Blue Team Goldmine: The Ultimate Self-Updating GitHub Repo for SOC, DFIR & Threat Hunting + Video

Listen to this Post

Featured Image

Introduction:

Security operations teams often struggle to maintain up-to-date detection artifacts—indicators of compromise (IOCs), suspicious patterns, and threat intelligence feeds—because manual curation is time-consuming and error-prone. The GitHub repository `mthcht/awesome-lists` addresses this gap by providing an actively maintained, auto-updated collection of detection lists covering everything from ransomware extensions to TOR exit node IPs, making it an indispensable resource for detection engineers and threat hunters.

Learning Objectives:

– Automate the ingestion of continuously refreshed threat detection lists (ports, processes, IPs, file signatures) into SIEM and EDR platforms.
– Implement YARA rules, offensive tool fingerprints, and LOLDriver patterns to identify adversary tradecraft.
– Build custom detection logic using Linux/Windows commands and Sigma rules based on the repository’s structured data.

You Should Know:

1. Cloning and Automating Updates of the Awesome-Lists Repository

This repository is designed for live environments—its lists are updated frequently via GitHub commits and scheduled actions. Below is an extended walkthrough of what the post describes (self-updating detection artifacts) and how to operationalize it.

Step‑by‑step guide to clone and set up auto‑pull:

– Linux/macOS:

git clone https://github.com/mthcht/awesome-lists.git
cd awesome-lists
 Add a cron job to pull updates daily at 2 AM
crontab -e
 Insert: 0 2    cd /path/to/awesome-lists && git pull origin main

– Windows (PowerShell):

git clone https://github.com/mthcht/awesome-lists.git
Set-Location .\awesome-lists
 Create a scheduled task to pull daily
$action = New-ScheduledTaskAction -Execute "git" -Argument "pull origin main" -WorkingDirectory "C:\path\to\awesome-lists"
$trigger = New-ScheduledTaskTrigger -Daily -At 2am
Register-ScheduledTask -TaskName "UpdateAwesomeLists" -Action $action -Trigger $trigger

After cloning, you’ll find folders like `lists/`, `yara/`, and `sigma/`. For real‑time detection engineering, point your log parsers or SIEM collectors to these local files, refreshing them via the scheduled task.

2. Suspicious Ports, Services & Named Pipes – Building Network-Based Alerts

The repository includes `suspicious_ports.txt`, `suspicious_services.txt`, and `suspicious_named_pipes.txt`. Attackers often use non‑standard ports (e.g., 4444 for Meterpreter, 3389 for RDP abuse) or create named pipes for C2 communication (e.g., `\\.\pipe\mojo.5688.8052.`). Use these lists to hunt in netstat output or Windows event logs.

Step‑by‑step guide for detection:

– Linux: Compare current listening ports against the suspicious list.

 Download the list (or use local copy)
curl -s https://raw.githubusercontent.com/mthcht/awesome-lists/main/lists/suspicious_ports.txt | grep -v '^' > /tmp/susp_ports.txt
ss -tulnp | awk '{print $5}' | cut -d: -f2 | sort -u | grep -f /tmp/susp_ports.txt

– Windows PowerShell: Hunt for suspicious named pipes from Sysmon Event ID 17 or 18.

$suspPipes = Get-Content "C:\path\to\awesome-lists\lists\suspicious_named_pipes.txt"
Get-WinEvent -FilterHashtable @{LogName='Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational'; ID=17} | ForEach-Object {
$pipe = $_.Properties[bash].Value
if ($suspPipes -contains $pipe) { Write-Output "Alert: $pipe" }
}

– SIEM Rule (Sigma example):

title: Suspicious Named Pipe Creation
detection:
selection:
EventID: 17
PipeName|contains: 'suspicious_patterns'
condition: selection

Integrate these lists into your SOAR playbooks to automatically enrich alerts.

3. Offensive & Greyware Tool Detection Patterns – Stopping Living‑off‑the‑Land

The repo’s `offensive_tools.txt` and `greyware_tools.txt` contain process names, file hashes, and command-line artifacts for tools like Mimikatz, Cobalt Strike, BloodHound, and PowerShell Empire. For example, `mimikatz.exe` or the presence of `sekurlsa::logonpasswords` in event logs.

Step‑by‑step guide for endpoint detection:

– Linux (auditd): Monitor for execution of known offensive binaries.

 Extract tool names from the list and generate auditd rules
grep -v '^' offensive_tools.txt | while read tool; do
auditctl -w /usr/bin/$tool -p x -k offensive_tool
done

– Windows (Sysmon + EventLog): Create a PowerShell script that checks running processes against the list.

