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Introduction:
Andy Jenkinson, an expert in Internet asset and DNS vulnerabilities, recently issued a stark warning on social media: “Any delayed disclosure as well as failing remediation is silent complicity.” This statement highlights a critical failure in modern incident response—when organizations delay revealing breaches or fail to fix known vulnerabilities, they create a cycle where attackers are given free rein. By pointing to major UK breaches at Capita, Marks and Spencer, the NHS, and Jaguar Land Rover, Jenkinson underscores that a lack of transparency is not neutral; it actively enables further cybercrime.
Learning Objectives:
- Analyze the legal and reputational risks of delayed vulnerability disclosure and remediation.
- Implement coordinated vulnerability disclosure (CVD) processes based on ISO/IEC 29147.
- Apply technical commands to perform DNS threat hunting and Active Directory privilege escalation detection.
- Configure cloud hardening and API security to prevent third-party breaches.
- Build an incident response playbook with transparent communication and regulatory reporting.
- The Complicity of Silence: A Framework for Understanding
Jenkinson’s core argument is that failing to act on a discovered vulnerability is not a passive state but an active enabler of fraud. When a security finding is dismissed or its remediation is delayed, the organization effectively grants attackers continued access to exploit the flaw. This is not merely a technical oversight but a form of “silent complicity” that can carry significant legal liability.
The hidden costs of non-disclosure are severe. Research shows that covering up a breach or delaying disclosure “benefits only the attackers,” giving them a head start to exploit stolen data while victims remain unaware. When a company hides evidence or pays hackers for silence, it “incentivises future attacks and puts countless other businesses and individuals at risk.” Jenkinson’s statement serves as a reminder that transparency is not optional—it is a moral and legal imperative.
Step‑by‑step guide to establishing a vulnerability disclosure policy:
- Assign a Point of Contact (POC): Designate a security team member to receive reports and maintain a dedicated email address (e.g., [email protected]).
- Publish a Security.txt File: Create a `/.well-known/security.txt` file on your web server to publicly state your disclosure policy and contact method.
- Adopt ISO/IEC 29147: Use this international standard to structure how you receive, triage, and disclose vulnerability information. The goal is to “reduce the risk associated with exploiting vulnerabilities.”
- Set Remediation SLAs: Establish clear internal service-level agreements (e.g., patch critical vulnerabilities within 48 hours).
- Implement a Bug Bounty Program: Use platforms like HackerOne to incentivize ethical hackers to report flaws before attackers find them.
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From Hindsight to Foresight: DNS & Threat Intelligence
As an expert in DNS vulnerabilities, Jenkinson emphasizes that many breaches begin with overlooked Internet assets. Weak DNS configurations can allow attackers to spoof domains, launch DDoS attacks, or exfiltrate data. One increasingly common technique is the NXDOMAIN attack, where attackers “purposely and systematically flood the DNS system with millions of nonexistent DNS queries” to exhaust its capacity. In late 2023, over 64% of DDoS attacks had a DNS component, with more than half being NXDOMAIN attacks.
To defend against this, organizations need proactive threat intelligence that goes beyond perimeter security. Passive DNS (pDNS) telemetry can reveal early signs of domain generation algorithms (DGAs) and command-and-control (C2) traffic.
Step‑by‑step guide for DNS hardening and threat hunting:
Linux/MacOS (using `dig` and `nslookup`):
Query DNS records for a domain dig example.com A Perform a reverse DNS lookup dig -x 8.8.8.8 Use nslookup to check for NXDOMAIN responses nslookup non-existent-domain.example.com
Windows (PowerShell):
Resolve a domain name to an IP address Resolve-DnsName example.com Check for DNS cache poisoning indicators ipconfig /displaydns
Threat Hunting: Detecting DNS Tunneling
Monitor for unusually long or encoded DNS queries (a sign of data exfiltration)
sudo tcpdump -i eth0 -n 'udp port 53' | grep -E 'TXT|NULL|[A-Za-z0-9+/=]{40,}'
Configuration: Restrict DNS Recursion
- Edit `/etc/bind/named.conf.options` (Linux) or DNS Server properties (Windows) to restrict recursive queries to internal networks only, preventing your server from being used in amplification attacks.
- Anatomy of a Breach: Capita, M&S, NHS, and JLR
Jenkinson’s warning is grounded in real-world failures. An examination of the four organizations he listed reveals common patterns:
- Capita (2023): An employee inadvertently downloaded a malicious file. Despite a high-priority security alert within 10 minutes, the company failed to quarantine the infected device for 58 hours. Attackers used this time to escalate privileges and deploy ransomware, exfiltrating nearly one terabyte of data and resetting all user passwords. The ICO fined Capita £14 million, noting “failure to prevent privilege escalation and unauthorised lateral movement” due to a lack of administrative account tiering.
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Marks and Spencer (2025): The Scattered Spider group used targeted phishing and MFA fatigue to steal credentials, then deployed legitimate remote administration tools (AnyDesk, TeamViewer) to move laterally and encrypt VMware ESXi servers with DragonForce ransomware.
