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Introduction
AWS’s Identity & Access Management (IAM) eventual consistency is not a bug—it’s a documented architectural trade-off where permission changes take several seconds to propagate across the global control plane. But when an attacker-controlled identity learns to exploit this propagation window, standard incident response (IR) containment playbooks become dangerously ineffective, as demonstrated by the open‑source tool notyet.
Learning Objectives
- Understand how AWS IAM eventual consistency creates a persistence window that automated offensive tools can abuse.
- Learn to identify which IR containment techniques actually work against tools like `notyet` and which fail.
- Gain practical command‑line skills to detect, test, and harden cloud identity containment using AWS CLI and Python.
You Should Know
1. Understanding Eventual Consistency and `notyet`’s Exploitation Mechanism
Eventual consistency in AWS IAM means that when you revoke a permission, delete an access key, or attach a deny policy, the change can take 2–10 seconds (or longer) to reach all AWS edge nodes. Inside this window, an attacker who still holds valid credentials can detect the incoming revocation and proactively reverse it by re‑attaching privileges or refreshing session tokens. The open‑source tool `notyet` automates exactly this behavior: given an initial access key or role session, it self‑escalates to administrator access and continuously monitors for containment actions, reverting them faster than the defender’s changes can stabilize.
Step‑by‑step guide: Simulate the eventual consistency race
- Set up a test AWS account (use a sandbox environment).
- Install `notyet` from GitHub (requires Go and AWS CLI configured):
`git clone https://github.com/OffensAI/notyet && cd notyet && go build` - Create a test IAM user with administrative privileges via the AWS Console or CLI:
`aws iam create-user –user-name notyet-test`
`aws iam attach-user-policy –user-name notyet-test –policy-arn arn:aws:iam::aws:policy/AdministratorAccess`
`aws iam create-access-key –user-name notyet-test` (save the output)
- Run `notyet` with the generated access key and secret:
`./notyet -access-key AKIA… -secret-key …`
The tool will start a persistence loop, periodically refreshing its privileges.
5. From another terminal, attempt to contain the identity using the AWS CLI:
`aws iam detach-user-policy –user-name notyet-test –policy-arn arn:aws:iam::aws:policy/AdministratorAccess`
`aws iam delete-access-key –user-name notyet-test –access-key-id AKIA…`
Observe how `notyet` quickly re‑attaches the policy and creates a new access key, staying alive.
- Why Most IR Playbooks Fail Against Eventual Consistency Attacks
Standard AWS incident response guides recommend revoking credentials, detaching policies, and even deleting the IAM user. However, `notyet` counters each of these steps by exploiting the eventual consistency gap. For example, revoking a session token using `aws iam revoke-session` is asynchronous; the attacker can use the still‑valid token to issue a new session before the revocation propagates. Similarly, deleting an IAM user triggers a deletion request, but the attacker can re‑create the user or escalate another identity within the window.
Step‑by‑step guide: Test common containment actions
- Revoke temporary session credentials (if the compromised identity uses a role):
`aws iam revoke-security-token-credentials –user-name compromised-user`
Check the tool’s logs to see if it refreshes its session.
2. Apply a service control policy (SCP) deny from the AWS Organizations management account:
`aws organizations attach-policy –policy-id p-example123 –target-id ou-xxxx`
SCPs apply globally but can also suffer from propagation delays.
3. Delete the IAM user outright:
`aws iam delete-user –user-name notyet-test`
Watch `notyet` attempt to re‑create the user or escalate a different identity.
In most cases, only one technique reliably stops notyet: deleting the AWS account. This is obviously not a practical IR playbook for production environments.
- The One Containment Technique That Works: The “Atomic Delete” Approach
After extensive testing, Nigel Sood from Sonrai Security discovered that the only reliable containment against `notyet` is a technique that bypasses the IAM control plane entirely: deleting the underlying compute resource (EC2 instance, Lambda function, or ECS container) that hosts the attacker’s session. Since `notyet` requires an active runtime environment to monitor and revert changes, terminating the compute instance cuts off its ability to act—regardless of any IAM permissions it holds.
Step‑by‑step guide: Implement atomic containment for EC2
- Identify the compromised compute resource (e.g., an EC2 instance ID) using CloudTrail logs or GuardDuty findings.
2. Terminate the instance via AWS CLI:
`aws ec2 terminate-instances –instance-ids i-1234567890abcdef0`
This action cannot be undone by `notyet` because the instance’s network agent is gone.
