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Introduction:
Many organizations operate under the dangerous assumption that their Azure cloud environment is secure by default. However, critical identity and access management settings are often overly permissive out-of-the-box, creating a vast attack surface. This article dissects the specific `defaultUserRolePermissions` that expose your tenant to internal and external threats, providing a comprehensive guide to auditing and hardening your configuration.
Learning Objectives:
- Understand the critical risks associated with Azure AD’s default user role permissions.
- Learn how to audit your tenant’s configuration using PowerShell, Microsoft Graph API, and dedicated security tools.
- Implement a step-by-step hardening strategy to mitigate privilege escalation and data exposure vulnerabilities.
You Should Know:
1. Auditing Default User Permissions with PowerShell
`Get-MgPolicyAuthorizationPolicy -Property “DefaultUserRolePermissions”`
This PowerShell command, part of the Microsoft Graph PowerShell module, retrieves the current authorization policy, specifically focusing on the permissions granted to the default user role. It is the first step in assessing your tenant’s security posture.
Step-by-step guide:
- Install the required module: Open PowerShell as an administrator and run
Install-Module Microsoft.Graph. - Connect to Microsoft Graph with the necessary scope: Run
Connect-MgGraph -Scopes "Policy.ReadWrite.Authorization". - Execute the audit command: Run
$DefaultUserPermissions = Get-MgPolicyAuthorizationPolicy -Property "DefaultUserRolePermissions". - Display the results: Run `$DefaultUserPermissions.DefaultUserRolePermissions` to see a detailed list of which permissions are enabled for all users.
2. Disabling User Ability to Create Security Groups
`Update-MgPolicyAuthorizationPolicy -DefaultUserRolePermissions @{AllowedToCreateSecurityGroups = $false}`
This command modifies the global authorization policy to revoke the permission for standard users to create new security groups. Uncontrolled group creation can lead to permission sprawl and is a common technique in privilege escalation chains.
Step-by-step guide:
- Ensure you are connected to Microsoft Graph with the `Policy.ReadWrite.Authorization` scope.
- Verify the current setting using the `Get-MgPolicyAuthorizationPolicy` command from the previous section.
- To change the setting, execute the `Update-MgPolicyAuthorizationPolicy` command with the `AllowedToCreateSecurityGroups` attribute set to
$false. - Confirm the change by re-running the `Get-MgPolicyAuthorizationPolicy` command.
3. Restricting Application Registration Permissions
`Update-MgPolicyAuthorizationPolicy -DefaultUserRolePermissions @{AllowedToCreateApps = $false}`
This command prevents standard users from registering new applications in your Azure AD tenant. Malicious application registrations are a primary vector for persistence and consent phishing attacks, allowing attackers to access mail, files, and other user data.
Step-by-step guide:
- Connect to Microsoft Graph with the `Policy.ReadWrite.Authorization` scope.
2. Execute: `Update-MgPolicyAuthorizationPolicy -DefaultUserRolePermissions @{AllowedToCreateApps = $false}`.
- Validate the change by retrieving the policy again. This action does not affect users with specific administrative roles like Application Administrator.
4. Securing User Directory Read Permissions
`Update-MgPolicyAuthorizationPolicy -DefaultUserRolePermissions @{AllowedToReadOtherUsers = $false}`
This critical configuration change prevents non-admin users from enumerating the entire user directory. While seemingly benign, this information is gold for attackers performing reconnaissance and crafting targeted social engineering campaigns.
Step-by-step guide:
- Using your established Microsoft Graph session, run the command to disable user enumeration:
Update-MgPolicyAuthorizationPolicy -DefaultUserRolePermissions @{AllowedToReadOtherUsers = $false}. - Test the impact by having a standard user account attempt to browse the Azure AD portal; they should no longer see a complete list of all other users.
5. Leveraging Microsoft Graph API for Direct Assessment
`GET https://graph.microsoft.com/v1.0/policies/authorizationPolicy`
This is the underlying REST API call that the PowerShell module uses. It is invaluable for automation scripts or when working in environments where PowerShell is not available. The response will be a JSON object containing the `defaultUserRolePermissions` block.
Step-by-step guide:
- Acquire an access token with the `Policy.Read.All` or `Policy.ReadWrite.Authorization` scope.
- Craft an HTTP GET request to the endpoint: `https://graph.microsoft.com/v1.0/policies/authorizationPolicy`.
- Parse the JSON response, focusing on the `defaultUserRolePermissions` object to review all boolean values (
allowedToCreateApps,allowedToReadOtherUsers, etc.). - To make a change, you would use a PATCH request to the same endpoint with a modified JSON body.
6. Automated Tenant Auditing with ROADtools
`roadrecon auth dump`
ROADtools (Reconnaissance and Offensive AD) is a popular open-source toolkit for interacting with Azure AD. The `roadrecon` command-line tool can authenticate and dump a vast array of configuration data, including authorization policies, for offline analysis.
Step-by-step guide:
1. Install ROADtools: `pip install roadrecon`.
- Authenticate to your tenant: `roadrecon auth -u
-p ` or using device code flow.
3. Dump the authorization data: `roadrecon auth dump`.
- Open the generated database file with the ROADtools GUI (
roadrecon gui) to browse the policies and user roles in a graphical interface, making it easier to identify misconfigurations.
7. Hardening Tenant Creation Permissions
`Update-MgPolicyAuthorizationPolicy -DefaultUserRolePermissions @{AllowedToCreateTenants = $false}`
This command disables the ability for standard users to create new Azure tenants associated with your organization. This is rarely a business requirement and preventing it reduces complexity and the potential for shadow IT deployments.
Step-by-step guide:
- Connect to Microsoft Graph with the `Policy.ReadWrite.Authorization` scope.
- Execute the hardening command:
Update-MgPolicyAuthorizationPolicy -DefaultUserRolePermissions @{AllowedToCreateTenants = $false}. - This setting should be part of a broader baseline policy applied to all production tenants to enforce least privilege.
What Undercode Say:
- The “secure by default” cloud paradigm is a dangerous myth; identity is the new perimeter and its configuration is your first line of defense.
- Overly permissive user roles are not just an operational oversight but a direct privilege escalation path waiting to be exploited, both by malicious insiders and external attackers who compromise a standard user account.
Our analysis indicates that the default configuration in Azure AD prioritizes ease of use over security, creating a significant gap between perceived and actual security posture. The `defaultUserRolePermissions` are a foundational control point. Leaving these settings enabled is equivalent to granting every employee in a traditional office building a master key copy. The tools and commands provided, from native PowerShell to the Microsoft Graph API and specialized kits like ROADtools, offer a multi-layered approach to visibility and control. Continuous auditing is non-negotiable, as these settings can be modified by administrators with sufficient privileges, and their state must be monitored as part of a robust cloud security framework.
Prediction:
The continued mass migration to cloud platforms like Azure will see a proportional rise in attacks targeting weak default configurations. We predict a surge in automated attack toolkits specifically designed to scan for and exploit permissive defaultUserRolePermissions, turning low-privilege initial access into full tenant compromise. Organizations that fail to implement a proactive, identity-centric hardening strategy will face increased incidents of data exfiltration, ransomware deployment in cloud storage, and malicious SaaS application integration.
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IT/Security Reporter URL:
Reported By: Charles F – Hackers Feeds
Extra Hub: Undercode MoN
Basic Verification: Pass ✅
