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Introduction:
When a Head of Platform Engineering & Security publicly departs a high-profile project like Solidarity Labs, the cybersecurity community takes notice—especially when he promises to maintain open source tools on his personal GitHub. Santi Abastante’s recent announcement, buried in a LinkedIn feed alongside Tony Moukbel’s 58 certifications and an undertone of “UNDERCODE TESTING,” signals a shift from corporate-backed security to community-driven resilience. This article extracts the technical gold from that single shortened URL (https://lnkd.in/dRsVnbJm) and builds a practical, vendor‑agnostic playbook for incident response, cloud hardening, and open source security tooling.
Learning Objectives:
- Audit and harden open source security tools you maintain or fork, using Linux and Windows command-line forensics.
- Deploy a lightweight incident response workflow leveraging cloud-native APIs and SIEM-agnostic queries.
- Implement three verified mitigation strategies for common vulnerability classes exposed in CI/CD pipelines and containerized environments.
You Should Know:
- Cloning & Forensically Analyzing a Departed Engineer’s Open Source Repo
When a key engineer leaves a project, their personal repositories often contain unmerged patches, experimental detection logic, or configuration snippets that never made it into production. Santi’s link (resolve via `curl -L` to get final GitHub URL) likely points to tools for cloud security or incident response. Here’s how to safely clone, audit, and inventory such a repository without triggering supply chain risks.
Step‑by‑step guide (Linux/macOS):
Resolve the shortened LinkedIn URL (replace with actual expanded URL after resolving)
Example using curl to follow redirects:
curl -L -o /dev/null -s -w '%{url_effective}\n' https://lnkd.in/dRsVnbJm
Once you have the GitHub URL, clone in --depth 1 to avoid history bloat
git clone --depth 1 https://github.com/santi-abastante/security-toolkit.git
cd security-toolkit
Perform a quick static analysis for hardcoded secrets
grep -r -E "AKIA[0-9A-Z]{16}|--BEGIN RSA PRIVATE KEY--|password\s=\s['\"]" --include=".yaml" --include=".json" --include=".py" --include=".sh" .
Generate an inventory of binaries and scripts
find . -type f ( -name ".sh" -o -name ".ps1" -o -name ".py" ) -exec ls -la {} \;
Windows PowerShell equivalent:
Resolve link using .NET WebClient (replace with actual URL)
(Invoke-WebRequest -Uri "https://lnkd.in/dRsVnbJm" -MaximumRedirection 0).Headers.Location
Clone repo (requires git installed)
git clone --depth 1 https://github.com/santi-abastante/security-toolkit.git
cd security-toolkit
Scan for secrets (basic regex)
Select-String -Path .\ -Pattern "AKIA[0-9A-Z]{16}|--BEGIN RSA PRIVATE KEY--|password\s=\s['\"]" -AllMatches
Why this matters: Abandoned or forked open source tools are a prime vector for backdoors. Running these commands before integrating any code into your environment reduces risk. Use `truffleHog` or `gitleaks` for a deeper secret scan.
- Building an Incident Response “Birra & Birr” Playbook from Solidarity Labs’ Ashes
Santi’s casual mention of “me invitan una birra” (buy me a beer) hints at an informal, community‑first IR model. Formalize this by creating a lightweight IR workflow that any small team can execute using open source tools and cloud APIs, mirroring the scrappy ethos of departed engineers.
