The Free Tools You NEED to Harden Your Microsoft Cloud Now

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Introduction:

Microsoft’s security ecosystem is vast, but mastering its core tools is critical for defending modern enterprise environments. Community-driven initiatives and free resources provide the foundational knowledge required to implement robust security postures, moving beyond default configurations to actively hardened tenants that resist contemporary threats.

Learning Objectives:

  • Understand the critical components of the Microsoft Security stack for tenant hardening.
  • Learn to implement and leverage community-driven baselines like OpenIntuneBaselines.
  • Gain practical skills through verified commands and scripts for Intune, Defender, and Entra ID.

You Should Know:

1. Automating Compliance with Intune Security Baselines

Community-generated baselines, such as those found in the OpenIntuneBaselines project, provide a critical starting point for enforcing security settings. These are collections of pre-configured policies designed to secure Windows 10/11, Microsoft Edge, and other Microsoft 365 applications according to best practices.

Step‑by‑step guide explaining what this does and how to use it.
To leverage these baselines, you don’t just assign them in the Intune portal; you should integrate them into a DevOps-style pipeline for version control and automated deployment.
1. Clone the OpenIntuneBaselines GitHub repository to your local machine or Azure DevOps pipeline.
`git clone https://github.com/microsoft/OpenIntuneBaselines.git`
2. Navigate to the specific baseline you wish to deploy, for example, the Windows 10 Security baseline.

`cd OpenIntuneBaselines/Windows10</h2>
3. Use the Microsoft Graph API to create the compliance policy in your tenant. First, obtain an access token.
`$token = (Get-MgAccessToken -ResourceUrl "https://graph.microsoft.com")`
4. Use the `New-MgDeviceManagementConfigurationPolicy` cmdlet from the Microsoft Graph PowerShell SDK to create the policy from the JSON configuration file.
<h2 style="color: yellow;">New-MgDeviceManagementConfigurationPolicy -BodyParameter @{name=”Secured Workstation Baseline”; platforms=”windows10″}`

5. Assign the newly created policy to the appropriate security groups within your Entra ID.

  1. Hunting for Identity Threats with Microsoft Defender for Identity
    Microsoft Defender for Identity (MDI) uses sensors on your domain controllers to monitor and analyze user and network activities. Security professionals can use its advanced hunting capabilities to proactively search for malicious activity, such as reconnaissance, lateral movement, and domain dominance.

Step‑by‑step guide explaining what this does and how to use it.
The following KQL (Kusto Query Language) query can be used in Advanced Hunting to detect potential Pass-the-Ticket attacks, where an attacker steals a Kerberos ticket and uses it to gain access to resources.
1. Log into the Microsoft 365 Defender portal (security.microsoft.com).

2. Navigate to Hunting > Advanced Hunting.

  1. Run the following query to identify logon events with the same ticket across multiple computers, which is a key indicator of this attack.

`// Hunt for Pass-the-Ticket Activity`

`IdentityLogonEvents`

`| where ActionType == “LogonAttempt”`

`| where Protocol == “Kerberos”`

`| where LogonType == “Network”`

`| project Timestamp, DeviceName, AccountName, TargetUserName, LogonType, Protocol, AdditionalFields`

`| extend Ticket = tostring(AdditionalFields.TicketOptions)`

`| where isnotempty(Ticket)`

`| summarize ComputerCount = dcount(DeviceName) by Ticket, TargetUserName`

`| where ComputerCount > 2`

`| join kind=inner (IdentityLogonEvents) on Ticket`

`| project-away Ticket1`

`| project Timestamp, SuspiciousTicket = Ticket, AccountName = TargetUserName, LogonComputer = DeviceName, TotalComputers = ComputerCount`
4. Investigate any results by reviewing the timeline of the affected user account and the computers involved.

3. Securing Service Principals in Entra ID

Service Principals (enterprise applications) in Entra ID are frequent targets for attackers due to their often-powerful permissions. Hardening these identities is a non-negotiable aspect of cloud security.

