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Introduction:
High-voltage direct current (HVDC) systems form the backbone of modern energy grids, enabling efficient long-distance power transmission. As leaders like Abhishek Singh drive digitalization and operational excellence at Adani Energy Solutions Ltd., the convergence of IT, OT, and cloud-based asset management (SAP PM/MM) introduces new cyber risk surfaces. This article dissects how attackers could target HVDC substations, STATCOM, and protection relays—and provides hands-on defensive techniques.
Learning Objectives:
- Identify critical attack vectors in HVDC and substation automation systems (IEC 61850, Modbus, DNP3).
- Implement Linux/Windows commands to detect anomalies in grid control network traffic.
- Harden API endpoints used for remote SCADA access and cloud-based asset management.
You Should Know:
- Reconnaissance on Industrial Control Networks – Using Nmap and Custom Scripts
Attackers often scan for exposed HVDC terminal assets. The following steps simulate a security assessment on an internal OT network segment (do not run on live infrastructure without authorization).
Step‑by‑step guide (Linux):
- Discover live hosts on the control network (e.g., 192.168.10.0/24):
`nmap -sn 192.168.10.0/24 –-send-ip`
(Use `-sn` to ping sweep without port scan, reducing interference with sensitive PLCs.)
- Identify IEC 61850 MMS services (port 102):
`nmap -p 102 –script iec-identify 192.168.10.0/24`
Output reveals IED model numbers and vendor info.
- Enumerate Modbus/TCP (port 502) with a passive script:
`nmap -p 502 –script modbus-discover 192.168.10.50`
Windows alternative (PowerShell as Admin):
`Test-NetConnection -ComputerName 192.168.10.50 -Port 102`
Then use `Get-NetTCPConnection -State Listen` to spot unexpected listening services.
Mitigation: Deploy port knocking or a dedicated OT firewall (e.g., Tofino) that only whitelists pre‑defined source IPs for SCADA.
- Detecting Anomalous HVDC Protocol Traffic with Wireshark and tshark
Abhishek Singh’s focus on reliability and safety requires monitoring for command injection or replay attacks on protection relays.
Step‑by‑step guide (Linux/Windows):
- Capture live traffic on the interface connected to an HVDC terminal LAN:
`sudo tshark -i eth0 -f “tcp port 102 or tcp port 502” -c 1000 -w hvdc_capture.pcap` - Apply display filter for unexpected write commands (IEC 61850 `Write` requests):
`tshark -r hvdc_capture.pcap -Y “mms.confirmedRequestPDU.writeRequest”`
(Look for unknown source MAC addresses.)
- Detect abnormal Modbus function codes (e.g., 0x05, 0x0F for coil writes):
`tshark -r hvdc_capture.pcap -Y “modbus.func_code == 0x05″`
Windows (Wireshark GUI):
Use menu Statistics → Protocol Hierarchy to spot unexpected high volumes of ICMP (covert channel). Then filter: `ip.src==
Tutorial: Automate alerting with a simple bash script that runs every 5 minutes:
`!/bin/bash`
`tshark -r /var/log/pcaps/latest.pcap -Y “modbus.func_code == 0x0f” | wc -l` – if count > 3, send SIEM alert.
- Hardening Cloud‑Based Asset Management APIs (SAP PM/MM Integration)
Adani’s use of SAP PM & MM for O&M means that APIs connecting field devices to cloud dashboards are prime targets. Attackers could manipulate work orders or shutdown commands.
Step‑by‑step guide (Linux / API security):
- Test API endpoint for improper object‑level authorization (IDOR):
`curl -X GET “https://api.adani-energysolutions.com/asset/status/12345” -H “Authorization: Bearer $TOKEN”`
Then increment ID to12346. If accessible, vulnerability exists. -
Enforce API schema validation using OpenAPI (Swagger). Example block in a gateway (Kong/NGINX):
location /api/v1/ { if ($request_body ~ ".../.") { return 403; } proxy_pass https://backend-sap; } -
Implement rate limiting on Windows (IIS URL Rewrite):
Add a rule limiting 10 requests per minute per IP for POST/workorder/create.
Cloud hardening checklist:
- Rotate API keys weekly via Azure Key Vault or AWS Secrets Manager.
- Require client certificates for all SCADA‑to‑cloud calls.
- Use `curl -k` disabled – enforce TLS 1.3 with
--tlsv1.3.
- Exploiting and Patching Vulnerabilities in HVDC Protection Systems (STATCOM, GIS Reactors)
A misconfigured GOOSE message (IEC 61850 Generic Object Oriented Substation Event) can trip a ±500kV HVDC breaker. This step shows how to mitigate a GOOSE spoofing attack.
Attack simulation (for lab only):
Using `libiec61850` library (Linux):
`goose_publisher -i ens160 -c GOOSE_01 -s ST -d “trip_breaker”`
This sends a false trip command if no authentication is enabled.
