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Introduction:
In the modern cybersecurity landscape, identity is the new perimeter, and monitoring identity-based threats is paramount. Microsoft’s Defender for Identity, a critical component for detecting advanced attacks targeting on-premises Active Directory, has extended its vigilant gaze to a major cloud identity provider. The newly announced support for PingOne integration marks a strategic evolution, enabling organizations with hybrid or multi-cloud identity fabrics to centralize threat detection across their critical identity stores.
Learning Objectives:
- Understand the significance of integrating Cloud Identity Providers (IdPs) like PingOne with Defender for Identity.
- Learn the conceptual steps and required permissions for configuring the PingOne connector.
- Develop a strategy for correlating identity signals across on-prem AD and cloud IdPs to detect sophisticated attack chains.
You Should Know:
- The Identity Monitoring Imperative: Why Every IdP Connection Counts
Extended version: The original post highlights a crucial gap being filled. Attackers no longer just target on-premises directories; they phish credentials for cloud identity systems like Okta and PingOne to move laterally. By connecting Defender for Identity to PingOne, security teams gain a unified sensor. This integration ingests sign-in logs, risky user reports, and administrative actions from PingOne, applying Microsoft’s advanced behavioral analytics and known attack kinematics (like “Golden SAML” or token theft) to detect anomalies. Without this, your cloud identity layer is a blind spot.
Step‑by‑step guide:
Conceptual Pre-requisites & Setup:
- Access: Ensure you have global administrator or security administrator rights in both your Microsoft Entra ID (Azure AD) tenant and your PingOne admin console.
- Locate Connector: In the Microsoft 365 Defender portal (security.microsoft.com), navigate to Settings > Identities > Identity providers.
- Add Provider: Select “+ Add identity provider” and choose “PingOne” from the list.
- API Credentials: You will be redirected to configure an application or service account within PingOne. This requires creating an OAuth 2.0 client with specific scopes (permissions) like
user.read,signin.read,risk.read. The exact roles are pending official docs, but expect needs for “Identity Data Administrator” or custom scopes for log ingestion. - Authorize & Sync: Provide the Client ID and Secret from PingOne to Microsoft Defender. Authorize the connection and initiate the first data sync. Validate by checking for incoming PingOne events in the Defender for Identity timeline.
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Permission Hardening: The Principle of Least Privilege for Connectors
Extended version: As the post cautions, “no docs yet” on permissions. This is critical. An over-privileged connector account becomes a prime target. The setup must follow least privilege, granting only the minimum API scopes necessary for read-only monitoring. Excessive permissions could allow an attacker who compromises the connector to manipulate identities, not just read logs.
Step‑by‑step guide:
Creating a Least-Privilege PingOne Application:
- In PingOne Admin Console, navigate to Connections > Applications.
- Create a new “Service” type application (Machine-to-Machine OAuth).
3. Grant API permissions scrupulously. Start with:
`p1:read:user` (Read user profiles)
`p1:read:signon` (Read sign-on logs)
`p1:read:riskAssessment` (Read risk scores)
- Avoid scopes like
p1:update:user,p1:reset:password, or `p1:admin` unless absolutely mandated later by official guidance. -
Store the generated Client Secret in a secure location like Azure Key Vault, not in plaintext scripts.
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Log Correlation & Attack Detection: From Data to Actionable Intelligence
Extended version: Once integrated, raw logs become security insights. Defender for Identity correlates PingOne events with on-prem AD events. For example, a user’s PingOne sign-in from an unfamiliar location minutes before a suspicious Kerberos ticket request from an on-prem workstation could indicate a compromised cloud credential being used to access network resources.
Step‑by‑step guide:
Investigating a Correlated Alert:
- Review an alert in the Microsoft 365 Defender Incidents queue titled “Suspicious identity provider activity.”
- Examine the incident graph to see links between the PingOne event (source IP, user agent) and the related on-prem alert (e.g., “Suspicious VPN connection”).