Step‑by‑step guide explaining what this does and how to use it.
This PowerShell script uses the Microsoft Graph API to audit and remediate service principals with high-risk credentials, such as those with long-lived passwords or excessive permissions.
1. Connect to Microsoft Graph with the necessary `Application.Read.All` and `AppRoleAssignment.ReadWrite.All` scopes.

`Connect-MgGraph -Scopes “Application.Read.All”, “AppRoleAssignment.ReadWrite.All”`

  1. Get all service principals and check for those with password credentials older than 1 year.

`$servicePrincipals = Get-MgServicePrincipal -All`

`$oldSecrets = @()`

`foreach ($sp in $servicePrincipals) {`

` $creds = Get-MgServicePrincipalPassword -ServicePrincipalId $sp.Id`

` foreach ($cred in $creds) {`

` if ((Get-Date) – $cred.EndDateTime -gt 365) {`

` $oldSecrets += $sp`

` break`

` }`

` }`

`}`

`$oldSecrets | Select-Object DisplayName, Id | Format-Table`

  1. To remove a specific expired credential, use the `Remove-MgServicePrincipalPassword` cmdlet.

`Remove-MgServicePrincipalPassword -ServicePrincipalId -KeyId `

  1. Additionally, review and remove excessive application role assignments.
    `Get-MgServicePrincipalAppRoleAssignment -ServicePrincipalId | Where-Object { $_.PrincipalType -eq “ServicePrincipal” } | Remove-MgServicePrincipalAppRoleAssignment -AppRoleAssignmentId $_.Id`

4. Implementing Conditional Access with Zero Trust Principles

A Conditional Access policy is the core enforcement engine of a Zero Trust architecture. Moving beyond basic MFA, advanced policies can enforce device compliance, limit access to trusted locations, and block legacy authentication protocols.

Step‑by‑step guide explaining what this does and how to use it.
This guide outlines creating a policy that blocks access for devices that are not marked as compliant, ensuring only managed and secure devices can access corporate data.
1. Navigate to the Entra Admin Center (entra.microsoft.com) > Protection > Conditional Access.

2. Click “Create new policy.”

  1. Name the policy: “Require Compliant Device for All Cloud Apps.”
  2. Under “Users or workload identities,” assign this to “All users” and exclude your emergency break-glass accounts.
  3. Under “Cloud apps or actions,” select “All cloud apps.”
  4. Under “Conditions,” you can further refine by client apps to block legacy authentication by selecting “Other clients.”
  5. Under “Grant,” select “Grant access,” check the box for “Require device to be marked as compliant,” and select “Require one of the selected controls.”
  6. Set the policy to “On” and create it. The policy will now force any device accessing your tenant to be Intune-compliant.

  7. Leveraging Microsoft Defender for Endpoint for EDR Triage
    When a potential threat is identified on an endpoint, security analysts need to act quickly to investigate and contain it. Microsoft Defender for Endpoint (MDE) provides powerful command-line tools for live response.

Step‑by‑step guide explaining what this does and how to use it.
These commands are run from the MDE portal’s Live Response session to gather critical forensic data from a potentially compromised Windows host.
1. In the MDE portal, navigate to the Device Inventory, select the suspect device, and choose “Initiate Live Response Session.”
2. Once connected, run `!usermode` to switch to user-mode command execution.
3. Gather a list of all running processes to identify malware.

`process list`

  1. Check for network connections associated with a suspicious process (replace `PID` with the actual Process ID).

`network connection list by process PID`

  1. Collect a specific file for deep analysis in the Defender portal.

`getfile “C:\Users\Public\suspicious.bin”`

  1. To analyze auto-start extensibility points (ASEPs) for persistence mechanisms, run:

`registry list “HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run”`

  1. After investigation, you can immediately isolate the device from the network using:

`isolate machine`

  1. Hardening Microsoft Defender AV with Attack Surface Reduction Rules
    Attack Surface Reduction (ASR) rules in Microsoft Defender Antivirus are a powerful, free tool to block common malware techniques like Office macros, script execution, and LSASS credential theft.

Step‑by‑step guide explaining what this does and how to use it.
You can configure ASR rules via Intune or PowerShell. This PowerShell script checks the current status and enables key rules in “Block” mode.