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NHS (2024): The Qilin ransomware attack on pathology service Synnovis disrupted over 10,000 appointments, and a subsequent investigation linked the attack to a patient’s death due to delays in obtaining blood test results.
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JLR (2025): A cyberattack compromised JLR’s global IT infrastructure, forcing production shutdowns and dealer outages. The company confirmed data theft, though specifics were not disclosed.
Step‑by‑step guide for Active Directory privilege escalation detection (to prevent Capita-style lateral movement):
1. Audit Administrative Accounts:
List all domain admins (PowerShell) Get-ADGroupMember "Domain Admins" | Select-Object name
2. Implement Tiered Administration Model: Use separate administrative accounts for different security levels (Tier 0 for domain controllers, Tier 1 for servers, Tier 2 for workstations).
3. Monitor for Suspicious Logons:
Query security event logs for non-interactive admin logons
Get-WinEvent -FilterHashtable @{LogName='Security'; ID=4624} | Where-Object {$_.Properties[bash].Value -eq 10}
4. Deploy LAPS (Local Administrator Password Solution): Ensure local admin passwords are randomized and rotated regularly.
4. The Third-Party Risk Blind Spot
Jenkinson notes that “many incidents result from lax basic security practices and a lack of expertise in DNS and Public Key Infrastructure (PKI), and undertrained investigation teams.” The NHS Synnovis attack and the Capita breach highlight how a third-party supplier’s vulnerability can directly impact the parent organization. In the NHS case, the pathology service’s systems were the entry point, causing harm to patients who were not even customers of Synnovis.
Step‑by‑step guide for third‑party risk management (TPRM):
- Create an Inventory of Third Parties: Use a spreadsheet or GRC tool to list all vendors with access to your data or network.
- Require SOC 2 or ISO 27001 Certification: Mandate that critical suppliers hold current security certifications.
- Perform API Security Checks: If integrating via APIs, test for OWASP API Top 10 vulnerabilities.
Test for API key exposure in Git history git log --all -p | grep -E 'api[_-]?key|token|secret'
- Implement Zero Trust Architecture: Verify every access request, even from trusted partners. Use micro-segmentation to limit lateral movement.
5. Cloud Hardening Commands (AWS Example):
List all publicly accessible S3 buckets aws s3api list-buckets --query "Buckets[?PublicAccessBlockConfiguration.RestrictPublicBuckets==`false`]" Ensure AWS Config is recording all resources aws configservice describe-configuration-recorders
5. Building a Transparent Incident Response Playbook
To avoid “silent complicity,” organizations must build a response plan that prioritizes rapid disclosure. This plan should integrate with legal and communications teams to ensure that breach notifications are timely and complete. Jenkinson’s message is that honesty is not just ethical—it is the most effective risk mitigation strategy.
Step‑by‑step guide for incident response and disclosure:
- Prepare an Incident Response Kit: Include pre‑drafted breach notification templates, regulatory contact lists (e.g., ICO, NCSC), and forensic collection scripts.
- Define “Delayed Disclosure”: Set a maximum internal timeline (e.g., 72 hours) from detection to disclosure, unless law enforcement requests otherwise.
3. Maintain a Forensic Artifact Log:
Capture running processes and network connections (Linux) ps auxf > processes.txt netstat -tulpn > network.txt
4. Notify Affected Parties Immediately: Use email, website banners, and direct mail. Include specific details on what data was compromised and what steps they should take.
5. Legal and Regulatory Compliance: In the UK, report breaches to the ICO within 72 hours. Provide a complete timeline of when the breach occurred, when it was detected, and when remediation was completed.
What Undercode Say:
- Transparency Defeats Fraud: Jenkinson’s statement that “absence or dismissal of findings is not absence of harm—it’s free rein for fraud” is a powerful reminder that hiding a breach is as bad as the breach itself. Organizations that choose silence empower attackers to continue their campaigns, turning a single incident into a systemic crisis.
- DNS and PKI Are Critical Battlefields: Many enterprises still treat DNS as a basic utility rather than a security control. The rise of NXDOMAIN attacks and DNS tunneling proves that threat actors are actively exploiting these overlooked protocols. Investment in threat intelligence, passive DNS, and DNSSEC is no longer optional.
Analysis: The thread connecting Capita, M&S, NHS, and JLR is not just the breach itself, but the delayed response that followed. Capita waited 58 hours to quarantine a known threat. NHS patients died while services were offline. JLR production halted during a critical sales period. These are not isolated technical failures; they are governance failures. Jenkinson’s call for immediate disclosure is a call to treat cyber incidents as matters of public safety, not just IT issues.
Expected Output:
Prediction:
The regulatory landscape will shift toward mandatory, real-time breach disclosure. In 2025, the UK government introduced the Cyber Security and Resilience Bill, which will mandate ransomware reporting. As fines like Capita’s £14m penalty become the norm, more organizations will adopt coordinated vulnerability disclosure. However, the most significant change will be cultural—boards will be legally and personally liable for “silent complicity.” Future cyber insurance policies will also require proof of an active, transparent vulnerability disclosure program as a condition of coverage.
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Reported By: Andy Jenkinson – Hackers Feeds
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