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Introduction:
In an era where wearable technology collects our most intimate health and location data, security researcher Moritz Abrell’s investigation into the COROS PACE 3 sports watch reveals a disturbing truth: convenience often trumps security. The research, detailed in a presentation and technical blogs, uncovers critical Bluetooth Low Energy (BLE) and firmware vulnerabilities that allow an attacker within wireless range to hijack the device without any user interaction. This case study is not just about one watch; it’s a stark lesson in the systemic risks posed by insecure IoT device design and implementation.
Learning Objectives:
- Understand the critical security implications of BLE connections that operate without mandatory pairing or bonding.
- Learn the practical methods for analyzing BLE communication and firmware to identify real-world vulnerabilities.
- Identify defensive strategies and testing methodologies to secure wearable and IoT devices against similar attacks.
You Should Know:
- The Unsecured BLE Gateway: Remote Access Without Consent
The core vulnerability lies in the COROS PACE 3’s implementation of its BLE connection. Unlike secure Bluetooth protocols that require a pairing process to establish a trusted link, this watch accepts connections from any device in its vicinity. This design flaw transforms a personal wearable into an open portal. An attacker can use a simple BLE scanning tool to discover the watch, connect to it, and begin interacting with its services—all while the victim is out for a run, completely unaware.
Step‑by‑step guide explaining what this does and how to use it.
Step 1: Discovery and Enumeration. Use a tool like `gatttool` (Linux) or a BLE scanner app to find the watch. The attacker identifies the target device by its advertised name or services.
Linux Command: `sudo hcitool lescan` – This scans for nearby BLE devices and displays their MAC addresses and names.
Step 2: Service Discovery. Once connected, the attacker enumerates the Generic Attribute Profile (GATT) services the watch offers. These services contain “characteristics” (data points) that can be read or written to.
Linux Command using gatttool: `gatttool -b [bash] –primary` – Connects to the watch and lists its primary GATT services.
Step 3: Exploitation. By writing to specific, unsecured characteristics, the attacker can execute various malicious actions. The research showed that characteristics controlling notifications, settings, and device commands lacked proper authentication.
2. Exploiting the Notification System: Eavesdropping and Injection
The watch’s notification relay feature, which mirrors alerts from a paired smartphone, was found to be critically insecure. Not only could an attacker eavesdrop on incoming messages (SMS, app alerts), but they could also inject fake notifications directly to the watch’s screen. This moves the threat from data theft to active social engineering and harassment, potentially creating fake emergency alerts or misleading messages.
Step‑by‑step guide explaining what this does and how to use it.
Step 1: Identify the Notification Characteristic. Through service enumeration, the attacker locates the GATT characteristic UUID responsible for handling incoming notifications.
Step 2: Enable Notifications. The attacker writes a value to the characteristic’s Client Characteristic Configuration Descriptor (CCCD) to “subscribe” to notification streams from the watch.
Step 3: Read or Inject Data.
Eavesdropping: Once subscribed, the attacking tool automatically receives data whenever a new phone notification is sent to the watch.
Injection: By crafting a packet that mimics the correct data structure and writing it to the same characteristic, the attacker can push a custom notification to the display. A proof-of-concept script would format and send the malicious payload.
3. Account Hijacking via Unsecured Firmware Updates
Perhaps the most severe finding was in the firmware update process. The watch’s companion mobile app would transmit the user’s full COROS account authentication token to the watch via the same unsecured BLE link. An attacker eavesdropping on this communication could steal this token. With it, they could impersonate the victim on COROS’s cloud services, gaining access to the user’s entire activity history, personal information, and potentially the ability to lock the account or manipulate data.
Step‑by‑step guide explaining what this does and how to use it.
Step 1: Sniff BLE Traffic. During the window when a user initiates a firmware update from their phone, the attacker uses a BLE traffic sniffer. Tools like the Ellisys Bluetooth sniffer or Ubertooth can capture the raw data exchange.