1. Open PowerShell as Administrator.

  1. Check if ASR rules are enabled and view their current state.

`Get-MpPreference | Select-Object AttackSurfaceReductionRules_Ids, AttackSurfaceReductionRules_Actions`

  1. To enable a rule, you need its specific GUID. For example, to block executable content from email (a common malware vector), use this command.

`Add-MpPreference -AttackSurfaceReductionRules_Ids BE9BA2D9-53EA-4CDC-84E5-9B1EEEE46550 -AttackSurfaceReductionRules_Actions Enabled`

4. Other critical rules to enable include:

  • Block process creations originating from PSExec and WMI commands: `d1e49aac-8f56-4280-b9ba-993a6d77406c`
    – Block abuse of exploited vulnerable signed drivers: `56a863a9-875e-4185-98a7-b882c64b5ce5`
    – Block credential stealing from the Windows local security authority subsystem (lsass.exe): `9e6c4e1f-7d60-472f-ba1a-a39ef669e4b2`
    5. Deploy these settings at scale by packaging the PowerShell script as a Win32 app in Intune.
  1. Auditing Entra ID with the Microsoft Graph Security API
    Proactive security requires continuous auditing and monitoring of your identity landscape. The Microsoft Graph Security API allows you to programmatically access security alerts and secure scores for automation and integration with SIEM systems.

Step‑by‑step guide explaining what this does and how to use it.
This script fetches a list of high-severity security alerts from your tenant, allowing for integration into a ticketing system or a custom dashboard.
1. Ensure you have the `SecurityEvents.Read.All` application permission granted to your service principal or delegate permissions for a user.

2. Connect to Microsoft Graph.

`Connect-MgGraph -Scopes “SecurityEvents.Read.All”`

3. Use the `Get-MgSecurityAlert` cmdlet to retrieve alerts.

`$highSeverityAlerts = Get-MgSecurityAlert -Filter “severity eq ‘high'” -Top 50`
4. You can format the output to show the most critical information.
`$highSeverityAlerts | Select-Object Id, , Severity, ServiceSource, CreatedDateTime | Format-Table`
5. To get your tenant’s Secure Score for a specific benchmark (like Identity Secure Score), use:

`Get-MgSecuritySecureScore -Top 1 | Select-Object ActiveUserCount, CurrentScore, MaxScore`

What Undercode Say:

  • Key Takeaway 1: The democratization of enterprise-grade security through free, community-vetted baselines like OpenIntuneBaselines represents a fundamental shift, enabling organizations of all sizes to rapidly achieve a robust security posture without massive consultancy fees.
  • Key Takeaway 2: The future of Microsoft security administration is inextricably linked to automation and API-driven management; proficiency with PowerShell and the Microsoft Graph API is no longer a niche skill but a core competency for any serious security practitioner.

The analysis from the promoted event and the associated tools reveals a clear trajectory: the barrier to implementing sophisticated Microsoft security controls is collapsing. The value is no longer locked behind expensive professional services but is being codified into scripts, baselines, and community knowledge. This empowers internal IT teams but also raises the baseline expectation for security hygiene. Attackers are automating their tradecraft, and the defense must respond in kind. Relying solely on GUI-based configurations is becoming a liability. The real-world impact is a faster, more scalable, and more resilient security deployment model, but one that demands a new level of technical fluency from security professionals.

Prediction:

The convergence of AI-powered security Copilots with these community-driven hardening templates will lead to an “auto-pilot” tier for cloud security within two years. We will see systems that not only recommend configurations but also autonomously implement, test, and roll back security policies based on real-time threat intelligence. This will drastically reduce the mean time to secure (MTTS) for new tenants but will also create a new attack surface where adversaries may attempt to poison the training data of these AI systems or exploit logic flaws in automated remediation workflows, leading to a new frontier in AI security warfare.

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IT/Security Reporter URL:

Reported By: Natehutchinson Expertsliveuk – Hackers Feeds
Extra Hub: Undercode MoN
Basic Verification: Pass ✅

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