Mitigation step‑by‑step:
- On each IED, enable GOOSE message authentication per IEC 62351‑6:
Configure digital signature (HMAC‑SHA256) for all published GOOSE datasets. - On Linux‑based substation gateway, drop malformed GOOSE with
nftables:nft add rule filter input udp sport 4000 ip saddr != 192.168.200.0/29 drop
- Windows (if any Windows‑based HMI): Use Windows Defender Firewall with advanced rules blocking inbound UDP 4000 from all but authorized MAC addresses (though MAC spoofing remains possible; combine with IPsec).
Training course recommendation: SANS ICS410 (ICS/SCADA Security Essentials) – covers GOOSE, MMS, and DNP3 hardening.
- Leveraging AI for Predictive Threat Hunting in HVDC Logs
With digitalization, massive amounts of SAP PM and relay fault logs can be fed into ML models to detect zero‑day patterns. Here’s a practical log analysis tutorial using Linux CLI and Python.
Step‑by‑step guide:
- Collect syslog from HVDC terminals:
`journalctl -u hvdc-oms –since “2026-05-10” | grep -E “FAIL|ALERT|UNAUTH” > hvdc_suspicious.log` - Count distinct source IPs trying to access SAP PM module:
`cat /var/log/apache2/access.log | grep “SAPMM” | awk ‘{print $1}’ | sort | uniq -c | sort -nr` - Use `mlock` (simple anomaly detection) on Windows event logs (PowerShell):
`Get-WinEvent -LogName Security | Where-Object { $_.Message -match “4776” -and $_.TimeCreated -gt (Get-Date).AddHours(-2) }` (4776 = credential validation failure – brute‑force indicator)
AI model on Linux:
Train an isolation forest on normal Modbus function code sequences:
from sklearn.ensemble import IsolationForest X = feature matrix of [src_ip_entropy, command_freq, inter_arrival_time] model = IsolationForest(contamination=0.01) model.fit(X_train) anomalies = model.predict(X_test) -1 = malicious
Prediction integration: Deploy as a cron job that re‑trains daily using new pcap data.
- Securing Remote Access to HVDC Substations (VPN Jump Hosts)
OT remote maintenance for HVDC terminals (like Mahendragarh) often relies on VPNs. Weak VPN configurations can expose internal protection relays.
Step‑by‑step hardening (Linux as VPN gateway):
- Move SSH to a non‑standard port and use ed25519 keys only:
`sudo nano /etc/ssh/sshd_config` →Port 2222,PubkeyAuthentication yes, `PasswordAuthentication no` - Install `fail2ban` to block brute force:
`sudo apt install fail2ban` → configure `/etc/fail2ban/jail.local`:
[bash] enabled = true port = 2222 maxretry = 3 bantime = 3600
- On Windows Server (VPN role): Use PowerShell to restrict RDP access to specific AD groups:
`Set-NetFirewallRule -DisplayGroup “Remote Desktop” -RemoteAddress 10.10.0.0/16 -Action Allow`
Additional control: Deploy a jumphost with `tmate` (shared terminal) + audit logging; every command is recorded to immutable AWS S3 bucket.
What Undercode Say:
- Key Takeaway 1: Digitalization of HVDC asset management (SAP PM/MM) without proper API security and network segmentation turns operational excellence into operational vulnerability. The same SAP systems that streamline O&M can become the attacker’s gateway to issuing trip commands.
- Key Takeaway 2: Most HVDC protection protocols (IEC 61850, Modbus) lack native encryption and authentication. Adani’s focus on grid stability must incorporate IEC 62351 security extensions and continuous traffic anomaly detection using open‑source tools like Wireshark and Python ML pipelines.
Analysis: The promotion of a leader like Abhishek Singh highlights the energy sector’s reliance on digitalized, interconnected control systems. While the post celebrates his expertise in HVDC and digitalization, it omits any mention of cyber resilience. Real‑world incidents (e.g., Ukraine grid hack, 2015) show that attackers target exactly these systems—using spear‑phishing to reach SAP workstations, then pivoting to protection relays. The commands and techniques above empower defenders to mimic adversary behavior and harden their own HVDC environments. Training courses (e.g., ICS410, GIAC GICSP) should be mandatory for all transmission O&M staff.
Prediction:
Within the next 18 months, a state‑sponsored group will successfully compromise an HVDC terminal’s protection system by exploiting an unpatched API in a cloud‑based asset management platform similar to SAP PM. The attack will not cause a blackout but will force regulators to mandate real‑time protocol authentication (IEC 62351) and prohibit direct IT/OT cloud integration without hardware air gaps. Consequently, operators like Adani Energy Solutions will accelerate adoption of AI‑driven anomaly detection on substation LANs and shift to “zero trust” for all HVDC remote access, using short‑lived certificates and continuous device posture checks.
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IT/Security Reporter URL:
Reported By: Abhisheksingh Adanienergysolutions – Hackers Feeds
Extra Hub: Undercode MoN
Basic Verification: Pass ✅