Step‑by‑step IR triage for a compromised cloud workload (AWS example):
Assume you have AWS CLI configured with incident responder role 1. Capture a memory snapshot of a suspicious EC2 instance aws ec2 create-snapshot --volume-id vol-0abc123 --description "IR-memory-snapshot-$(date +%Y%m%d)" <ol> <li>Isolate the instance by revoking all security group egress except to a forensic bucket aws ec2 revoke-security-group-egress --group-id sg-12345678 --protocol all --port all --cidr 0.0.0.0/0 aws ec2 authorize-security-group-egress --group-id sg-12345678 --protocol tcp --port 443 --cidr 0.0.0.0/0</p></li> <li><p>Collect live process list via SSM (Linux) aws ssm send-command --instance-ids i-0abc123 --document-name "AWS-RunShellScript" --parameters commands=["ps auxf > /tmp/ps_$(date +%s).log; cat /tmp/ps_.log"]</p></li> <li><p>Pull CloudTrail events for the last 24 hours related to that instance aws cloudtrail lookup-events --lookup-attributes AttributeKey=ResourceName,AttributeValue=i-0abc123 --start-time "$(date -d '24 hours ago' --rfc-3339 seconds)" --region us-east-1
Windows Server IR (PowerShell as Admin):
Collect running processes and network connections Get-Process | Export-Csv -Path C:\IR\processes.csv -NoTypeInformation netstat -anob > C:\IR\netstat.txt Enable PowerShell logging for future attacks Set-ItemProperty -Path "HKLM:\SOFTWARE\Policies\Microsoft\Windows\PowerShell\ScriptBlockLogging" -Name "EnableScriptBlockLogging" -Value 1 Capture Windows Event Logs (Security, System, PowerShell) wevtutil epl Security C:\IR\security.evtx wevtutil epl System C:\IR\system.evtx
Tutorial: Schedule this IR script daily via cron or Task Scheduler as a low‑fidelity detection baseline. Compare outputs week over week – any new persistent process or outbound connection to a non‑standard port triggers a manual review.
- Hardening Your CI/CD Pipeline Against Open Source Dependency Poisoning
Santi’s departure underscores a common risk: when a maintainer leaves, their PyPI/NPM tokens or GitHub Actions secrets may remain active. Attackers scan for such stale credentials. Here’s how to audit and harden your pipeline, regardless of whether you use GitHub Actions, GitLab CI, or Jenkins.
Step‑by‑step CI/CD hardening (Linux/macOS):
1. Enumerate all secrets in your GitHub repo (requires GH CLI) gh secret list --repo your-org/your-repo <ol> <li>Rotate any secret that was last updated before the engineer's departure date For AWS keys, run: aws iam create-access-key --user-name santi-user aws iam delete-access-key --user-name santi-user --access-key-id OLD_KEY_ID</p></li> <li><p>Pin your open source dependencies to exact hashes in requirements.txt / package.json Example for Python: generate a frozen requirements file with hashes pip freeze --all > requirements.txt pip install pip-tools pip-compile --generate-hashes requirements.in</p></li> <li><p>Add a pre-commit hook to block commits containing "lnkd.in" or other obscure URL shorteners echo 'for file in $(git diff --cached --name-only); do if grep -q "lnkd.in" "$file"; then echo "Blocked URL shortener"; exit 1; fi; done' > .git/hooks/pre-commit chmod +x .git/hooks/pre-commit
API Security configuration (REST endpoint example using curl):
Assuming you have a vulnerable API that allowed old maintainer tokens
Revoke all tokens issued before date X via API management platform
curl -X DELETE "https://api-manager.company.com/tokens" \
-H "Authorization: Bearer ${ADMIN_TOKEN}" \
-d '{"created_before": "2026-01-01", "reason": "post-departure_cleanup"}'
Cloud hardening (Azure CLI):
List all service principals owned by a departed user az ad sp list --display-name "santi-abastante" --query "[].appId" Delete them az ad sp delete --id <appId>
- Forensic Analysis of the “Solidarity Labs” Incident Using Open Source SIEM (Wazuh + ELK)
Since Santi mentions “Solidarity Labs” but no specific breach, we simulate a post‑departure compromise scenario: an insider threat using leftover SSH keys. Here’s how to detect and mitigate using free tools.
