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When using Palo Alto’s WildFire antivirus solution, detection logs are stored in temporary files at:
`C:\Windows\Temp\PAN[A-Z0-9]{4}.tmp`
These files contain valuable forensic data, including:
- Detection reasons
- Timestamps
- File hash values
This is particularly useful for incident responders who lack direct access to Palo Alto’s XDR console but have deployed their own forensic agents.
You Should Know:
1. Locating WildFire Temp Files (Windows)
Use PowerShell to find and extract detection logs:
Get-ChildItem -Path "C:\Windows\Temp" -Filter "PAN.tmp" | Select-Object FullName, LastWriteTime
2. Analyzing the .tmp File Contents
Open the file in a text editor or use `cat` (Linux/WSL) or `type` (Windows):
type C:\Windows\Temp\PAN1234.tmp
Or in Linux (if analyzing a memory dump or transferred file):
cat PAN1234.tmp | grep -i "malware|detection"
3. Extracting Hashes for Threat Intelligence
Use `Get-FileHash` (PowerShell) or `sha256sum` (Linux) to verify:
Get-FileHash -Algorithm SHA256 C:\Windows\Temp\PAN1234.tmp
Linux alternative:
sha256sum PAN1234.tmp
4. Automating Collection with Velociraptor
As mentioned in the comments, Velociraptor (https://docs.velociraptor.app/) can automate artifact collection:
name: Custom.PaloAltoWildFireDetections description: Collects WildFire detection logs from Windows temp files. parameters: - name: TempFilePath default: C:\Windows\Temp\PAN.tmp sources: - precondition: SELECT OS From info() where OS = 'windows' queries: - SELECT FullPath, Size, Mtime FROM glob(globs=TempFilePath)
5. Monitoring for New Detections (Linux/Windows)
On Linux (if analyzing logs from a Windows dump):
inotifywait -m -e create /mnt/windows_mount/C/Windows/Temp/ | grep "PAN..tmp"
On Windows (real-time monitoring with PowerShell):
$watcher = New-Object System.IO.FileSystemWatcher
$watcher.Path = "C:\Windows\Temp"
$watcher.Filter = "PAN.tmp"
$watcher.EnableRaisingEvents = $true
Register-ObjectEvent $watcher "Created" -Action { Write-Host "New WildFire detection: $($EventArgs.FullPath)" }
What Undercode Say:
Palo Alto’s WildFire storing logs in temporary files is both a forensic opportunity and a security risk. Attackers could delete or manipulate these logs, so organizations should:
– Automate log collection (Velociraptor, SIEM integrations).
– Enable real-time monitoring (Windows Event Forwarding/Sysmon).
– Cross-validate hashes with VirusTotal or MISP.
For red teams, this could be a blind spot—check if logs are wiped post-exploitation.
Expected Output:
- Extracted `.tmp` files with detection details.
- Automated alerts on new detections.
- Centralized logging for incident response.
Prediction:
As XDR solutions evolve, expect more vendors to store forensic artifacts in unconventional locations, requiring IR teams to adapt collection techniques.
(Relevant URL: Velociraptor DFIR)
References:
Reported By: Stephan Berger – Hackers Feeds
Extra Hub: Undercode MoN
Basic Verification: Pass ✅
