From Red Bull Cans to Critical CVEs: How One Bug Bounty Researcher Hacked a Global Energy Drink VDP + Video

Listen to this Post

Featured Image

Introduction:

In an era where even energy drink companies run massive digital infrastructures, the gap between “thank you” and “thank you, here is $50,000” is often defined by a single HTTP request. A recent disclosure by Adarsh Shetty, an Application Security engineer at Take-Two Interactive, revealed a critical vulnerability submitted to Red Bull’s Vulnerability Disclosure Program (VDP) hosted on Intigriti. While the reward was six trays of Red Bull rather than an F1 paddock pass, the technical implication is clear: corporate attack surfaces are expanding, and the difference between a patched system and a compromised domain often lies in the hands of independent researchers. This article dissects the technical workflows, tooling, and offensive security methodologies required to replicate such findings, moving beyond the meme-worthy swag into the actual command-line operations that uncover critical flaws.

Learning Objectives:

  • Understand how to leverage Intigriti and other VDP platforms for responsible disclosure and reward maximization.
  • Execute reconnaissance, endpoint discovery, and parameter tampering techniques using both Linux and Windows native tooling.
  • Identify and exploit common web application vulnerabilities (IDOR, SSTI, SQLi) that frequently appear in “critical” bug bounty reports.
  • Implement secure coding headers and API hardening measures to prevent the exact issues researchers find.
  • Analyze the ROI of VDP participation versus full-scope Bug Bounty programs.

You Should Know:

1. Passive Reconnaissance: Harvesting Red Bull’s Digital Foothold

Before a single payload is sent, researchers map the target’s external footprint. Red Bull, like most enterprises, utilizes subdomains for regional campaigns (e.g., promo.redbull.com, academy.redbull.com) and legacy staging environments.

Step‑by‑step guide:

On Linux (Kali/Parrot):

 Install Assetfinder and Amass
go install github.com/tomnomnom/assetfinder@latest
go install -v github.com/OWASP/Amass/v3/...@master

Enumerate subdomains
assetfinder --subs-only redbull.com | tee redbull_subs.txt
amass enum -d redbull.com -o amass_redbull.txt

Probe for live hosts using HTTPX
cat redbull_subs.txt | httpx -silent -status-code -title -tech-detect | tee live_hosts.txt

On Windows (PowerShell) :

 Basic DNS enumeration without third-party tools
$domains = "redbull.com","redbullracing.com"
foreach ($d in $domains) {Resolve-DnsName -Name $d -Type A}
 Use CertUtil to download Aquatone if preferred

What this does: This builds a target list of live applications. Legacy endpoints often lack WAF configurations, making them prime candidates for parameter-based attacks.

2. IDOR Hunting: The Six-Tray Vulnerability Pattern

Adarsh’s finding was likely an Insecure Direct Object Reference (IDOR)—an API endpoint that leaked user data or allowed unauthorized modifications. IDOR is the king of “critical” VDP reports due to its direct impact and ease of reproduction.

Step‑by‑step guide:

Intercept traffic using Burp Suite or ZAP.

  1. Authenticate to a target application (e.g., Red Bull Reward Portal).
  2. Navigate to a feature referencing a numeric ID: /api/v1/user/profile/12345.

3. Send the request to Repeater (Ctrl+R).

4. Modify the ID: `/api/v1/user/profile/12346`.

  1. If data from a different user is returned, you have an IDOR.

Linux command-line alternative (cURL):

curl -X GET https://api.redbull.com/user/orders/12345 -H "Authorization: Bearer <token>" -v
 Change ID
curl -X GET https://api.redbull.com/user/orders/12346 -H "Authorization: Bearer <token>" -v

Mitigation: Implement random GUIDs instead of integers and enforce object-level authorization checks on the backend.

3. Server-Side Template Injection (SSTI) Recon

Given Red Bull’s heavy use of marketing microsites, SSTI vulnerabilities are plausible. Attackers inject template syntax into user-supplied fields (e.g., profile names, support forms).

Detection payloads (Polyglot):

${{<%[%'"}}%\

If the application throws a 500 error or alters the response structure, SSTI is suspected.

Fingerprinting the engine:

  • Jinja2 (Python): `{{77}}` returns `49`
    – Twig (PHP): `{{77}}` returns `49`
    – Freemarker (Java): `${77}` returns `49`
    – Velocity: `set($a=77)$a` returns `49`

Linux command:

ffuf -u https://promo.redbull.com/FUZZ -w ssti_payloads.txt -mr "49" -ac

Windows PowerShell equivalent:

$payloads = @("{{77}}", "{{7'7'}}")
foreach ($p in $payloads) { Invoke-WebRequest -Uri "https://promo.redbull.com/$p" }

Why this matters: SSTI often leads to Remote Code Execution (RCE), escalating a VDP report from “medium” to “critical.”