- Use advanced hunting queries in the “Hunting” section to proactively search:
IdentityLogonEvents | where Protocol contains "Ping" | where IsRisky == true | project Timestamp, AccountUpn, DeviceName, IPAddress, Country, RiskScore
- Create automated remediation playbooks in Microsoft Sentinel or Defender to temporarily disable a hybrid user’s on-prem AD account upon a high-risk PingOne detection.
4. Windows/Linux Audit Policy Reinforcement for Hybrid Context
Extended version: To maximize value, ensure your on-premises systems feeding into Defender for Identity are fully instrumented. This creates a richer context when correlating with a cloud IdP event. A PingOne sign-in from New York should be contextualized with the subsequent Windows logon event from a workstation in London.
Step‑by‑step guide:
Relevant Windows Command (on Domain Controller):
Audit credential validation (critical for NTLM/Kerberos logon correlation) auditpol /set /subcategory:"Credential Validation" /success:enable /failure:enable Audit Kerberos Service Ticket Operations auditpol /set /subcategory:"Kerberos Service Ticket Operations" /success:enable /failure:enable
Relevant Linux Command (for servers integrated with AD via SSSD):
Ensure SSSD logs detailed authentication info sudo vi /etc/sssd/sssd.conf Set: debug_level = 2 in the [domain/YOUR.DOMAIN] section Monitor auth logs in real-time for correlation sudo tail -f /var/log/secure | grep -E "(sssd|krb5)"
5. API Security Configuration for the Connector Itself
Extended version: The connector relies on PingOne’s APIs. Secure this channel. Implement IP allowlisting (if PingOne supports it) to only accept API calls from Microsoft’s published IP ranges for Defender for Identity. Enforce regular secret rotation for the OAuth client and use conditional access policies (in PingOne) to add an extra layer of control for the service account itself.
Step‑by‑step guide:
Defensive API Configuration Checklist:
- IP Restriction: In PingOne, locate API client settings and restrict inbound calls to Microsoft’s Defender for Identity IPs (refer to Microsoft’s official JSON file of service tags/URLs).
- Secret Rotation: Schedule a quarterly rotation of the OAuth client secret. Update the credential in the Defender for Identity portal.
- Monitoring: In PingOne, enable audit logging for the service account’s own activity to detect misuse.
What Undercode Say:
- Key Takeaway 1: The integration turns a potential blind spot into a strategic sensor. It’s not just a new feature; it’s a necessary evolution of the product to reflect the distributed, hybrid reality of enterprise identity.
- Key Takeaway 2: The initial configuration phase is a critical security task. The permissions granted to the connector must be meticulously scoped and monitored. “No docs yet” means proceed with extreme caution, applying fundamental zero-trust principles to the integration itself.
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Analysis: This move by Microsoft is a direct response to the escalating attack chain “Credential -> Initial Access -> Lateral Movement,” where the credential increasingly resides in a cloud IdP. It acknowledges that security silos are fatal. The technical implementation hinges on robust OAuth hygiene and cross-platform log correlation. Organizations that implement this must go beyond the checkbox setup; they need to train their SOC on the new telemetry and rehearse response playbooks for attacks that span these two identity planes. The true value will be unlocked by automated correlation rules that shrink the detection time for attacks like pass-the-hash originating from a phished PingOne credential.
Prediction:
This integration is a harbinger of a fully unified identity threat detection and response (ITDR) platform. Within 18-24 months, we predict Defender for Identity will evolve into a central brain consuming signals from all major IdPs (Okta, ForgeRock, Entra ID, Ping), on-prem AD, and endpoint identity providers (like local accounts). It will use generative AI to narrate attack stories that seamlessly weave events from each source, providing a single pane of glass for identity-based attacks. This will make “identity fabric visibility” a baseline expectation, raising the bar for attackers and forcing them to develop even more stealthy, low-and-slow techniques that avoid behavioral anomalies across all monitored systems.
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IT/Security Reporter URL:
Reported By: Nathanmcnulty It – Hackers Feeds
Extra Hub: Undercode MoN
Basic Verification: Pass ✅