$tools = Get-Content "C:\awesome-lists\lists\offensive_tools.txt"
Get-Process | Where-Object { $tools -contains $_.ProcessName } | 
Select-Object ProcessName, Id, StartTime | Export-Csv -Path offensive_alerts.csv

– EDR Query (KQL for Microsoft Sentinel):

DeviceProcessEvents
| where ProcessName has_any (dynamic(["mimikatz.exe", "sharpview.exe", "beacon.exe"]))
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, ProcessName, InitiatingProcessCommandLine

For greyware (e.g., PSExec, Certutil), combine with command-line arguments like `certutil -urlcache -f`.

4. Ransomware File Extensions & Ransom Note Names – Fast Triage

Ransomware leaves distinctive traces: appended extensions (`.encrypted`, `.locky`, `.crypt`) and note files (`READ_ME.txt`, `DECRYPT.html`). The repo provides `ransomware_extensions.txt` and `ransomware_notes.txt`, updated continuously. Use them to build file integrity monitoring (FIM) alerts.

Step‑by‑step guide for real‑time detection:

– Linux (inotify): Monitor critical directories for new files with suspicious extensions.

 Install inotify-tools and watch /var/www/html
inotifywait -m /var/www/html -e create -e moved_to --format '%f' | while read newfile; do
ext="${newfile.}"
if grep -Fxq "$ext" /path/to/awesome-lists/lists/ransomware_extensions.txt; then
echo "Ransomware extension detected: $newfile" | wall
fi
done

– Windows (PowerShell FileSystemWatcher):

$watcher = New-Object System.IO.FileSystemWatcher
$watcher.Path = "C:\Users\Public"
$watcher.IncludeSubdirectories = $true
$extList = Get-Content ".\ransomware_extensions.txt"
Register-ObjectEvent $watcher "Created" -Action {
$ext = [System.IO.Path]::GetExtension($Event.SourceEventArgs.FullPath).TrimStart('.')
if ($extList -contains $ext) {
Write-Warning "Potential ransomware file: $($Event.SourceEventArgs.FullPath)"
}
}

– Hunting for ransom notes: Use `grep -r -f ransom_notes.txt /` on Linux (careful with performance) or `Get-ChildItem -Recurse -Include @(‘README.txt’,’DECRYPT.html’)` on Windows.

5. VPN/Proxy/TOR Node IP Lists – Automating Malicious IP Feed Ingestion

The repository contains auto‑updated IP lists for VPN providers, public proxies, and TOR exit nodes. These are critical for enriching firewall logs and web proxy logs. Because they refresh automatically, your blocklists never go stale.

Step‑by‑step guide for integration into a Linux firewall (iptables/nftables):
– Download and convert:

wget https://raw.githubusercontent.com/mthcht/awesome-lists/main/lists/tor_exit_nodes.txt
wget https://raw.githubusercontent.com/mthcht/awesome-lists/main/lists/vpn_proxy_ips.txt
cat tor_exit_nodes.txt vpn_proxy_ips.txt | sort -u > malicious_ips.txt

– Create an ipset (persistent):

ipset create malicious_ip_set hash:net
while read ip; do
ipset add malicious_ip_set $ip
done < malicious_ips.txt
iptables -I INPUT -m set --match-set malicious_ip_set src -j DROP

– Windows (Netsh or PowerShell with Windows Defender Firewall):

$ips = Get-Content ".\vpn_proxy_ips.txt"
foreach ($ip in $ips) {
netsh advfirewall firewall add rule name="BlockMaliciousIP_$ip" dir=in action=block remoteip=$ip
}

For cloud environments (AWS Security Groups, Azure NSGs), use Terraform or CLI scripts to sync these lists periodically.

6. YARA Rules & Threat Hunting Keywords – Proactive Memory and Disk Scanning

The repository includes a `yara/` folder with rules for detecting malware families (e.g., Cobalt Strike beacons, REvil ransomware strings) and `threat_hunting_keywords.txt` for log analysis. YARA rules should be run against running processes, files, or memory dumps.

Step‑by‑step YARA scanning on Linux:

– Install yara:

sudo apt install yara -y
git clone https://github.com/mthcht/awesome-lists.git
cd awesome-lists/yara

– Scan a running process (e.g., PID 1234):

sudo yara -w -r ./ -p 1234

– Scan all processes (using `/proc`):

for pid in $(ls /proc | grep -E '^[0-9]+$'); do
sudo yara -w -r ./ -p $pid 2>/dev/null
done

– Windows (using yara64.exe):

yara64.exe -w -r C:\awesome-lists\yara\ C:\Windows\System32\

For threat hunting keywords (e.g., “Invoke-Mimikatz”, “AmsiBypass”, “schtasks /create”), create a Splunk query:

index=windows EventCode=4688 CommandLine="Invoke-Mimikatz" OR CommandLine="AmsiBypass" OR CommandLine="schtasks /create /tn "

Use `grep -E -f threat_hunting_keywords.txt /var/log/syslog` on Linux.

