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Introduction:
The March 11th incident known as the “Stryker attack” exposed a critical flaw in modern endpoint management: a single compromised administrative account was leveraged to remotely wipe approximately 80,000 devices across 79 countries using Microsoft Intune. This event underscores a dangerous architectural reality where privileged access controls and approval workflows for destructive actions are often absent, allowing attackers to utilize legitimate tools as weapons without deploying malware or exploits.
Learning Objectives:
- Understand the architectural gaps that enable mass device wipes via Intune using compromised admin accounts.
- Learn how to implement multi-admin approval (MAA) and Privileged Identity Management (PIM) to prevent similar attacks.
- Identify configuration and monitoring strategies to harden Intune environments against identity-based threats.
You Should Know:
- The Architecture of Destruction: Why Intune Became a Weapon
The attack relied on a core design flaw: the conflation of administrative privilege with everyday identity. In many organizations, the same account used for email and daily work also holds Global Administrator or Intune Administrator roles. When that account is compromised—via phishing, password spray, or session token theft—attackers inherit the keys to the kingdom.
In this incident, the adversary logged into Intune as the compromised admin, navigated to the “Devices” blade, selected all managed endpoints, and issued a “Wipe” command. Because no secondary approval was required for destructive actions, Intune executed the command across 80,000 devices simultaneously.
Step‑by‑step guide explaining what this does and how to use it:
The following steps simulate how an attacker would execute a mass wipe if permissions are misconfigured. This is for educational purposes only and should be tested in a lab environment.
- Access Intune Portal: Navigate to `https://intune.microsoft.com` and sign in with a compromised Global Administrator or Intune Administrator account.
- Navigate to Devices: Click on Devices > All devices.
- Select Targets: Use the filter to select “All devices” or a specific group (e.g.,
groupID: all_devices). - Execute Wipe: Click the … (More) button, select Wipe, and confirm the action.
– Command Equivalent (Graph API):
POST https://graph.microsoft.com/v1.0/deviceManagement/managedDevices/{deviceId}/wipe
Content-Type: application/json
Authorization: Bearer {compromised_token}
{
"keepEnrollmentData": false,
"keepUserData": false
}
– To wipe all devices, an attacker would iterate through device IDs using a PowerShell script:
Connect-MgGraph -Scopes "DeviceManagementManagedDevices.ReadWrite.All"
$devices = Get-MgDeviceManagementManagedDevice
foreach ($device in $devices) {
Invoke-MgWipeDeviceManagementManagedDevice -ManagedDeviceId $device.Id
}
2. Closing the Gap: Implementing Multi-Admin Approval (MAA)
CISA’s post-incident guidance emphasizes multi-admin approval for destructive Intune actions. MAA requires a second administrator to approve any wipe or retire command before Intune executes it. This creates a “two-person rule” that neutralizes a single compromised account.
Step‑by‑step guide explaining what this does and how to use it:
Configuring MAA in Microsoft Intune:
- Prerequisites: Ensure you have at least two Global Administrators or Intune Service Administrators in your tenant.
2. Enable MAA:
- Navigate to Tenant administration > Roles > Multi-admin approval.
- Toggle Enable multi-admin approval for wipe and retire actions to On.
3. Configure Rules:
- Set the Approval request timeout (default 7 days).
- Define which roles require approval (e.g., Intune Administrator, Global Administrator).
4. Testing the Policy:
- As an admin, attempt to wipe a device.
- You will receive a notification that the request is pending approval.
- A second admin must navigate to Tenant administration > Multi-admin approval > Pending requests and approve the action.
Windows/Linux Monitoring:
To detect unauthorized attempts, audit the Microsoft Graph API logs:
– In Azure AD, go to Monitoring > Audit logs.
– Filter for `Activity: “Wipe device”` or "Retire device".
– Look for `”Result: Failure”` with `”Reason: Multi-admin approval required”` to detect unauthorized wipe attempts.
