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Introduction
Account deletion vulnerabilities, such as the one highlighted in the HackerOne bug report, allow unauthorized users to delete accountsâincluding high-privilege roles like CEOsâwithout permission. Such flaws expose critical gaps in authorization controls and can lead to reputational damage, data loss, or operational disruption. This article dissects the technical mechanics behind these vulnerabilities and provides actionable mitigation strategies.
Learning Objectives
- Understand how improper access controls enable account deletion exploits.
- Learn to test for and patch authorization flaws in web applications.
- Implement secure coding practices to prevent privilege escalation.
1. Testing for IDOR in Account Deletion Endpoints
Command:
curl -X DELETE 'https://example.com/api/users/123' -H 'Cookie: session=attacker_token'
Step-by-Step Guide:
- Intercept a legitimate account deletion request (e.g., using Burp Suite).
- Replace the user ID in the URL or body with a high-privilege account (e.g.,
CEO_ID
). - If the request succeeds, the app is vulnerable to Insecure Direct Object Reference (IDOR).
2. Mitigating IDOR with Role-Based Checks
Code Snippet (Node.js):
app.delete('/api/users/:id', (req, res) => { if (req.user.id !== req.params.id && !req.user.isAdmin) { return res.status(403).send('Unauthorized'); } // Proceed with deletion });
Explanation:
- Verify the requesting user owns the account or has admin rights before processing deletion.
3. Windows: Auditing Account Deletion Events
Command:
Get-EventLog -LogName Security -InstanceId 4725 -After (Get-Date).AddDays(-1)
Purpose:
- Lists account deletion events in the last 24 hours (Event ID
4725
).
4. Linux: Restricting `userdel` Privileges
Command:
sudo visudo
Add:
%developers ALL=(root) NOPASSWD: /usr/sbin/userdel, !/usr/sbin/userdel admin
Effect:
- Allows developers to delete standard users but blocks deletion of admin accounts.
- API Security: Enforce UUIDs Over Incremental IDs
Code Snippet (Python/Flask):
from uuid import UUID @app.route('/delete_user/<user_uuid>', methods=['DELETE']) def delete_user(user_uuid): try: UUID(user_uuid, version=4) Validate UUID format except ValueError: abort(400)
Why?
- UUIDs make IDOR attacks harder to guess than sequential IDs.
- Cloud Hardening: AWS IAM Policy to Limit Account Deletion
Policy Example:
{ "Version": "2012-10-17", "Statement": [{ "Effect": "Deny", "Action": "iam:DeleteUser", "Resource": "arn:aws:iam:::user/admin" }] }
Impact:
- Prevents deletion of IAM users with `admin` in their name.
7. Vulnerability Mitigation: HackerOneâs Response
Process:
- Bug Triage: Classify reports as P1 for critical auth flaws.
- Patch Timeline: Fix within 24 hours for high-risk vulnerabilities.
3. Bounty: Reward researchers even for internal duplicates.
What Undercode Say
Key Takeaways:
- Authorization Over Authentication: Authentication alone wonât stop IDORâalways validate permissions.
- Assume Breach: Log all deletion attempts and alert on anomalous patterns (e.g., mass deletions).
Analysis:
The HackerOne case underscores systemic issues in bug bounty programs: delayed triage, undervalued reports, and inconsistent payouts. While platforms incentivize crowdsourced security, enterprises must streamline response workflows. Future exploits will likely target hybrid cloud environments, where fragmented IAM policies exacerbate authorization risks. Proactive measuresâlike mandatory UUIDs and real-time auditingâwill define next-gen defense strategies.
Prediction:
By 2025, AI-driven static analysis tools will auto-detect 80% of IDOR flaws during development, reducing post-deployment exploits. However, human oversight remains vital to catch logic gaps automated tools miss.
IT/Security Reporter URL:
Reported By: R3dw4n 48m3d – Hackers Feeds
Extra Hub: Undercode MoN
Basic Verification: Pass â