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Introduction:
A recent viral post by Jérémy Chieppa highlights a painful reality in the cybersecurity industry: the “Miracle Tool Syndrome.” Enterprises are spending tens of thousands on Security Information and Event Management (SIEM), Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR), and Privileged Access Management (PAM) solutions, only to remain critically vulnerable. The core issue is a fundamental misunderstanding that security can be purchased off-the-shelf. In reality, technology represents only a fraction of a mature security posture; without defined processes, asset visibility, and human expertise, these tools become dormant consoles generating ignored alerts. This article dissects the gap between tool acquisition and actual security, providing a roadmap to transform your expensive stack into a functional defense system.
Learning Objectives:
- Understand the “30% Rule” and why process and governance must precede technology.
- Learn how to audit current security tools to identify “dormant” licenses and underutilized features.
- Acquire practical command-line and configuration steps to validate SIEM coverage and EDR deployment.
- Identify key process gaps (asset management, access control) that render security tools ineffective.
- Develop a strategy to shift from a “tool-first” to a “risk-first” cybersecurity posture.
- The Dormant Console Audit: Identifying Your Dead Weight
The post mentions a common scenario: “des consoles que personne ne regarde” (consoles that no one watches). Before you can fix the problem, you must quantify it. Most organizations utilize less than 40% of their security tool’s capabilities. This section guides you through a technical audit to identify these gaps.
Step 1: Check SIEM Log Ingestion & Alert Fatigue
A SIEM is useless if it isn’t receiving data or if alerts are set to “informational” and ignored.
– Linux/Mac (Checking Agent Status):
Check if the SIEM agent (e.g., Splunk Universal Forwarder, Wazuh Agent) is running systemctl status splunk or ps aux | grep -i "ossec-agent" or service wazuh-agent status
– Windows (PowerShell):
Check for common SIEM agents Get-Service -Name "splunk" , "wazuh" , "ossec" | Select-Object Name, Status, StartType
– SIEM Query (Example using Splunk):
Search for the last 30 days of data from critical assets. If the volume is suspiciously low, ingestion is broken.
index= sourcetype=WinEventLog:Security host=critical-server-01 | timechart count by host
Step 2: Review EDR/AV Dormancy
An EDR that hasn’t run a scan or reported a telemetry event in weeks is a paperweight.
– Linux (Check last scan/check-in):
Check ClamAV last scan time grep "Infected files:" /var/log/clamav/clamav.log | tail -1 Check Falco last rule trigger tail -50 /var/log/falco.log
– Windows (PowerShell – Check Defender Status):
Check AMEngine (Antimalware) and Last Full Scan time Get-MpComputerStatus | Select-Object AMEngineVersion, AntivirusEnabled, LastFullScanTime, LastQuickScanTime
Step 3: Identify PAM “Ghost” Accounts
A PAM tool is irrelevant if you haven’t onboarded your service accounts or if local admin passwords never rotate.
– Windows (PowerShell – Find local admins that should be managed):
List all local administrators on a machine net localgroup administrators Check last password set for a user (if it's >90 days, rotation is failing) Get-ADUser -Identity svc_webapp -Properties PasswordLastSet | Select-Object Name, PasswordLastSet
- Zero Asset Inventory: You Can’t Protect What You Can’t See
The post highlights the absence of “cartographie des actifs critiques” (critical asset mapping). If you don’t have a hardware/software inventory, your SIEM and EDR are monitoring an unknown battlefield. You cannot configure alerts for a server you forgot existed.
Step 1: Network Discovery (Nmap)
Run an internal scan to find live hosts and open ports that may not be in your CMDB.
Scan your internal subnet for live hosts and service versions nmap -sV -O 192.168.1.0/24 -oN network_inventory.txt Look for unexpected hosts (e.g., a rogue IoT device, a forgotten dev server) grep "open" network_inventory.txt
Step 2: Cloud Asset Inventory (AWS CLI)
If you use the cloud, misconfigured or forgotten assets are a primary risk.
List all S3 buckets (check for public access later) aws s3api list-buckets --query "Buckets[].Name" List all EC2 instances across all regions aws ec2 describe-instances --region eu-west-1 --query "Reservations[].Instances[].[InstanceId,State.Name,Tags]" --output table
Step 3: Software Inventory (Windows WMI)
Compare installed software against your approved software baseline.
Get a list of all installed software on a remote machine Get-WmiObject -Class Win32_Product -ComputerName REMOTE-PC-01 | Select-Object Name, Version, Vendor
- “Zero Procedure” Access Management: Cleaning Up the Kingdom
The original post mentions “zéro procédure de gestion des accès.” Tools cannot protect data if every user is an admin or if former employees still have active accounts.
Step 1: Audit Active Directory for Stale Users
Dormant accounts are a primary entry vector for attackers.
Find users who haven't logged in for 90 days (PowerShell with ActiveDirectory module)
Search-ADAccount -AccountInactive -TimeSpan 90.00:00:00 -UsersOnly | Select-Object Name, SamAccountName, LastLogonDate
Find users where password never expires
Get-ADUser -Filter -Properties Name, PasswordNeverExpires | Where-Object {$_.PasswordNeverExpires -eq $true} | Select-Object Name
Step 2: Audit Local Admin Rights (Privileged Access Workstation concept)
Users should not be local admins on their own machines. This breaks EDR containment.