- Privileged Identity Management (PIM) as a Preventative Layer
Before MAA was implemented in many organizations, the attacker had persistent, always-on administrative privileges. PIM mitigates this by enforcing just-in-time (JIT) access. Admins only activate a role for a limited time, and activation can require approval. In the Stryker case, if the compromised account had no standing privileges, the attacker would have been forced to request activation—triggering alerts and delays.
Step‑by‑step guide explaining what this does and how to use it:
Configuring PIM for Intune Administrators:
- Navigate to Azure AD Privileged Identity Management: Go to `https://portal.azure.com/view/Microsoft_AAD_PIM/`.
- Manage Roles: Select Azure AD roles > Roles.
- Assign Eligibility: Find Intune Administrator. Change assignments from “Active” to “Eligible” for all users.
4. Configure Activation Settings:
- Set activation duration to a maximum of 8 hours.
- Require Azure AD Multi-Factor Authentication (MFA) on activation.
- Require approval from a designated approver.
- Audit Activation: Monitor PIM audit logs for unexpected role activations, especially outside business hours.
4. Conditional Access and Token Theft Mitigation
The attack vector likely involved token theft, where an adversary stole a valid session token after phishing. Conditional Access policies can mitigate this by enforcing device compliance and session controls, even after a token is stolen.
Step‑by‑step guide explaining what this does and how to use it:
Implementing a Conditional Access policy to block token replay:
1. Create a new policy: In Azure AD Conditional Access, create a policy named “Block Token Replay for Admins”.
2. Assignments: Include all admin roles (Global Admin, Intune Admin, etc.). Exclude emergency break-glass accounts.
3. Cloud Apps: Include Microsoft Intune and Microsoft Intune Enrollment.
4. Conditions: Under Session, enable Use app enforced restrictions and Sign-in frequency set to “Every time”.
5. Grant Controls: Require compliant device or hybrid Azure AD joined device.
– This ensures that even if an attacker steals a token, they cannot use it from an unmanaged device.
- Mitigating with Defender for Endpoint and Intune Integration
Post-incident, organizations can leverage Microsoft Defender for Endpoint (MDE) to monitor Intune administrative activity and respond automatically. MDE’s advanced hunting can identify when a wipe command is issued from a risky location or unusual IP.
Step‑by‑step guide explaining what this does and how to use it:
Using KQL (Kusto Query Language) in Defender for Endpoint to hunt for mass wipe events:
1. Navigate to Microsoft 365 Defender > Advanced hunting.
2. Run the following query to detect wipe commands from new or anomalous IPs:
CloudAppEvents | where Timestamp > ago(7d) | where Application == "Microsoft Intune" | where ActionType == "Wipe device" | join kind=inner (IdentityLogonEvents | where Timestamp > ago(7d) | summarize FirstSeenIP = arg_min(Timestamp, IPAddress) by AccountUpn) on $left.AccountUpn == $right.AccountUpn | where IPAddress != FirstSeenIP | project Timestamp, AccountUpn, DeviceName, IPAddress, ActionType
3. Set up an automated investigation and response (AIR) rule to automatically disable the user account if more than 10 wipe actions are initiated in 5 minutes.
What Undercode Say:
- Identity is the new perimeter: The Stryker attack proves that an organization’s entire device fleet can be destroyed without a single line of malware code if identity controls are weak.
- Architecture over tools: Relying on Intune’s default settings is insufficient. Administrators must actively redesign roles using PIM and enforce multi-admin approval for destructive actions as a baseline security control.
- The blast radius of standing privileges: Permanent admin access is a liability. Implementing JIT access and requiring MFA at every privileged step significantly reduces the attack surface.
Prediction:
We will see a surge in regulatory requirements mandating “break-glass” approval workflows for mass-scale administrative actions in SaaS platforms. The Stryker incident will likely catalyze Microsoft to make multi-admin approval a default, unbypassable feature for all tenants handling sensitive data, similar to how MFA is now enforced by default. Future attacks will shift from exploiting code vulnerabilities to abusing legitimate administrative interfaces, making identity governance and approval workflows the most critical security battleground of the next decade.
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