3. For Lambda functions, delete the function:
`aws lambda delete-function –function-name compromised-function`
4. For ECS tasks, stop the task:
`aws ecs stop-task –cluster default –task arn:aws:ecs:region:account:task/task-id`
Windows/Linux command equivalent for on‑prem or hybrid environments:
If a compromised identity is running on a local machine, use `taskkill /F /PID
4. Hardening Your Environment Against Eventual Consistency Exploits
Because the IAM propagation delay is a fundamental property of AWS, the best defense is to prevent initial compromise and to limit the blast radius of any compromised identity. Adopt a least‑privilege architecture where no single identity has administrative permissions. Use permission boundaries, condition keys (like `aws:SourceIp` or aws:RequestedRegion), and short‑lived session tokens (e.g., using AWS STS with `DurationSeconds` set to 15 minutes) to reduce the attack window.
Step‑by‑step guide: Enforce least privilege and monitor for racing behavior
- Deploy a permissions firewall like Sonrai Security’s cloud permissions firewall, which applies a “default deny” policy to every new identity and eliminates unused permissions automatically.
- Use AWS IAM Access Analyzer to identify unused roles and keys, then remove them:
`aws accessanalyzer list-findings –analyzer-arn arn:aws:accessanalyzer:region:account:analyzer/my-analyzer`
- Enable CloudTrail Insights to detect anomalous IAM changes:
`aws cloudtrail put-insight-selectors –trail-name my-trail –insight-selectors InsightType=ApiCallRateInsight`
- Write a custom Lambda function that watches for rapid‑fire IAM changes (e.g., multiple `AttachUserPolicy` calls within 5 seconds) and automatically terminates the associated compute resource. This is the only automated containment that can beat `notyet` at its own game.
5. AI‑Powered Offensive Tools: The Bigger Picture
`notyet` is just one example of a growing class of AI‑driven offensive tools. OFFENSAI, for instance, builds an Autonomous Cloud Attack Execution engine that continuously probes cloud environments using two AI models: one for attack path discovery and one for evasion. Similarly, the Asgard Framework provides AI‑assisted red teaming across web, cloud, and OSINT domains. Real‑world intrusions have already used AI orchestrators to handle 80–90% of reconnaissance, exploitation, and lateral movement—executing thousands of requests per second while humans only approve key checkpoints. As these tools become more accessible, defenders must shift from periodic testing to continuous, AI‑enhanced monitoring and response.
Step‑by‑step guide: Test your own environment with AI red teaming tools
1. Set up Asgard Framework (Linux/Docker):
`git clone https://github.com/binarymass/TheDivinityProject-Asgard`
`cd TheDivinityProject-Asgard && docker-compose up –build</h2>
2. Run a basic vulnerability scan against a test target:
`ASGARD_TARGET=https://your-test-app.com python3 freya/freya_alpha.py`
3. Use the AI agent shell to ask natural language questions:
<h2 style="color: yellow;">python3 yggdrasil/yggdrasil_agent.py`
2. Run a basic vulnerability scan against a test target:
`ASGARD_TARGET=https://your-test-app.com python3 freya/freya_alpha.py`
3. Use the AI agent shell to ask natural language questions:
<h2 style="color: yellow;">
Then type: `Scan the target for SQL injection vulnerabilities.`
4. Analyze the generated report (PDF or JSON) to see which weaknesses an automated attacker would find.
What Undercode Say
- IAM eventual consistency is a double‑edged sword. It enables AWS’s global scale but creates a persistence window that advanced attackers can weaponize. Defenders must assume that any manual revocation will be contested.
- The only reliable containment is atomic termination of compute resources. Traditional IAM‑focused playbooks are insufficient. Update your IR runbooks to include immediate termination of EC2 instances, Lambda functions, or ECS tasks hosting compromised identities.
- AI‑powered red teaming is already in the wild. Tools like
notyet, OFFENSAI, and Asgard are not theoretical—they are being used to test (and attack) real cloud environments. Defenders must adopt continuous, automated, and AI‑enhanced detection to keep pace.
Prediction
As AI‑driven offensive tools become more sophisticated, the gap between attacker speed and defender reaction time will widen dramatically. Manual incident response will become obsolete for high‑velocity cloud attacks. The future of IR lies in autonomous containment systems that can delete, isolate, or re‑mediate compromised resources faster than any human or AI adversary can react. Expect to see “AI vs. AI” security battles where offensive and defensive agents race for control of the identity plane, with milliseconds deciding the outcome. Organizations that fail to automate their containment logic will remain permanently vulnerable to tools like notyet.
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Reported By: Eduard K – Hackers Feeds
Extra Hub: Undercode MoN
Basic Verification: Pass ✅
