v1.0/users` lists all users in the directory. Querying `/v1.0/me/memberOf` with the token of a newly compromised user lists all groups that user is a member of, which is key to identifying further escalation paths to privileged roles like “Global Administrator” or “Groups Administrator.”
6. Exploiting Group Ownership for Privilege Escalation
`Add-AzureADGroupOwner -ObjectId -RefObjectId `
Step‑by‑step guide: If a compromised user has ownership of a privileged group (e.g., a group assigned the “Global Administrator” role), they can add themself or another compromised account as an owner. The `Add-AzureADGroupOwner` cmdlet is used for this, taking the ObjectId of the target group and the ObjectId of the user to be added as an owner. Ownership of such a group is functionally equivalent to having the role assigned directly.
7. Pillaging Azure Key Vault for Secrets
`Get-AzKeyVaultSecret -VaultName ‘Critical-KV’`
`Get-AzKeyVaultSecret -VaultName ‘Critical-KV’ -Name ‘AdminAPIKey’ -AsPlainText`
Step‑by‑step guide: After escalating privileges to a user with access, an attacker targets Azure Key Vaults. Using the `Az` PowerShell module, they first list all secrets in a vault with Get-AzKeyVaultSecret. Then, they retrieve the plaintext value of a specific, high-value secret (like an API key or password) by using the `-AsPlainText` parameter. These secrets can provide access to other critical systems and data, completing the breach.
What Undercode Say:
- The principle of least privilege is not a suggestion; it is the primary defense against these attack chains. Over-assignment of built-in roles like “Password Administrator” is a endemic misconfiguration.
- Identity is the new perimeter. Monitoring for anomalous sign-ins, PowerShell sessions, and Graph API calls is no longer optional for a mature security posture.
This attack path demonstrates a systematic failure in identity governance. The “Password Administrator” role, often considered mid-tier, is a potent weapon in the hands of an adversary because it directly enables lateral movement. The subsequent abuse of group ownership reveals a deep dependency on understanding group-based role assignments. Defenders must move beyond static role checks and implement continuous threat detection for identity-based actions, particularly password resets and group membership modifications. The lab by Altered Security perfectly encapsulates a realistic attack chain that is occurring in enterprise environments daily.
Prediction:
The automation of these Entra ID attack paths will become standard in penetration testing tools and adversary simulators, making them more accessible to less sophisticated threat actors. As more organizations shift critical workloads to Azure, we will see a rise in cloud-centric ransomware campaigns. These attacks will not just encrypt data but will exfiltrate secrets from Key Vaults and compromise identity systems, holding an organization’s entire cloud identity fabric hostage for extortion. Defensive focus will urgently need to shift from pure network security to intense identity and access management (IAM) auditing and real-time behavioral analysis of cloud user activity.
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IT/Security Reporter URL:
Reported By: Faran Siddiqui – Hackers Feeds
Extra Hub: Undercode MoN
Basic Verification: Pass ✅