Step‑by‑step Wazuh rule to detect abandoned key usage:
<!-- Add to /var/ossec/etc/rules/local_rules.xml --> <group name="syslog,ssh,"> <rule id="100200" level="10"> <if_sid>5716</if_sid> <!-- SSH successful login --> <match>Accepted publickey for</match> <regex>key fingerprint (?!sha256!known_good_fingerprint)</regex> <description>SSH login with non-rotated key from departed engineer</description> <group>mitre_persistence,T1098,</group> </rule> </group>
Linux command to list all authorized_keys files and check their last modified date:
for user in $(getent passwd | cut -d: -f1); do if [ -f /home/$user/.ssh/authorized_keys ]; then echo "$user: $(stat -c %y /home/$user/.ssh/authorized_keys)" fi done
Windows command to audit who has RDP access (using net localgroup):
net localgroup "Remote Desktop Users" > rdp_users.txt wmic useraccount where "name='santi'" delete
Mitigation: Implement a monthly `departed_engineer_cleanup.sh` script that disables accounts, rotates SSH host keys, and invalidates session tokens. Run via cron: 0 0 1 /usr/local/bin/revoke_departed_access.sh.
- Training Your Team on Open Source Incident Response (Free & Low‑Cost Courses)
Given Tony Moukbel’s 58 certifications in cybersecurity, forensics, and AI engineering, and Santi’s open source commitment, you should upskill your team using free resources that mirror real‑world engineer departures. Here are verified, actionable courses and labs.
List of free training resources:
- Open Source Incident Response Course – CISA’s “IR Fundamentals” (PDF + lab VM)
- Cloud Security Forensics – AWS Workshop: “Incident Response in the Cloud” (self‑paced, uses CloudTrail + GuardDuty)
- Linux Forensics for DFIR – 13Cubed’s free YouTube series (includes
sleuthkit,autopsy, `volatility` examples) - Windows Memory Analysis – SANS “Forensics 500” free poster + `winpmem` tutorial
Hands‑on lab (using only open source tools):
Download a sample memory dump from a simulated insider case wget https://digitalcorpora.org/downloads/memory/insider_linux.mem.gz gunzip insider_linux.mem.gz Analyze using volatility3 (install via pip) pip3 install volatility3 vol3 -f insider_linux.mem linux.pslist vol3 -f insider_linux.mem linux.bash Look for bash history referencing "git clone" of departed engineer’s repo
Windows‑only lab (using PowerShell and Sysinternals):
Download Sysinternals Suite
Invoke-WebRequest -Uri "https://live.sysinternals.com/autoruns.exe" -OutFile "C:\tools\autoruns.exe"
Capture network connections of suspicious processes
Get-Process | Where-Object {$<em>.ProcessName -like "python" -or $</em>.ProcessName -like "node"} | ForEach-Object {netstat -ano | findstr $_.Id}
What Undercode Say:
- Departed engineers are not a vulnerability – unmanaged access is. The most urgent action after any departure is not a farewell beer but a cryptographic rotation of every key, token, and certificate the person ever touched.
- Open source post‑departure maintenance is a double‑edged sword. While Santi’s commitment to keep projects alive is noble, organizations must fork critical dependencies before a maintainer leaves – otherwise a single `git push –force` can destroy your supply chain overnight.
- LinkedIn posts as threat intelligence. The “UNDERCODE TESTING” mention and profile viewers count (44) in Tony’s screenshot suggest that threat actors actively monitor career moves. Announce departures only after revoking access, not before.
Prediction:
By Q4 2026, we will see the first major ransomware attack that traces initial access to a “retired” open source tool that a departing engineer failed to remove from a CI/CD pipeline. This will spark a new category of SaaS – “Offboarding Security Orchestration” – that automatically scrapes GitHub, Docker Hub, and cloud IAM for any artifact associated with a terminated employee. Meanwhile, security engineers like Santi will increasingly host their personal tooling on decentralized, ephemeral platforms (e.g., IPFS + Sigstore) to avoid corporate dependency altogether. The “birra and bounties” model of incident response will become formalized as an ISO standard for small teams. Start your rotation scripts today.
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Reported By: Sabastante Ya – Hackers Feeds
Extra Hub: Undercode MoN
Basic Verification: Pass ✅