Step 2: Analyze the Capture. The captured packets are analyzed in a tool like Wireshark, with a focus on the “ATT” (Attribute Protocol) layer to find write operations containing large blocks of data—the firmware image and the accompanying metadata.
Step 3: Extract the Token. By reverse-engineering the packet structure or looking for patterns, the attacker isolates the account token, which is often a long string of alphanumeric characters. This token can then be used in direct HTTP requests to COROS’s web API.
4. Platform-Specific Risks: The iOS vs. Android Divide
Abrell’s research highlighted a crucial behavioral difference: on iOS, the watch would only communicate with its previously paired iPhone. On Android, however, the watch remained openly discoverable and connectable to any device, significantly widening the attack surface. This disparity underscores how platform-level Bluetooth security policies directly impact end-user risk and shows that Android users of the watch were at greater immediate risk.
Step‑by‑step guide explaining what this does and how to use it.
This is an observation from the research, not a direct exploitation step, but it informs an attacker’s methodology:
Step 1: Target Selection. An attacker in a crowded space would use scanning tools to identify COROS watches. Watches that are actively discoverable are highly likely to be paired with an Android phone.
Step 2: Tailored Exploitation. Knowing the target is likely an Android user, the attacker can proceed with the full suite of connection-based exploits (notification injection, settings changes) described in previous sections, with a high probability of success.
5. Mitigation and Hardening for IoT Developers
The vulnerabilities stem from fundamental design flaws. Proper mitigation requires a defense-in-depth approach starting at the design phase. Key measures include enforcing secure pairing (like LE Secure Connections with numeric comparison), implementing proper authentication and encryption for all sensitive GATT characteristics, and never transmitting sensitive cloud credentials over BLE.
Step‑by‑step guide explaining what this does and how to use it.
For developers and security testers auditing their own BLE devices:
Step 1: Enforce Secure Pairing. Configure the device’s BLE stack to require “MITM Protection” (Man-in-the-Middle protection) for any service that handles personal data. Reject connections that do not establish an encrypted link.
Step 2: Implement Attribute Permissions. For each GATT characteristic, set the correct permissions: `READ` for public data, `WRITE` or `NOTIFY` only with `AUTHENTICATED` and `ENCRYPTED` links. This is done in the device’s firmware code.
Step 3: Use OAuth for Cloud Sync. Instead of sending a static account token, implement a challenge-response protocol or use the smartphone app as a secure proxy to handle all cloud authentication, ensuring long-term credentials never leave the phone.
What Undercode Say:
The Perimeter is Personal. The attack radius for IoT devices is no longer the network edge; it is the physical vicinity of the human user. A device on your wrist can be a direct vector for compromising your entire digital identity.
Convenience is the Killer App for Hackers. Features designed for seamless user experience—like easy connection and background data sync—were the very pathways exploited. Security cannot be an afterthought in the UX design process.
This research is a paradigm-shifting case study in IoT threats. It demonstrates that even devices with limited interfaces are rich targets, as they act as bridges to more valuable systems (like cloud accounts). The technical depth, from RF analysis to firmware reverse-engineering, provides a complete blueprint for both offensive security researchers and defensive product engineers. It conclusively proves that the absence of basic, standard security controls in mass-market consumer electronics creates a tangible and widespread risk to personal privacy and security.
Prediction:
This research will catalyze increased scrutiny from security researchers and regulatory bodies towards the fitness tracker and wearable industry. We can expect a wave of similar findings against other brands as the methodology becomes a standard test case. In the medium term, this will likely lead to the development of stricter industry-wide guidelines or certification requirements for BLE security in consumer health devices. Furthermore, it may fuel the growth of specialized “IoT penetration testing” services and tools, moving these assessments from a niche practice to a standard part of the product development lifecycle for all connected devices.
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Reported By: Saurabh B294b21aa – Hackers Feeds
Extra Hub: Undercode MoN
Basic Verification: Pass ✅