Use PowerShell to check a list of computers for local admin membership
$computers = Get-Content -Path "C:\servers.txt"
foreach ($computer in $computers) {
Invoke-Command -ComputerName $computer -ScriptBlock {
net localgroup administrators | Where-Object {$_ -and $_ -notmatch "command completed successfully"}
} -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue
}
- The SIEM Tuning Exercise: From Noise to Signal
If alerts are “jamais traitées” (never processed), it’s because the SIEM is generating too much noise. You must tune it to focus on the 30% of risks that matter.
Step 1: Identify the Top 10 Noisiest Rules
Log into your SIEM (Splunk, QRadar, Sentinel) and run a query to find which rules trigger most frequently.
– Conceptual SIEM Query:
index=alerts | top limit=10 rule_name, source_ip
If the top rule is “User logged in successfully,” it needs to be disabled or heavily filtered.
Step 2: Suppress Expected Behavior
Create suppression filters for known administrative activity.
- Example (Linux `rsyslog` or SIEM filter logic):
Instead of alerting on every `sudo` command, filter for `sudo su -` from approved admin jump boxes only.Example rsyslog rule to drop specific noise before it hits the SIEM if $programname == 'sudo' and $msg contains 'session opened for user' then ~
5. Exploitation vs. Mitigation: The “No Tool” Scenario
The comment by Daniel Douhet suggests that “mieux vaudrait n’acheter aucun outil mais disposer de processus solides” (better to buy no tools but have solid processes). Here is a quick example of a common exploit that tools alone cannot stop, but process can.
The Vulnerability: Unpatched SMBv1 (still present in many industrial environments).
The Tool: The company owns an EDR. The EDR flags the exploit attempt (EternalBlue) but the SOC team doesn’t investigate because they are overwhelmed.
The Process Solution (If you had no EDR):
- Asset Management: You have a list of all assets running SMBv1.
- Change Control: You have a process to apply the Microsoft patch (MS17-010) or disable the protocol via GPO.
- Verification:
Check if SMB1 is enabled on a remote system (Process > Tool) Get-WindowsOptionalFeature -Online -FeatureName "SMB1Protocol" Local check Network check for vulnerable services (Process) nmap -p 445 --script smb-protocols <target>
6. Building the 70%: The Governance Layer
This section focuses on the non-technical 70% that makes the technical 30% work. This involves documentation and routine.
The “Human” Configuration: The Runbook
A tool is useless if the analyst doesn’t know what to do when an alert fires.
– Step 1: For your top 5 alert types (e.g., “Powershell Empire Detection”), create a playbook.
– Step 2: The playbook must contain the exact commands to run:
Step A: Isolate the host (if using CrowdStrike/FireEye, use API, but manual first) Linux Isolation command (conceptual iptables) iptables -A INPUT -s 0.0.0.0/0 -j DROP iptables -A OUTPUT -d 0.0.0.0/0 -j DROP Windows Isolation (PowerShell) New-NetFirewallRule -DisplayName "EMERGENCY_BLOCK_ALL" -Direction Outbound -Action Block New-NetFirewallRule -DisplayName "EMERGENCY_BLOCK_ALL_IN" -Direction Inbound -Action Block
7. Tool Rationalization: The “30%” Configuration
Finally, go back to your tools and configure them to support the processes you’ve now defined.
Example: Hardening a Public-Facing Web App (WAF/API Security)
Your process says: “All APIs must reject requests without a proper JSON Web Token (JWT).”
Your tool (e.g., Nginx/Apache/Cloudflare WAF) enforces this.
- Nginx Configuration Example (enforcing process):
server { location /api/ { This is the TOOL (Nginx) enforcing the PROCESS (Auth) auth_request /_validate_token; proxy_pass http://backend_api; } location = /_validate_token { internal; proxy_pass http://auth_service/validate; proxy_pass_request_body off; proxy_set_header Content-Length ""; proxy_set_header X-Original-URI $request_uri; } }
What Undercode Say:
- The 30/70 Rule is Non-Negotiable: You cannot outsource strategic thinking to a vendor. A SIEM does not create an incident response plan, and an EDR does not enforce a principle of least privilege. The hardware is a force multiplier, not the army itself.
- Dormant Tools are a Greater Liability than No Tools: An unmonitored EDR console or an un-tuned SIEM creates a dangerous illusion of safety. It divests leadership from the need to invest in human capital and process maturity because they believe the “tool” has it covered.
The analysis from the original LinkedIn post reveals a systemic failure in the cybersecurity market: vendors selling aspirin for a broken leg. The proliferation of “alert fatigue” and “console neglect” is a direct symptom of buying technology to solve a cultural and procedural problem. A company with a flawless asset register, a rigorous access control process, and a well-trained team can survive a data breach with open-source tools. A company with a million-dollar stack but no governance is merely a well-funded victim waiting to happen.
Prediction:
The next major shift in the cybersecurity industry will be a market correction away from “point products” and toward “integrated outcomes.” We will see a rise in “virtual CISO” (vCISO) services and managed detection and response (MDR) that bundle human expertise with technology. The standalone SIEM and EDR market will consolidate as enterprises realize they are buying complexity, not security. The future belongs not to the vendor with the most features, but to the provider that can most effectively bridge the gap between the tool and the tired human staring at its console at 3 AM.
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IT/Security Reporter URL:
Reported By: Jeremychieppa On – Hackers Feeds
Extra Hub: Undercode MoN
Basic Verification: Pass ✅
