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Introduction:
Active Directory (AD) remains the crown jewel of enterprise networks, yet most defenders only discover intrusions hours or days after attackers have extracted password hashes, escalated privileges, or planted backdoors. Traditional SIEM solutions introduce latency, but EVENmonitor—an open‑source, agentless tool—streams Windows Domain Controller security logs in real time directly to your terminal, transforming how blue teams detect DCSync, Kerberoasting, Pass‑the‑Hash, and other common AD attacks at the moment they occur.
Learning Objectives:
- Install and configure EVENmonitor on Kali Linux for real‑time Active Directory monitoring.
- Detect critical attacks (DCSync, AS‑REP Roasting, Password Spraying, Kerberoasting, Pass‑the‑Ticket) using specific Windows Event IDs.
- Analyze attack patterns, isolate compromised accounts, and initiate immediate response actions.
You Should Know:
1. Installing EVENmonitor – Agentless AD Log Streaming
EVENmonitor connects to a Domain Controller via the MS‑EVEN6 RPC interface, requiring only domain credentials with Security log read permissions. It runs on any Linux host (Kali recommended) and decodes raw events into human‑readable alerts.
Step‑by‑step installation (Kali / Debian‑based):
Install pipx if not already available sudo apt update && sudo apt install pipx -y pipx ensurepath Install EVENmonitor directly from GitHub pipx install git+https://github.com/NeffIsBack/EVENmonitor Verify installation EVENmonitor --help
Windows alternative (PowerShell – querying logs manually):
If you cannot install EVENmonitor, you can still hunt events live
Get-WinEvent -FilterHashtable @{LogName='Security'; ID=4662} -MaxEvents 10 | Format-List
To test connectivity to your DC:
EVENmonitor --dc-ip 192.168.1.10 -u administrator -d ignite.local -p 'YourPassword' --list-eventids
2. Detecting DCSync Attacks – Event ID 4662
DCSync abuses the Directory Replication Service to pull password hashes for every domain account, including krbtgt. Attackers often use `netexec` (formerly nxc) or mimikatz. EVENmonitor catches it by watching Event 4662 (access to an Active Directory object) and filtering for the sensitive extended right DS-Replication-Get-Changes-All.
Step‑by‑step detection:
1. Launch EVENmonitor listening only for Event 4662:
EVENmonitor --dc-ip 192.168.1.10 -u administrator -d ignite.local -p 'Ignite@987' --event-id 4662
2. Simulate an attack (from a separate compromised account) using netexec:
nxc smb 192.168.1.10 -u 'shivangi' -p 'Password@1' --ntds
3. EVENmonitor instantly shows:
– `SubjectUserName: shivangi`
– `Properties GUID: 1131f6aa-9c07-11d1-f79f-00c04fc2dcd2` (DS‑Replication‑Get‑Changes‑All)
– Source IP of the attacker
Mitigation: Immediately disable the compromised account and rotate krbtgt password twice.
3. Catching AS‑REP Roasting – Event ID 4768
AS‑REP Roasting targets accounts with “Do not require Kerberos pre‑authentication” enabled. Attackers request a TGT and receive an encrypted hash that can be cracked offline. Event 4768 (Kerberos authentication ticket requested) shows the attack when the “Pre‑authenticated” flag is missing.
Step‑by‑step detection:
1. Monitor Event 4768 across all users:
EVENmonitor --dc-ip 192.168.1.10 -u auditor -d ignite.local -p 'Audit@2025' --event-id 4768
2. Attacker runs:
nxc ldap 192.168.1.10 -u yashika -p '' --asreproast
3. EVENmonitor output reveals `TargetUserName` with `Pre‑authenticated: False`.
- Cross‑reference with `Get-ADUser -Filter “DoesNotRequirePreAuth -eq $true”` in PowerShell.
Remediation: Enable pre‑authentication on all user accounts (except legacy systems), and rotate hashes for any roasted account.
4. Identifying Password Spraying – Event ID 4625
Password spraying tries a few common passwords against many accounts. The hallmark is many Event 4625 (failed logon) records with different `TargetUserName` values from the same source IP, but without account lockouts.
Step‑by‑step detection:
1. Monitor Event 4625 with EVENmonitor:
EVENmonitor --dc-ip 192.168.1.10 -u securityreader -d ignite.local -p 'Read123' --event-id 4625
2. Attacker runs spraying (e.g., nxc smb 192.168.1.10 -u users.txt -p 'Spring2025').
3. Real‑time output shows rapid consecutive failures:
– `Account Name: bob.smith`
– `Source Network Address: 10.0.0.45`
– `Status: 0xC000006D` (bad password)
4. Count occurrences per IP using Linux one‑liner (post‑collection):
EVENmonitor --dc-ip 192.168.1.10 ... --event-id 4625 --output-format json | jq '.SourceNetworkAddress' | sort | uniq -c
Response: Block the offending IP at firewall, enforce password complexity, and enable smart lockout thresholds.
