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New research from Censys identified that nearly 400 web-based Human Machine Interfaces (HMIs) connected to U.S. water facilities were exposed online as of last October. The discovery was made using TLS certificate analysis and further validated through automated screenshot capture.
Censys alerted the US Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and the software vendor to enable a coordinated response. Within nine days, 24% of the systems had been secured, rising to 58% in the following weeks. As of last month, fewer than 6% remain exposed in either read-only or unauthenticated configurations.
Source: About 400 exposed web-based US water facility interfaces
You Should Know:
- How to Detect Exposed HMIs Using TLS Certificate Analysis
– Use Censys or Shodan to scan for exposed industrial control systems (ICS):
shodan search 'http.title:"HMI" port:80,443 country:US' censys search 'services.tls.certificates.parsed.names: "water-facility.com"'
- Nmap for identifying open HMI ports:
nmap -p 80,443,502,44818 --script vulners <target_IP>
2. Securing Exposed Web-Based HMIs
- Disable default credentials and enforce multi-factor authentication (MFA):
Example: Changing default passwords on Linux-based HMIs sudo passwd admin
Restrict access using firewalls (UFW/IPtables):
sudo ufw allow from 192.168.1.0/24 to any port 443 sudo iptables -A INPUT -p tcp --dport 502 -j DROP Block Modbus (common in HMIs)
Enable HTTPS-only access (avoid HTTP):
Using Let’s Encrypt for TLS sudo certbot --nginx -d hmi.yourdomain.com
3. Automated Screenshot Validation for Exposed Systems
- Use EyeWitness or Webscreenshot to verify exposure:
python3 EyeWitness.py -f urls.txt --web webscreenshot -i targets.txt -o screenshots/
4. Monitoring for Unauthenticated Access
Fail2Ban to block brute-force attempts:
sudo fail2ban-client set sshd banip <attacker_IP>
Log analysis with ELK Stack:
grep "authentication failed" /var/log/auth.log | awk '{print $1,$2,$3,$9,$10}'
What Undercode Say:
The exposure of critical water facility HMIs highlights systemic weaknesses in industrial cybersecurity. Attackers could exploit these interfaces to manipulate water treatment processes, leading to physical damage or public health risks.
Critical Commands for ICS Security:
- Detecting SCADA/HMI vulnerabilities:
metasploit-framework -q -x 'use auxiliary/scanner/scada/modbus_find; set RHOSTS <target>; run'
Windows-based HMI hardening:
Set-NetFirewallProfile -Profile Domain,Public,Private -Enabled True Disable-WindowsOptionalFeature -Online -FeatureName SMB1Protocol
Linux-based ICS monitoring:
sudo auditctl -w /etc/scada/config -p wa -k scada_changes
Remediation is possible, but proactive security is key.
Prediction:
- Ransomware groups (like LockBit 3.0) may target exposed water facility HMIs in 2025.
- AI-driven scanning tools will increase detection of exposed critical infrastructure.
Expected Output:
- Secured HMIs with TLS, MFA, and restricted access.
- Continuous monitoring for unauthorized access.
- Reduced attack surface in critical infrastructure.
Source: Industrial Cyber Report
IT/Security Reporter URL:
Reported By: Anna Ribeiro – Hackers Feeds
Extra Hub: Undercode MoN
Basic Verification: Pass ✅
