Lateral Movement Between Workstations and Servers in Azure Environments

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Lateral movement in Azure environments is a critical topic for penetration testers and red teamers. Attackers often exploit misconfigurations, weak credentials, and excessive permissions to move between workstations and servers. This article explores techniques and defenses for lateral movement in Azure.

You Should Know:

1. Enumerating Azure Resources

Use PowerShell and Azure CLI to discover resources:

 List all VMs in a subscription
Get-AzVM | Select-Object Name, ResourceGroupName

List available roles and permissions
Get-AzRoleAssignment | Where-Object {$_.DisplayName -eq "User"}

2. Exploiting Misconfigured JIT (Just-In-Time) Access

If JIT is poorly configured, attackers can abuse VM access:

 Check JIT policies via Azure CLI
az vm list --query "[].{Name:name, JIT:justInTimeAccessPolicy}" -o table

3. Abusing Service Principals and Managed Identities

Extract credentials from misconfigured service principals:

 List service principals with high privileges
Get-AzADServicePrincipal | Where-Object { $_.AppRoles -ne $null }

4. Pass-the-PRT (Primary Refresh Token) Attacks

Steal Azure AD tokens for lateral movement:

 Use AADInternals to extract PRT (requires admin access)
Import-Module AADInternals
Get-AADIntPRTToken -PfxFileName "malicious.pfx" -DeviceKey "key"

5. Defending Against Lateral Movement

  • Enable MFA for all privileged accounts.
  • Restrict Role Assignments using PIM (Privileged Identity Management).
  • Monitor Anomalous Logins with Azure Sentinel:
    SecurityEvent
    | where EventID == 4624
    | where AccountType == "User"
    | where LogonType == 3
    | where IPAddress != "InternalRange"
    

What Undercode Say:

Lateral movement in Azure is a major threat, but proper hardening can mitigate risks. Key takeaways:
– Least Privilege is critical—avoid excessive permissions.
– Logging and Monitoring (Azure Sentinel, Defender for Cloud) detect suspicious activity early.
– Regular Audits of service principals and JIT policies prevent abuse.

For further reading:

Expected Output:

Get-AzVM | Format-Table Name, Location, ResourceGroupName
az network nsg list --query "[].{Name:name, Rules:securityRules[].name}"

References:

Reported By: Ben Zamir – Hackers Feeds
Extra Hub: Undercode MoN
Basic Verification: Pass ✅

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