4. API Security Misconfigurations: BOLA and Mass Assignment

Modern Red Bull applications are API-driven. Bug bounty hunters frequently exploit Broken Object Level Authorization (BOLA) and Mass Assignment flaws.

Example discovery workflow:

  1. Capture an API call updating user details: `PATCH /api/user`

Body: `{“email”:”[email protected]”}`

2. Add an unexpected parameter: `{“email”:”[email protected]”, “role”:”admin”, “isVerified”:true}`

  1. If the application accepts the new parameters, the API is vulnerable to Mass Assignment.

Tooling configuration:

Arjun (parameter discovery):

arjun -u https://api.redbull.com/v2/user/update --headers "Authorization: Bearer <token>"

Nuclei template for BOLA detection:

id: bola-idor

info:
name: BOLA/IDOR Detection
severity: high

requests:
- raw:
- |
GET /api/resource/1 HTTP/1.1
Host: {{Hostname}}
- |
GET /api/resource/2 HTTP/1.1
Host: {{Hostname}}
req-condition: true
matchers:
- type: dsl
dsl:
- "status_code_1 == 200 && status_code_2 == 200 && len(body_1) > 100 && len(body_2) > 100 && body_1 != body_2"

5. Cloud Storage Bucket Enumeration

Many VDP reports involve exposed AWS S3 or Azure Blob storage. Red Bull likely uses cloud CDNs for media assets.

Command:

 S3 bucket enumeration
s3scanner scan -bucket redbull-media -enumerate
 Azure blob check
curl -I https://redbullassets.blob.core.windows.net/private/

If `x-ms-error-code: AuthenticationFailed` is absent, the container is public. Data exposure of campaign strategies or user PII yields critical severity.

Hardening command (for defenders):

aws s3api put-public-access-block --bucket redbull-media --public-access-block-configuration BlockPublicAcls=true,IgnorePublicAcls=true,BlockPublicPolicy=true,RestrictPublicBuckets=true
  1. Writing the Report that Gets You Swag (and CVSS: 9.0+)
    Technical exploitation is only half the battle. The Intigriti platform requires clear, reproducible steps.

Step‑by‑step for researchers:

  1. “Critical IDOR in /api/v1/campaign/redeem allows unauthorized code redemption”
  2. Summary: “The endpoint fails to verify ownership of voucher IDs.”

3. Steps:

  • Log in as user A
  • Request `GET /voucher/status/5001`
    – Log in as user B
  • Request same endpoint → user A’s voucher status is visible
  1. Impact: “An attacker can drain active promotional codes before legitimate users redeem them.”
  2. Remediation: “Bind voucher queries to the authenticated session ID.”

What Undercode Say:

  • Key Takeaway 1: Swag is not the goal; leverage is. A “six trays of Red Bull” finding, if weaponized, could have led to account takeovers, financial fraud, or reputational damage. Researchers should always pair exploitability with business impact.
  • Key Takeaway 2: The VDP/Bug Bounty boundary is blurring. Red Bull’s decision to use Intigriti for a VDP—rather than a paid bounty program—signals a shift. Enterprises now expect professional-grade research without a guaranteed payout, placing the onus on researchers to prioritize high-impact, high-likelihood flaws rather than spraying low-signal automation.
  • Analysis: The industry often mocks non-monetary rewards, yet this post generated 90+ reactions and widespread engagement. It validates that recognition within the infosec community—coupled with even symbolic prizes—fuels participation. However, researchers should note that critical vulnerabilities disclosed via VDPs often never appear in CVE databases, meaning the wider community cannot defend against similar attacks. Responsible disclosure must balance corporate courtesy with collective security.

Prediction:

Within the next 12 months, regulatory bodies in the EU and US will begin mandating that private VDPs—particularly those operated by consumer brands exceeding $1B revenue—must publish anonymized security advisories for critical and high-severity reports. This shift will transform “silent patching” into a compliance requirement, forcing companies like Red Bull to either allocate public bug bounty budgets or expose their security debt through mandatory disclosure registers. The era of paying in soft drinks for hard vulnerabilities is ending; the F1 ticket will soon be the baseline.

▶️ Related Video (72% Match):

🎯Let’s Practice For Free:

IT/Security Reporter URL:

Reported By: Adarshshettyy Bugbounty – Hackers Feeds
Extra Hub: Undercode MoN
Basic Verification: Pass ✅

🔐JOIN OUR CYBER WORLD [ CVE News • HackMonitor • UndercodeNews ]

💬 Whatsapp | 💬 Telegram

📢 Follow UndercodeTesting & Stay Tuned:

𝕏 formerly Twitter 🐦 | @ Threads | 🔗 Linkedin | 🦋BlueSky