5. Hunting Kerberoasting – Event ID 4769
Kerberoasting requests service tickets (TGS) for accounts with Service Principal Names (SPNs). Attackers extract these tickets and crack them offline. Event 4769 (Kerberos service ticket request) with a `Ticket Options: 0x40810000` (renewable, forwardable) is suspicious, especially when requested by a non‑service account.
Step‑by‑step detection:
- Monitor Event 4769 and filter for suspicious service names:
EVENmonitor --dc-ip 192.168.1.10 -u analyst -d ignite.local -p 'Anal@2026' --event-id 4769
2. Attacker uses `GetUserSPNs.py` or `Rubeus`:
python3 GetUserSPNs.py ignite.local/shivangi:Password@1 -dc-ip 192.168.1.10 -request
3. EVENmonitor decodes:
– `Account Name: shivangi` (requester)
– `Service Name: MSSQLSvc/sql.ignite.local` (target SPN)
– `Ticket Request Count` increases rapidly
4. Correlate with high‑entropy service account passwords.
Hardening: Use group Managed Service Accounts (gMSA) for services, enforce 30‑character random passwords, and monitor for anomalous TGS requests.
- Monitoring Account Lifecycle Abuse – Events 4720, 4726, 4725, 4722
Attackers often create rogue users (4720), delete legitimate accounts (4726), disable accounts (4725), or re‑enable disabled ones (4722) to maintain persistence. EVENmonitor catches these instantly.
Step‑by‑step monitoring for creation & deletion:
Monitor both creation and deletion EVENmonitor --dc-ip 192.168.1.10 -u auditor -d ignite.local -p 'Audit@2025' --event-id 4720,4726,4725,4722
When an attacker creates a user `backdoor_admin` using net user backdoor_admin P@ssw0rd /add /domain, EVENmonitor displays:
– `TargetUserName: backdoor_admin`
– `SubjectUserName: compromised_hr_user`
– `TargetSid` and timestamp.
Best practice: Configure a Windows scheduled task that triggers a webhook or email when these events appear; or pipe EVENmonitor output to `jq` and Slack API.
- Advanced – Authenticating with NTLM Hash & Detecting Pass‑the‑Ticket (Event 4769)
EVENmonitor can authenticate using an NTLM hash instead of a password, which is critical for monitoring during an active breach when plaintext credentials are rotated. Additionally, Pass‑the‑Ticket attacks reuse stolen Kerberos tickets and leave subtle traces in Event 4769 (unusual ticket flags).
Step‑by‑step – using NTLM hash with EVENmonitor:
Obtain hash of a service account (e.g., from LSASS dump) Then authenticate directly EVENmonitor --dc-ip 192.168.1.10 -u svc_monitor -d ignite.local --ntlm 'aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:817e6e2c7f5b7e6a8d9a0c2f3e1b5d7f' --event-id 4769
Detecting Pass‑the‑Ticket:
- Look for Event 4769 where `Ticket Options` include `0x40810000` but the `Account Name` is not a known service account.
- Correlate with `EventData` field `TicketEncryptionType` – RC4_HMAC (0x17) for older tickets may indicate replay.
Windows native command to hunt Pass‑the‑Ticket (post‑fact):
Get-WinEvent -FilterHashtable @{LogName='Security'; ID=4769} | Where-Object {$<em>.Properties[bash].Value -like "0x40810000"} | Select-Object TimeCreated, @{n='Requester';e={$</em>.Properties[bash].Value}}, @{n='Service';e={$_.Properties[bash].Value}}
What Undercode Say:
- Real‑time visibility defeats attacker dwell time – EVENmonitor transforms reactive log analysis into proactive, second‑by‑second intrusion detection, allowing blue teams to isolate compromised accounts before lateral movement begins.
- Event ID mapping is your new cyber weapon – Each of the 12+ attack patterns (DCSync, Kerberoasting, password spraying, etc.) has a unique, unforgeable Windows Event ID. Memorizing these mappings turns any analyst into a threat hunter.
- Agentless and lightweight wins – No need to install proprietary agents on Domain Controllers; EVENmonitor uses native RPC, reducing overhead and avoiding compatibility nightmares, making it ideal for SOC intern training (as noted in the VIEH Group SOC internship).
Prediction:
Within 18 months, AI‑driven log streamers will supersede traditional SIEM correlation rules, ingesting real‑time Event IDs from EVENmonitor‑like tools into large language models that automatically recommend isolation commands, rollback actions, and patch scripts. We will see “real‑time AD defense” become an ISO standard, with open‑source tools democratizing enterprise‑grade monitoring for small teams. Attackers will respond by abusing legitimate admin tools and encrypted channels, forcing defenders to adopt behavioural baselining and memory‑only detection on Domain Controllers themselves. The arms race will shift from “detecting the hack” to “preventing the first abnormal RPC call” – and EVENmonitor is the first step.
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Reported By: Blue Teaming – Hackers Feeds
Extra Hub: Undercode MoN
Basic Verification: Pass ✅
