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Introduction:
The endpoint security market isn’t dying; it’s undergoing a fundamental, often misunderstood, transformation. While vendors like CrowdStrike have been named a Leader in the 2025 Gartner Magic Quadrant for Endpoint Protection Platforms (EPP) for the sixth consecutive time, their strategic focus is rapidly shifting away from the endpoint agent itself and toward broader, AI-driven SOC platforms, as seen with initiatives like Charlotte AI. The unease in the market stems not from the obsolescence of endpoint protection, but from the quiet commoditization of detection and response technologies, even as core attack techniques like LOLBAS, BYOVD, and RMM abuse remain remarkably consistent.
Learning Objectives:
- Analyze the shift from standalone EDR to integrated platforms like XDR and AI-driven SOC tools.
- Identify persistent living-off-the-land (LOLBAS), BYOVD, and RMM abuse techniques that bypass traditional defenses.
- Apply specific Linux/Windows commands and configurations to detect and mitigate these evolving threats.
You Should Know:
- The Core Techniques Aren’t Changing: A Guide to Detecting LOLBAS, BYOVD, and RMM Abuse
The blog post correctly notes that techniques like LOLBAS, PowerShell abuse, BYOVD, and RMM misuse have been remarkably consistent for over a decade. Adversaries favor these methods because they abuse legitimate, often signed, tools to evade detection. Here is how to hunt for them.
Step 1: Hunting for LOLBAS (Living Off the Land Binaries and Scripts)
LOLBAS are Microsoft-signed binaries attackers use for malicious purposes. Common examples include rundll32.exe, regsvr32.exe, and mshta.exe.
- Windows (PowerShell): Hunt for suspicious LOLBAS execution by looking for parent-child process anomalies. The following command searches the Security Event log for processes like `rundll32` or `regsvr32` spawned by Microsoft Office apps, a common infection vector.
Get-WinEvent -FilterHashtable @{LogName='Security'; ID=4688} | Where-Object { $_.Properties[bash].Value -match "rundll32|regsvr32|mshta" } | Format-List TimeCreated, Message - Linux: While LOLBAS is Windows-centric, the concept applies to Linux. Monitor for built-in tools like
curl,wget,gcc, or `python` being used in unusual ways. Use `auditd` to track process execution.Add a rule to auditd to track all process executions sudo auditctl -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S execve -k process_execution Search the audit log for suspicious binaries sudo ausearch -k process_execution | grep -E "curl|wget|gcc|python"
The LOLBAS project website provides a comprehensive list of binaries and the specific commands attackers use.
Step 2: Detecting BYOVD (Bring Your Own Vulnerable Driver) Attacks
BYOVD attacks involve an attacker delivering a vulnerable but signed driver to a system and exploiting it to gain kernel-mode code execution, often to disable EDR sensors. This is considered a “gold standard” for EDR impairment.
- Windows (Command Prompt – Administrator): To detect BYOVD, you need to monitor for unauthorized driver loading. The `driverquery` command lists all installed drivers. You can use it to baseline your environment and check for anomalies.
driverquery /v /fo csv > driver_baseline.csv
- Proactive Mitigation: Implement stricter driver control policies. Use Windows Defender Application Control (WDAC) or AppLocker to create a whitelist of allowed drivers, blocking all others. This is the most effective mitigation against BYOVD.
- Detection via Sysmon: Install Sysmon and configure it to log driver load events (Event ID 6). A basic config to log all driver loads:
<EventFiltering> <DriverLoad onmatch="include" /> </EventFiltering>
Then, analyze the logs for newly loaded drivers from unusual paths or with suspicious hashes.
Step 2: Uncovering RMM (Remote Monitoring and Management) Abuse
Threat actors are increasingly using legitimate RMM tools like ScreenConnect or AnyDesk for persistent remote access, bypassing security tools that trust them.
- Windows (PowerShell): RMM tools often create services or scheduled tasks. Hunt for the installation of common RMM tools.
Get-Service | Where-Object { $<em>.DisplayName -match "ScreenConnect|TeamViewer|LogMeIn|AnyDesk|Splashtop" } Get-ScheduledTask | Where-Object { $</em>.TaskName -match "ScreenConnect|TeamViewer|LogMeIn" } - Mitigation Strategy: The primary defense is application allowlisting. Block all unapproved RMM tools from executing, especially from temporary or user-writable directories. Furthermore, monitor outbound network connections to known RMM domains and block them unless explicitly required.