7. Microsoft App IDs for BEC Detection – Email & OAuth Monitoring

The list `microsoft_app_ids.txt` contains OAuth application IDs abused for business email compromise (BEC), such as malicious consent phishing apps. Monitoring Azure AD sign-in logs for these IDs can block unauthorized access.

Step‑by‑step guide using Azure CLI and PowerShell:

– Azure CLI (query sign-in logs for specific app IDs):

az login
app_ids=$(cat microsoft_app_ids.txt | tr '\n' ' ')
az monitor activity-log list --query "[?contains(properties.resourceId, '/applications/') && contains('$app_ids', properties.resourceId)]" -o table

– PowerShell (Microsoft Graph):

Connect-MgGraph -Scopes "AuditLog.Read.All"
$appIds = Get-Content ".\microsoft_app_ids.txt"
$filter = "clientAppId eq '" + ($appIds -join "' or clientAppId eq '") + "'"
Get-MgAuditLogSignIn -Filter $filter

– Sentinel KQL:

AADSignInEventsBeta
| where AppId in~ (dynamic(["abused-app-id-1", "abused-app-id-2"]))
| project Timestamp, UserPrincipalName, AppDisplayName, IPAddress

Add this to a scheduled query to automatically revoke any compromised OAuth grants.

What Undercode Say:

– Key Takeaway 1: The true power of `awesome-lists` lies not in static reference but in its automated update mechanism—treat it as a live intelligence feed, not a one‑time download.
– Key Takeaway 2: Combining multiple list types (e.g., ransomware extensions + suspicious ports + YARA rules) creates overlapping detection layers that dramatically reduce false positives in SOC environments.

Analysis: The repository bridges the gap between theoretical detection engineering and operational reality by providing machine‑readable, version‑controlled artifacts. Unlike commercial threat feeds that may cost thousands, this open‑source approach democratizes access to quality IOCs. However, analysts must still contextualize the lists—blindly blocking all TOR exit nodes could break legitimate services, and checking every process against offensive tool names might flag benign tools with similar names. The recommended workflow is to start in a “log‑only” mode, tune thresholds based on your environment, then move to automated alerting. The inclusion of MITRE ATT&CK mappings (implied by LOLDrivers and greyware lists) further aids in creating detection analytics mapped to specific tactics like Defense Evasion (T1218) or Credential Access (T1003).

Prediction:

– +1 Increased adoption of community‑driven detection lists will force commercial vendors to lower prices and improve transparency, making high‑fidelity detection accessible to small and medium blue teams.
– -1 Over‑reliance on automated IP blocklists from this repo may lead to false positives and service disruptions for organizations that legitimately use VPNs or TOR for business research, requiring careful exception management.
– +1 The repository’s YARA rules and Sigma templates will accelerate the creation of AI‑assisted detection pipelines, where LLMs parse these lists to generate custom hunting queries in natural language.

▶️ Related Video (80% Match):

🎯Let’s Practice For Free:

🎓 Live Courses & Certifications:

[Join Undercode Academy for Verified Certifications](https://undercode.co.uk/certifications/)

🚀 Request a Custom Project:

Secure, high-velocity infrastructure and disruptive technological engineering. Contact our engineering team for high-tier development and proprietary systems:
[[email protected]](mailto:[email protected])
💎 Smart Architecture | 🛡️ Secure by Design | ⭐ Trusted by Thousands

IT/Security Reporter URL:

Reported By: [Syed Muneeb](https://www.linkedin.com/posts/syed-muneeb-shah-4b5424266_cybersecurity-soc-dfir-share-7469752046640963585-mrN1/) – Hackers Feeds
Extra Hub: Undercode MoN
Basic Verification: Pass ✅

🔐JOIN OUR CYBER WORLD [ CVE News • HackMonitor • UndercodeNews ]

[💬 Whatsapp](https://undercode.help/whatsapp) | [💬 Telegram](https://t.me/UndercodeCommunity)

📢 Follow UndercodeTesting & Stay Tuned:

[𝕏 formerly Twitter 🐦](https://x.com/undercodeupdate) | [@ Threads](https://www.threads.net/@undercodetesting) | [🔗 Linkedin](https://www.linkedin.com/company/undercodetesting/) | [🦋BlueSky](https://bsky.app/profile/undercode.bsky.social)