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The Chinese hacking group APT41 (linked to the I-SOON leaks) has developed a new malware called TOUGHPROGRESS, which hijacks Google Calendar to establish a command-and-control (C2) channel. This technique allows attackers to hide malicious communications behind a trusted cloud service, making detection harder.
Infection Chain Overview
- Spear-Phishing Email: Victims receive an email with a link to a ZIP archive hosted on a compromised government site.
2. Malicious Payload: The ZIP contains:
- A LNK file disguised as a PDF.
- 6.jpg – Encrypted payload.
- 7.jpg – A fake image file (actually a DLL named PlusDrop).
3. Execution:
- Clicking the LNK opens a decoy PDF.
- PlusDrop decrypts and executes the payload in memory.
4. Malware Stages:
- PlusInject: Injects into svchost.exe via process hollowing.
- ToughProgress: Uses Google Calendar events to receive commands and exfiltrate data.
You Should Know: Detection & Mitigation
1. Detecting Suspicious Calendar Activity
- Google Workspace Logs: Check for unusual calendar events with encoded commands.
grep -i "calendar.google.com" /var/log/google-workspace/logs.json | jq '. | select(.event_type == "CREATE_EVENT")'
- YARA Rule for Memory Analysis (Detect ToughProgress):
rule APT41_ToughProgress { meta: description = "Detects ToughProgress malware in memory" strings: $c2 = "calendar.google.com/event" ascii wide $cmd = "cmd /c" ascii wide condition: any of them }
2. Blocking Malicious LNK Files
- Windows Defender ASR Rule:
Set-MpPreference -AttackSurfaceReductionRules_Ids "BE9BA2D9-53EA-4CDC-84E5-9B1EEEE46550" -AttackSurfaceReductionRules_Actions Enabled
- Sysmon Configuration (Log LNK Execution):
<RuleGroup name="LNK Execution Monitoring"> <ProcessCreate onmatch="include"> <CommandLine condition="contains">.lnk</CommandLine> </ProcessCreate> </RuleGroup>
3. Hunting for Process Hollowing (svchost.exe Abuse)
- Volatility (Memory Forensics):
volatility -f memory.dump --profile=Win10x64 pslist | grep svchost volatility -f memory.dump --profile=Win10x64 malfind -p <PID_of_svchost>
4. Disabling Google Calendar API Abuse
- Restrict API Access:
gcloud services disable calendar-json.googleapis.com --project=YOUR_PROJECT_ID
- Monitor OAuth Tokens:
gcloud logging read "protoPayload.authenticationInfo.principalEmail= AND protoPayload.methodName=google.calendar.v3.events.import"
What Undercode Say
APT41 continues to innovate by weaponizing legitimate cloud services (Google Drive, Sheets, now Calendar). Defenders must:
– Monitor memory execution (fileless malware).
– Restrict API permissions.
– Use behavioral detection (unusual svchost.exe activity).
Expected Output
- Detection Alerts: Unusual Google Calendar API calls.
- Forensic Artifacts: Malicious LNK files, suspicious DLLs.
- Mitigation: Disable unnecessary API access, enforce ASR rules.
Prediction
APT41 will likely escalate abuse of other cloud services (e.g., Slack, Trello) for C2. Zero-trust policies and memory forensics will be critical.
Relevant URLs:
IT/Security Reporter URL:
Reported By: Piveteau Pierre – Hackers Feeds
Extra Hub: Undercode MoN
Basic Verification: Pass ✅