How APT41 Turned Google Calendar into a C2 Channel

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The Chinese hacking group APT41 (linked to the I-SOON leaks) has developed a new malware called TOUGHPROGRESS, which hijacks Google Calendar to establish a command-and-control (C2) channel. This technique allows attackers to hide malicious communications behind a trusted cloud service, making detection harder.

Infection Chain Overview

  1. Spear-Phishing Email: Victims receive an email with a link to a ZIP archive hosted on a compromised government site.

2. Malicious Payload: The ZIP contains:

  • A LNK file disguised as a PDF.
  • 6.jpg – Encrypted payload.
  • 7.jpg – A fake image file (actually a DLL named PlusDrop).

3. Execution:

  • Clicking the LNK opens a decoy PDF.
  • PlusDrop decrypts and executes the payload in memory.

4. Malware Stages:

  • PlusInject: Injects into svchost.exe via process hollowing.
  • ToughProgress: Uses Google Calendar events to receive commands and exfiltrate data.

You Should Know: Detection & Mitigation

1. Detecting Suspicious Calendar Activity

  • Google Workspace Logs: Check for unusual calendar events with encoded commands.
    grep -i "calendar.google.com" /var/log/google-workspace/logs.json | jq '. | select(.event_type == "CREATE_EVENT")'
    
  • YARA Rule for Memory Analysis (Detect ToughProgress):
    rule APT41_ToughProgress {
    meta:
    description = "Detects ToughProgress malware in memory"
    strings:
    $c2 = "calendar.google.com/event" ascii wide
    $cmd = "cmd /c" ascii wide
    condition:
    any of them
    }
    

2. Blocking Malicious LNK Files

  • Windows Defender ASR Rule:
    Set-MpPreference -AttackSurfaceReductionRules_Ids "BE9BA2D9-53EA-4CDC-84E5-9B1EEEE46550" -AttackSurfaceReductionRules_Actions Enabled
    
  • Sysmon Configuration (Log LNK Execution):
    <RuleGroup name="LNK Execution Monitoring">
    <ProcessCreate onmatch="include">
    <CommandLine condition="contains">.lnk</CommandLine>
    </ProcessCreate>
    </RuleGroup>
    

3. Hunting for Process Hollowing (svchost.exe Abuse)

  • Volatility (Memory Forensics):
    volatility -f memory.dump --profile=Win10x64 pslist | grep svchost
    volatility -f memory.dump --profile=Win10x64 malfind -p <PID_of_svchost>
    

4. Disabling Google Calendar API Abuse

  • Restrict API Access:
    gcloud services disable calendar-json.googleapis.com --project=YOUR_PROJECT_ID
    
  • Monitor OAuth Tokens:
    gcloud logging read "protoPayload.authenticationInfo.principalEmail= AND protoPayload.methodName=google.calendar.v3.events.import"
    

What Undercode Say

APT41 continues to innovate by weaponizing legitimate cloud services (Google Drive, Sheets, now Calendar). Defenders must:
– Monitor memory execution (fileless malware).
– Restrict API permissions.
– Use behavioral detection (unusual svchost.exe activity).

Expected Output

  • Detection Alerts: Unusual Google Calendar API calls.
  • Forensic Artifacts: Malicious LNK files, suspicious DLLs.
  • Mitigation: Disable unnecessary API access, enforce ASR rules.

Prediction

APT41 will likely escalate abuse of other cloud services (e.g., Slack, Trello) for C2. Zero-trust policies and memory forensics will be critical.

Relevant URLs:

IT/Security Reporter URL:

Reported By: Piveteau Pierre – Hackers Feeds
Extra Hub: Undercode MoN
Basic Verification: Pass ✅

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