- Detection as a Business Model: Why Prevention is a Worse Business
The original post makes a cynical but astute observation: “Detection is where the recurring revenue is… Prevention is a worse business, because if it works, there’s nothing left to monitor.” This dynamic explains why the EDR market has become so crowded and why vendors focus on selling alerts, dashboards, and analyst time. It also explains why a vendor like CrowdStrike is shifting its messaging away from “endpoint” and toward “agentic security platforms.” AI is not “eating” endpoint security; it is being used to automate the analysis of the massive amounts of data that detection-first tools generate. Charlotte AI AgentWorks, a no-code platform for building custom security agents, exemplifies this pivot toward a broader SOC and automation play.
Step-by-Step: Emulating an Attack with Atomic Red Team to Test Your Detections
To truly understand your detection gaps, you must emulate adversary behavior. Atomic Red Team is a library of small, portable tests mapped to the MITRE ATT&CK framework, which can be used to safely test your EDR’s detection capabilities.
1. Installation (Windows – PowerShell as Admin):
Download the Atomic Red Team repository git clone https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team.git cd atomic-red-team/atomics
2. Run a Test: To execute a specific technique, use the `Invoke-AtomicTest` PowerShell module.
Import the Atomic Red Team module Import-Module "C:\path\to\atomic-red-team\atomics\Invoke-AtomicRedTeam.psd1" Run a test for T1059.001 - PowerShell execution Invoke-AtomicTest T1059.001 -TestNumbers 1
3. Analyze Results: After running the test, check your SIEM, EDR console, or logs for the corresponding alert. If you don’t see an alert, you have a detection gap that needs to be addressed. This process allows you to baseline your security controls and iteratively improve them.
- The AI Frontier: CrowdStrike’s Charlotte AI and the Agentic SOC
CrowdStrike’s Charlotte AI AgentWorks is a clear indication of where the market is heading. It allows security teams to build, test, and deploy custom AI agents without writing code, directly within the Falcon platform. This moves the value proposition from simply blocking an attack to autonomously orchestrating a response across the entire SOC. This is the “ground shifting,” not the market dying. It represents a move up the stack from a commodity endpoint tool to a high-value, AI-driven decision-making and automation platform.
What Undercode Say:
- Key Takeaway 1: The narrative of endpoint security’s “death” is incorrect; the market is simply maturing and shifting focus. The persistence of fundamental attack techniques like LOLBAS, BYOVD, and RMM abuse means endpoint visibility and control remain critical.
- Key Takeaway 2: The evolution from EDR to XDR to AI-driven “agentic” SOC platforms is a strategic repositioning by vendors to capture higher-value recurring revenue from detection and response automation, not an admission that the endpoint is no longer a primary battlefield.
While the specific acronyms and platforms will continue to evolve, the core battleground of the endpoint will remain. The techniques that have worked for a decade will continue to work until the fundamental design of our operating systems changes. AI will not magically solve this; it will become a powerful tool for both attackers and defenders, automating and accelerating the same cat-and-mouse game.
Expected Output:
- Introduction: A balanced view that the endpoint security market is transforming, not dying, driven by the persistence of core attack techniques and a vendor shift towards AI-powered SOC platforms.
- What Undercode Say: The key takeaways highlight the misconception of endpoint death and the economic/business model shift behind the new marketing acronyms.
Prediction:
In the next 18 months, a major security vendor will announce it is dropping “EDR” from its product branding entirely, merging it into a broader “AI-Driven XDR” or “Security Operations Platform.” This will cause a panic among legacy EDR providers and lead to a series of rushed, subpar AI integrations. Meanwhile, the most sophisticated security teams will realize that their core detection logic for LOLBAS and other living-off-the-land techniques remains the true differentiator, leading to a resurgence in community-driven projects like Atomic Red Team and a backlash against opaque, “black box” AI security products. The endpoint will not die; the hype cycle will simply move elsewhere.
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IT/Security Reporter URL:
Reported By: Josehelps Was – Hackers Feeds
Extra Hub: Undercode MoN
Basic Verification: Pass ✅
